Faking it

  Rime Allaf

Facts have rarely gotten in the Bush administration's way when demonizing a political opponent, even when that opponent has actually tried to accommodate multiple American demands. Accused of enemy complicity in most places where the US or its allies are involved, Syria has nevertheless regularly offered concrete help in the "war on terror" (including in the infamous extraordinary renditions) and in policing and sealing the Iraqi border.

A last minute invitation to Annapolis, in November 2007, was merely a reluctant move by US President George W. Bush to pretend he was serious about reaching a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Under no circumstance should Syria have imagined this meant American pressure would stabilize, or even decrease, especially after the Israeli raid on a mysterious Syrian target in September 2007, which was clearly blessed by Bush.

Seven months after that raid, the US suddenly divulged that Israel had destroyed a nuclear reactor, built with North Korean help, which would have produced enough plutonium for one or two weapons within a year of becoming operational. The allegations were supported by "proof" presented in a series of graphs and photographs of "North Korean faces", nuclear equipment and satellite images of buildings, which were promptly discredited by some experts while used as evidence by others.

The IAEA was understandably outraged that this information was not produced for its inspection, before the Israeli raid and in the months following it. While some have chosen to believe that the current disclosure was meant to pressure North Korea, Bush offered several reasons for this delay. In particular, he explained, the US wanted to prevent confrontation and conflict in the region (raid notwithstanding, apparently) and was concerned that Syria would feel pressured to retaliate against Israel if the nuclear intelligence was made public, a reasoning that is difficult to take seriously. Clearly, the US is somehow convinced that Syria's urge to defend itself has now passed.

Even by the low standards of the Bush administration and its record of manufactured intelligence and fabricated liberations, the allegations about the timing are implausible and have other aims: since his arrival at the White House, Bush has done everything to thwart a potential peace deal between Syria and Israel, regardless of the fluctuating positions of the latter.

Indeed, even when taking into account the invitation to Annapolis, US behavior toward Syria has at least been consistent throughout the tenure of the Bush administration, with political pressure steadily increasing over the years and sanctions imposed. In contrast, Israel's demeanor vis-a-vis Syria has been erratic, sending mixed messages and failing to adopt a solid position.

It is odd that a prime minister raiding a site on enemy ground, supposedly knowing it is a nuclear facility, should praise that same enemy leader ten days later, declaring his respect. It is also strange that a massive war drill should subsequently be choreographed, groundlessly fueling war speculations. At the same time, Israeli officials have repeatedly confirmed that Syria poses no military threat, an acknowledgement that not only lays to rest looming war fears from its side, but also annuls the security factor in the Golan withdrawal equation.

The sudden emergence of peace talk rumors is confusing in the midst of such conflicting messages. Divulged by Syria, uncharacteristically, an initiative by Turkey has put negotiations back on the agenda. Most importantly, Ehud Olmert, the Israeli prime minister, confirmed to his Turkish mediators that Israel would return the entire Golan in exchange for peace with Syria. Normally, such statements are unnecessary, given that UNSC Resolution 242 already obliges Israel to return to its June 4, 1967 position. Furthermore, the Rabin Deposit, since the early 1990s, had already pledged Israel's full withdrawal from occupied Syrian land. In the current regional balance, however, Olmert's unexpected statement would have been music to Syrian ears.

Lest there be too much enthusiasm that an immediate deal is imminent, however, the Syrian president was quick to clarify that this would not be possible before 2009, when a more reasonable US administration, one assumes, is in place. Syria seems to be discounting the possibility of a McCain presidency, or else ignorant of the latter's own visions, and it seems to expect that whoever Bush's successor is, he or she will be a more willing and honest broker. Even if Syria and Israel warm to each other under the matchmaking talents of their common friend Turkey, all parties know that an eventual wedding can only be officiated by an American minister. It would thus be premature to interpret the current messages as signs of seriousness or of a breakthrough.

Damascus has often been accused of wanting to engage for engagement's sake, but its position has not changed over the years as it called repeatedly for a return to negotiations. In contrast, Israel continuously found excuses to procrastinate while claiming it doubted Syria's intentions. Obviously, Israel knows a peace deal means a complete withdrawal from the Golan, to which Israelis seem to have gotten rather attached over the years, and whose return to Syria will cost the latter a lot more than just "peace" according to the blueprints developed in track two talks. Israel is clearly in no hurry to reach this stage, making the timing of Olmert's declaration suspect as well, especially when considering his domestic political struggles and his attempt to avoid "painful concessions" on the Palestinian track.

It seems rather unfortunate that the public acknowledgement of Israel's full withdrawal from the Golan should coincide with the "revelation" of Syria's amazing nuclear capacities. What remains to be determined is whether Bush was helping Olmert retract, whether Olmert was helping Bush attack, or whether both were simply, as usual, simultaneously scratching each other's backs.- Published 1/5/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at London's Chatham House.