As Syria watches, Lebanon changes

  Rime Allaf

The passion seems to have gone out of the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, and the intermittent sparks that flare every now and then hardly cause a ripple. Moreover, for the moment neither side seems to care about rekindling the flame. Or so it seems.

On the Syrian side, no matter which way one looks at it, there is a definite sense of "Lebanon fatigue" overtaking official and popular circles, rendered lethargic by the avalanche of accusations coming their way courtesy of the March 14 movement and their allies. For several years every single crime, assassination, strike, parliamentarian deadlock, economic slump or political stalemate was blamed solely on "Syria". No Lebanese politician or leader, apparently, might have had any role to play in any such bad, negative or destructive incidents--no Lebanese party, that is, apart from Hizballah and other "pro-Syrian" parties, of course.

Even events in Syria itself, such as the assassination of Hizballah official Imad Mughniyeh in the middle of Damascus were seen by several Lebanese experts (who don't seem to read self-congratulatory pieces in Israeli newspapers) as being the work of a Syrian regime that apparently had a long list of reasons for wanting to commit such an action.

According to this simplistic discourse, Lebanon had become a simple case of us versus them, of pro-democracy versus pro-Syria, of life-loving versus death-glorifying. In other words, it translated into March 14 versus all those who opposed it, including Syria and its allies. These, consequently, had to be shunned and punished for their long list of alleged crimes, their flouting of Security Council resolutions (a point on which Israel always agrees without a hint of irony) and their ultimate agenda to come back to Lebanon by hook or by crook.

However, an increasing number of observers, analysts and governments around the world were not convinced that this was true--or, at least, that this was the only truth--and began to communicate with Damascus again over Lebanon and over issues bigger than Lebanon. With this, they earned themselves the ire of the March 14 movement and their Saudi-owned media supporters, and became the new target of incredible contempt.

Thus, the presidents of France and Russia and the foreign minister of Spain, to name but a few recent recipients of indignant reprimands, have been unwisely criticized, to the point of ridicule, for basically not conducting their respective countries' affairs around the agenda of the March 14 movement. They are being lectured as if they were adolescents who embarked on a stormy affair without having considered the consequences, harassed for daring to make high profile official visits and being seen in public together and scolded for not understanding that Syria's only interest is escaping isolation.

Most of these critics have not noticed that the so-called isolation had never been a serious hindrance, that Syria was never really entirely "out" of Lebanon (although it borders on the pathetic to imagine that Syrian commandos this week "invaded" and "occupied" Lebanon through Tripoli), and that the likelihood of UNSC Resolution 1559 being implemented (or of the UN's international tribunal being invested) was small and depended on a lot more than meets the eye.

The agitation of the last few years, and especially the last few months following the showdown with Hizballah in Beirut, seems to have come full circle with the apparent crisis within March 14 itself. In recent days and weeks, key figures of the majority are sending out signals, presumably to Damascus, about potential changes in their position, and making open overtures to parties they had hitherto blamed for most of Lebanon's ills. Walid Jumblatt's recent statements, for instance, are indicators of serious problems within March 14 and of a possible timid nod toward Damascus (even when accounting for his legendary habit to effect a swift volte-face whenever his position becomes untenable).

No matter how its media supporters spin it, there is no escaping the fact that March 14 is nowhere near achieving its goals (declared or undeclared), and that a variety of issues and troublemakers (not least of which the sectarian clashes in Tripoli, a fire on which Hariri's media continues to throw fuel) will continue to immobilize the reconciliation process that was imposed on all factions last May in Doha. The adjournment of the dialogue for seven weeks--until November 5, one day after the Americans will have elected their next president--speaks volumes about the involvement, for good or bad, of players other than Syria. Even the visit of the Lebanese president to Washington D.C., just before Tehran, is failing to excite most people as they wait for things to heat up again, probably before the May election circus begins in earnest.

It is perhaps a sign of the maturity of the Syrian regime that its schadenfreude is not being paraded (indeed, Syrian official reactions have practically reached a point of indifference) and that official statements have so far remained civil, indicating that all Lebanese leaders were welcome in Damascus. Perhaps it is easy to play the dignified, more mature partner in this relationship while moving in more prestigious circles and mixing with leaders who have real political weight around the world. Indeed, with an increasing number of friends in high places, there are no longer any signs of Syria's obsession with maintaining an ostentatious presence in Lebanon or even of continuing to micro-manage the affairs of its allies. For the time being, the Syrian leadership seems confident that Lebanese factions are more than capable by themselves of ruining any chance for real independence, while the bigger issues on the table (including the status of Hizballah) are left simmering on the back burner.

Unfortunately for March 14, there is no escaping the fact that plus ça change, plus c'est la meme chose.- Published 18/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at London's Chatham House.