A government in the shadow of Hizballah

  Nizar Abdel-Kader

The warm welcome given the new Lebanese government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the support expressed by international and regional powers will not make it any easier for it to tackle the many controversial issues it faces. The new government is concentrating on drafting a policy statement that is expected to be ratified prior to Independence Day on November 22 and political parties of all stripes seem to have decided to postpone tackling contentious issues, including Hizballah's weapons, in the upcoming National Dialogue sessions. Nevertheless, the main bone of contention remains Hizballah's weapons.

International concern over Hizballah's weapons was reflected in a White House statement that praised the formation of the Lebanese government after more than four months of political deadlock. In its statement, the White House also called on the government to implement UN Security Council resolutions that called for dismantling all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

Hariri sought to form a "unity government" as a step to overcome the country's deep sectarian divisions and avoid a repetition of last year's scenario that nearly brought Lebanon to the brink of a new civil war. However, given all the major differences between the March 8 and the March 14 ministers over both Hizballah's weapons and economic issues, the cabinet will yet again serve as a platform for contentious debate and will, consequently, have a very slim chance of doing any better than the previous government of Fouad Siniora.

In practical terms, there is no real possibility for an agreement to disarm Hizballah ahead of a general settlement to the Arab-Israel conflict--a precondition posited by General Secretary of Hizballah Hassan Nasrallah--something not currently on the horizon. In other words, the Lebanese National Dialogue, the UN Security Council, US pressure on Lebanon or repeated Israeli threats will not make any difference.

Within Lebanon there is no doubt that Hizballah has lost the strategic depth it possessed prior to the July war of 2006, especially within Sunni and Christian communities. However, conserving the "problematic" Lebanese political balance will certainly not serve as an incentive to disarmament, rather the reverse.

The formation of the new government will not solve the domestic roots of the continuing crisis, and the environment of non-cooperative behavior from Lebanon's political elite toward the country's power-sharing arrangements will not cease. The political debate around the negotiations to reach a compromise on the distribution of ministerial portfolios does not indicate any clear movement toward ending the political crisis through reform in the near future. Sooner or later, the opposition will again claim a veto power in the cabinet by trying to express the importance of the Doha agreement as an explanation of the Taif accord. Consequently, the new government and the new parliament are not expected to function any better than the previous ones.

The mistrust between the majority and the opposition will affect the political interplay within the cabinet as well as in society at large, something that will reflect negatively on the government's ability to take any important political, economic or military decisions to improve the present situation. It was seen during the session of the National Dialogue that Hizballah is not ready to reach a compromise with the Lebanese government on the right to declare war and peace. Hizballah instead linked its military role to an Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms area. These discussions have led many political leaders to look at the Hizballah militia as a regional, rather than a Lebanese force. It is believed that Hizballah is acting more as an Iranian and Syrian proxy than as a Lebanese political party, even though it is represented within the parliament and the government.

Briefly, then, democracy has not prevailed and the power of Hizballah's weapons will remain stronger than the public ballot and all state institutions. The risk of more paralysis and the fear of instability and insecurity will not totally vanish with the new government.

Several scenarios could bring the cabinet to a partial or total standstill, the most important ones being a new war erupting between Hizballah and Israel as a consequence of the continuing crisis with Iran; a series of attacks against UNIFIL in South Lebanon to derail its mission in response to international and internal pressures on Hizballah to disarm according to UNSC resolutions 1551 and 1701; or the withdrawal of the opposition ministers from the government in response to challenges posed by the on-going Special Tribunal for Lebanon or by reaching a deadlock on defense strategy within the National Dialogue forum.

No breakthrough is expected to be reached through the new government or through the new National Dialogue. The only hope for any positive developments lies in possible changes in the regional strategic context.- Published 19/11/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper, Beirut.