The Syrian role

  Ferry Biederman

Rare is the occasion on which the anti-Syrian camp in Lebanon agrees with the government in Damascus. But even though the western-backed March 14 bloc's Saad Hariri is heading his first government and even though the anti-Syrian parliamentary majority tries to put the best face on it, many of its people feel that the outcome of the arduous cabinet formation is a triumph for Damascus. And the Syrians are not hiding their satisfaction either.

Undoubtedly the make-up of the government, denying the parliamentary majority an outright majority of cabinet seats, is the most direct reason for this shared assessment. But given Lebanon's notoriously and serially ineffective governments and the country's many other, sectarian, regional and political checks and balances, the actual make up of any cabinet cannot be a reason for much sentiment either way. In any case, some of the ministers who hold the balance in the new cabinet, chosen by president Michel Suleiman, can be counted on to support Hariri.

Both sides are rather looking at a complex and delicate set of signals and developments in the country, the region and the world from which they draw the same conclusions. And if these do not play out in the most optimistic way possible, the chances for peace and stability in Lebanon in the coming four years look bleak. Hariri actually did not strike a bad deal on the face of it. But all depends on the willingness of the minority, and specifically the Hizballah movement, to let him govern. That dependency was exactly what he had initially vowed to avoid.

In Damascus some may point out that the cabinet negotiations finally meant Saudi Arabian recognition of Syria's role in Lebanon and a new status quo. Syria has given the impression that it has now "allowed" the cabinet formation in Lebanon to proceed and it will expect something in return, just as it received the gift of relative detente after the Doha accords in 2008. The expected quid pro quo is more American rapprochement and possibly US blessing for progress on the Israeli-Syrian peace front. Apart from Lebanon, Damascus feels that it has other aces up its sleeve to force this, particularly its ability to influence events in Iraq.

Syria has much to gain economically if it is allowed to reintegrate into the region and the world, see an end to US sanctions, attract investment and trade more easily. But that may not be the real focus of its diplomatic drive. It now almost seems as if the Syrian government sees an opportunity to have its cake and eat it. For years, received wisdom among many observers in the region was that if Damascus wanted the Golan Heights back and a detente with the West, it would have to give up on Lebanon and it would have to loosen control at home. This was never a deal that the powers that be were going to take and it seems now they feel that they don't have to; they can do better.

One indication is that Syria is finally managing to turn the humiliation of leaving Lebanon in 2005 to its advantage. It does not have to be physically present in the country to demonstrate to all the players there and abroad that it still plays a considerable role. This was one of the purposes of the maneuvering surrounding the cabinet formation. Both Lebanese and Syrians acknowledge that the pre-2005 situation will not be restored, but as far as Damascus is concerned it does not have to be. Better to disavow responsibility for Lebanon while still exerting broad political and military influence through Hizballah.

It is a way of at least reducing the role Lebanon will play in negotiations over the Golan with Israel, if not take it completely off the table as an issue. Talk of disarming Hizballah or cutting off its supplies is fanciful anyway and maybe Damascus calculates that the Israelis will realize this and move on. This is all assuming that Syria and the Israelis are not merely interested in negotiations for negotiations' sake.

What this means for Lebanon is that it is once again subject to the machinations of regional and global players, although this does not absolve the local politicians from the original sin of allowing this to be so. Hariri's bet for the immediate future is on stability. If he succeeds in serving out his full term without war or internal conflict, it would be a real breakthrough even if he achieves nothing else. Not only would it be positive for the economic development of the country, it could also in itself strengthen the state and its institutions and improve his own political position. This would come at the expense of the parliamentary minority, mainly Hizballah, and of Syria's influence over the affairs of the country. The minority could therefore benefit from disrupting Hariri's rule politically, and if needed otherwise. It would not face much more of a backlash than it suffered over the fighting in May 2008.

Certainly in the absence of an Israeli-Syrian deal, the latter scenario looks the most likely and all regional and global players know it. Other contingencies are possible, the Iranian situation may play a role, but this seems the basic equation. It is a bleak one because it is still unlikely that Israel or the US will deal with Syria on its conditions, leaving it the Hizballah and probably also the Hamas and Iraq cards.- Published 19/11/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ferry Biedermann is a Beirut-based journalist.