Understanding the dilemma

  Michel Nehme

Lebanon's new unity government is unified in name only. Deep divisions between rival parties, especially regarding the issue of Hizballah's arsenal of weapons, remain unresolved. Observers of Lebanese politics assert that the cabinet deal came as a result of Syrian and Saudi efforts, with Iranian-Turkish help, and is based on a recommendation to leave all divisive issues stalemated.

Thus this alleged unity government is at best ceremonial. One force on the ground, Hizballah, which refused to disarm regardless of who won the parliamentary elections, will essentially dictate the workings of the new cabinet in coordination with and exploitation of the Amal movement and coalition partner Michel Aoun. Thus far, Hizballah has managed to get what it wants; nothing can happen without its consent.

Though Hizballah and its allies were defeated in last June's general election, this new government was formed following more than four months of tough negotiations where the Hizballah-led opposition proved to have the upper hand regarding the distribution of portfolios and the choice of ministers. Abiding by Saudi-Syrian directives, the 30-member cabinet is composed of 15 seats for Saad Hariri and his coalition, 10 for Hizballah's camp and five for President Michel Suleiman's appointees. This is a government of contradictions that mirrors all of the country's complexities and woes. The rival ministers will be at each other's throats in each cabinet session and more Saudi-Syrian intervention to pacify them will be continuously necessary.

Druze minority leader Walid Jumblat, who spearheaded the anti-Syrian movement within the March 14 forces, has now shifted away from the Hariri political trend to argue that Syrian influence in Lebanon is permissible. He wants his son Taymour and the Druze minority to cease involvement in the conflict between the March 8 and 14 forces, arguing that the confrontation is not between Muslims and Christians but rather between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims. This, after his Progressive Socialist Party had to compromise repeatedly to reduce Shi'ite-Druze tension and to limit the repercussions of the May 7, 2008 events when Shi'ites and Druze came into direct military confrontation.

Both Jumblat and Suleiman Franjieh, the pro-Syrian leader of a Christian faction, are thus now shifting alliances. This is producing a whole new balance of power in the polarized Lebanese political arena, a tendency that is weakening Hariri's coalition and ultimately will compel him to become more dependent on the regional support of the Saudis.

The major point of contention between the two camps in Lebanon--for reasons more local than regional--has been Hizballah's weapons, an issue starkly highlighted in May 2008 when the militant group staged a spectacular takeover of mainly Muslim West Beirut and attacked the Druze in their mountain redoubt. All anti-Syrian factions in Lebanon live in a state of anxiety that a repeat of these events is possible unless the new government addresses the fundamental divisions among the rival parties.

Thus the efforts of the new cabinet will be fruitless unless it works to consolidate national consensus. This will be hard to achieve. Lebanon is de-facto sitting on a powder keg. Whether we like it or not, Iran's nuclear ambitions, the Arab-Israel conflict and the bloodshed in Iraq all render it a regional battleground.

Al-Qaeda's brand of Sunni militancy has taken root in Lebanon in recent years, feeding upon Sunni-Shi'ite hatred and the insurgency in Iraq where dozens, maybe hundreds of young Lebanese and Palestinian Sunnis have fought the Shi'ite government and American and British troops and returned home inspired by their experiences. It was a more than usually turbulent Lebanon that greeted the expanded UNIFIL in southern Lebanon in 2006, when the devastating month-long war between Hizballah and Israel ended only to be followed by deep political crisis between Sunnis and Shi'ites.

When one addresses these United Nations peacekeepers, one quickly learns that their principal force protection concern has little to do with Lebanon's Hizballah guerrillas, Israeli aerial provocations or indeed potential ill-feeling on the part of the local population. Rather, it is al-Qaeda possibly taking advantage of the presence of nearly 10,000 foreign, mainly western, troops in Lebanon's Deep South that gives them pause.

Meanwhile Hizballah, whose stock has soared in the Sunni Arab and Islamic world due to the potential military threat it poses, has been developing a new and innovative fighting strategy based on new weapons acquisitions to compensate for the autonomy it lost in the border area with Israel. The intricate network of bunkers, firing positions, tunnels, arms depots and observation posts that Hizballah held in the South has been replaced by new systems that can meet the same objectives. The deployment of a strengthened UNIFIL and, more crucially, of 15,000 Lebanese troops south of the Litani River, has not made it politically or practically difficult for Hizballah to rebuild its pre-war strength.

In addition to trepidation lest the al-Qaeda brand of Sunni militancy try to undermine the state system, a core problem of the new cabinet is the belief that Israel and the United States assume that any military action they launch against Iran's nuclear program would draw a muscular response from Hizballah. Correspondingly, Hizballah believes that any move against Tehran would require a move first against its capability to disrupt life in northern Israel with its rockets. Confronted with this sort of dilemma, what could Lebanon's so-called new unity government do?- Published 19/11/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Prof. Michel Nehme is director of University International Affairs, Notre Dame University, Lebanon.