A changing environment

  Khaled Salih

In October 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan opined that "there is nothing permanent except change. Give Turkey three years, and it will be a totally different country. Whatever happens we are going to change."

In fact, it was in 2009 that Erdogan's government took the initiative to start a process that most probably will bring about major change in Turkey's Kurdish policy. The current government is clearly serious about the desirability and usefulness of a dialogue to bring about such change. One clear element in this on-going process is the realization that in the current climate of mistrust, neither the government nor civil society can contribute to a viable and constructive policy change without creating a new climate based on trust. The discussions and debates of the past few months are designed to create that new environment. Changes in attitude and in the tone of the discussions and debates are already visible both inside and outside Turkey.

Erdogan's government has made clear that the country needs a new, strong and inclusive vision in order to effectively deliver the new initiative. This new vision seems to entail a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue that will increase stability in the country and enhance democratic governance. The government seems to be fully aware of the fact that strengthening liberal democratic legislation, standards and values with also help the country's relationship with the European Union and boost the accession process. If and when this initiative is implemented satisfactorily, we will witness a transformation in which Kurds in Turkey view themselves as citizens rather than subjects.

At this juncture, Turkey appears likely to adopt a combination of democratization and decentralization in which the unitary nature of the Turkish state remains its main characteristic. In this context, a decentralization mechanism will devolve powers to administrative units without recognizing group identities. Centralist state tradition and the fear of breaking up the country will be used to justify such an approach. But the evidence provided by genuinely democratizing countries that are linked to EU mechanisms of regional cooperation will undermine such reasoning. Spain and Greece provide two examples that mitigate against traditional resistance to reforms and democratization based on shallow arguments and the exploitation of fear.

Thus, Turkey can combine democratization and decentralization with the recognition of group identities. Loyalty to the state and its institutions would be based on the notion of democratic citizenship in which shared interests, values and necessity would not only keep the state and its institutions together but strengthen the ties and links for the benefit of all groups in Turkey. References to historical traditions of recognition in the Middle East and the decentralized characteristics of the Ottoman past can serve this purpose. So can contemporary European models such as arrangements in the UK to meet Scottish, Welsh, and Irish national aspirations.

Another possibility is to look closely into the Spanish constitutional revolution of 1978. Spain has become increasingly federal in everything but name. Politicians have recognized the need to integrate democracy and decentralization with recognition of historical nationalities. The 1978 Spanish constitution created a decentralized, democratic political order in Spain that political scientists characterize as "a pluri-national and multilingual state". The most interesting element of developments in Spain is the recognition of the need to build self-government into the fabric of the new polity by recognizing the unity of the nation (or more appropriately the state) as well as the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions. The right to self-government of municipalities, provinces and autonomous communities has in fact strengthened both democracy and stability in Spain through a mechanism and process of differentiation of the country's previously unitary state structure. More than two decades of negotiations and agreements have reinforced self-government and power sharing with the regions, adopting federal arrangements.

Local and regional units' rights to make decisions independent of central government supervision and control have contributed to deepening constitutional democracy in Spain. The political redistribution of power between Madrid and 17 autonomous regions has given the three historic nationalities in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia their own statute of autonomy tailored to their particular situation. In each case, the "central" government and the autonomous regions have a range of exclusive powers but also function jointly in several spheres.

Turkey can also learn from developments in Belgium, although this model might be regarded as too radical a departure from the Turkish state tradition. The Belgian federation (since 1993) is based on three territorially-defined regions (Flemish, Brussels-Capital and Walloon [French]), and three non-territorial language-based communities (Flemish, French and German-speaking). Distribution of exclusive powers is between the federal government and two other kinds of governments: while the three territorially-delineated governments are mainly responsible for regional economic matters, the three non-territorial communities are mainly responsible for linguistic and cultural matters.

Erdogan's democratic/Kurdish initiative could adapt elements of the British, Spanish or Belgian systems into its own restructured and transformed political system. Under liberal democratic conditions this could be achieved without overtly opting for federalization of the country.- Published 10/12/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Khaled Salih is an independent analyst and consultant based in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. He is former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government.