Arab peace or Durban war?

  Gerald M. Steinberg

The recently concluded Durban Review Conference held in Geneva was in many ways the opposite of the 2001 United Nations World Conference on Racism. The 2001 version marked the revival of the soft war to demonize Israel and Jewish sovereignty. The governmental part of the conference adopted a text that singled out Israel for condemnation--the only country to be specifically mentioned. The United States and Israel walked out in protest, but the Europeans stayed, providing overall legitimacy.

In contrast, the preparations and pressures that preceded Durban II, including decisions by ten countries against attending, meant that this follow-up meeting was largely neutralized before it began. For Israel, this was an important political success in which common sense overcame the obsessive anti-Zionist rhetoric characteristic of many human rights frameworks.

Although Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's speech and the resulting protests provided the dominant images, these were anti-climactic. Following the original Durban conference, Israeli officials and leaders of Jewish organizations started preparations to prevent similar defeats. Shortly after Libya and Iran were selected as the chairs for Durban II (reflecting the power of the Islamic bloc in the UN), Canada pulled out, citing the anti-Semitic nature of the first conference.

Later, as sections of the draft text were tabled that sought to extend the demonization of 2001, Israel and then the US--led by President Barack Obama--followed Canada. Italy was the fourth country to pull out, raising the fear of a full withdrawal by Europe and a delegitimized conference. Responsibility for the draft document was suddenly transferred from the Libyan chair to a UN official, who removed attacks against Israel and clauses designed to curtail free speech and protect Islam from criticism. But this was too late, and others withdrew.

A more significant difference between the two conferences was in the non-governmental organization sphere. In 2001, a forum of 1,500 NGOs featured attacks against Jewish participants, anti-Semitic slurs, marches under the "Zionism is racism" banner and a declaration that used terms like apartheid and allegations of war crimes. The declaration, which also called for a strategy of boycotts and court actions against Israeli officials ("lawfare"), was rejected by UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson but served as the blueprint for NGO activity that followed.

In contrast, many of these NGOs were absent in the 2009 conference and those that did participate were largely ineffective. UN officials decided against another NGO Forum, while the Ford Foundation and the Canadian government, which had paid for much of the 2001 NGO Forum, refused funding this time. NGO superpowers such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International kept a very low profile in Geneva and the "civil society forum" and "Israel review conference" were sparsely attended. In the UN sessions, a small number of NGOs with European-government funding were present, such as Badil, which continued to promote "right of return" claims that negate a viable two-state solution.

In parallel, over 20 Jewish NGOs, in alliances with groups representing victims from Darfur, Rwanda, Iran, Tibet, India and elsewhere also held side events. These activities reflected a determination not to allow a repetition of the one-sided 2001 scenario on the streets or in the official proceedings and to restore the universal moral foundation of human rights in place of the attacks on Israel. This was clearly a very different conference from the 2001 event.

At the end, UN officials such as Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay tried to portray the review conference a success, but this was hardly convincing. Ahmadinezhad's performance reinforced the image of a circus atmosphere, far from the sobering discussion of combating racism that the UN had sought to promote. As a result, the prospect of yet another Durban conference is unlikely to gain much support.

Instead, narrative wars using the language of human rights and international law will be fought in mini-Durbans such as the meetings of the UN Human Rights Council. President Obama has announced that the US would return to these sessions, after the Bush administration condemned this framework as counterproductive. But if discussion of main human rights abuses continues to be vetoed by the various governments, and Israel again becomes the obsessive focus, with the participation of the NGO network, the American return is likely to be short-lived.

The resulting damage goes beyond undermining the moral foundations of human rights and has a direct impact on the prospects for the Arab Peace Initiative and a two-state solution. The demonization of Zionism and Israel, particularly through terms such as "apartheid", is entirely incompatible with mutual acceptance and recognition of legitimacy. Such terms, when used by Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian and other Arab officials in the preparatory conferences for Durban II or in other frameworks and boycott campaigns, suggest that the API is not serious. To demonstrate that the long period of de-legitimization has ended, the language of the Durban strategy must disappear.- Published 7/5/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Gerald M. Steinberg is the founder and president of NGO Monitor and professor of political science at Bar Ilan University.