Is a US-Israel clash inevitable under Netanyahu?

  George Giacaman

It was not surprising that the Netanyahu government decided to take a confrontational approach with the US on the question of stopping all building in the settlements. Three reasons account for this: first, there was no actual pressure on the government of Israel other than verbal requests, even if public and seemingly firm. Second, there may be room for "bargaining" to keep at least "natural growth" possible, however it is defined, especially if defined in a way that may keep the present governing coalition intact, a process that is underway. Third, support among pro-Israel lobbies in the US for the present government of Israel has by no means disappeared.

The Obama administration has so far succeeded in isolating the question of the settlements from general support for Israel, as Netanyahu discovered while meeting with members of the US Congress during his first trip to the US after he became prime minister. Even ardent supporters of Israel in Congress were not sympathetic on this issue. But it remains to be seen if Congress will remain silent if actual and tangible pressure is exercised, a red line that most US presidents were not willing to cross in the past.

Only George Bush senior dared cross this line, threatening to withdraw loan guarantees for the state of Israel during the Shamir government just before the Madrid conference of October 1991. Some believe that this was one reason why he lost his bid for a second term.

In the next few months, we will witness a process of maneuvering and an attempt to dilute all the requests of the Obama administration, a process that may well continue into next year. This was evident in all the conditions placed by Netanyahu in his speech in mid-June that have to attend before mentioning the word "state" in relation to Palestinians. It was obvious to all and sundry that what he had in mind was something like the present situation, a form of "self government" for the Palestinian Authority, shorn of sovereignty but nevertheless to be called a state if Palestinians so prefer.

This is the basic challenge facing the Obama administration as well as Palestinians and Arabs, who will also be asked to begin a process of normalization with Israel in conjunction with any progress achieved in the political process if it takes off at all. It is a challenge, but also a responsibility because any possible settlement that does not carry credibility among Palestinians as well as the Arab public will simply ensure that the seeds of conflict remain in place to be re-ignited in the not too distant future.

Freezing all settlement construction is the first test of the credibility and resolve of the Obama administration. In principle, Arab states can also help since several are needed by the US administration given its problems in the region and the economic crisis. The key question is: do they have the political will? Some Arab leaders tried to impress upon the new US administration the need for a determined effort to resolve the conflict. But these efforts, while necessary, are not enough given that states' policies are determined by the balance of concrete interests and not merely by advice, no matter how pressing or sound.

For the PA, this is a critical watershed, possibly the last stage in its life given that Palestinians never entertained the idea that the final outcome of the "peace process" was for the PA to function merely as a large municipality to administer the affairs of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. And after nearly 18 years of "negotiations" since the Madrid conference, the PA cannot endure an additional endless process without result. Its credibility is at stake as is the legitimacy of its continued existence. At various junctures in the past few years following the failure of negotiations, there were public calls for the dissolution of the PA. Such calls will no doubt come back with any future failure.

With the Netanyahu government prospects are not propitious to say the least. And it pains one to contemplate the price of failure: an open-ended conflict that will keep the region boiling. Such is the responsibility that the Obama administration carries. The question is: does it have the political muscle and the political will?- Published 16/7/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

George Giacaman teaches at Birzeit University and contributes political analysis to Arab and international media.