The post-9/11 obsession with security casts its shadow over the partnership's political perspectives.
Mediterranean disillusions
Joseph Bahout
In 1995, at the moment of its inception, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona could undoubtedly be seen as an innovative breakthrough in the process of regionalization concerning Europe's southern neighboring area. However, ten years later a critical eye has to acknowledge not only that the framework envisaged then has shown its endogenous limitations and insufficiencies, but that it has become seriously challenged by more aggressive, if not more attractive, models. Anniversaries are also a time for reassessment. The Barcelona ambition has to be recreated, not only if it is to live, but also because change in the south of the Mare nostrum has become a matter of life and death.
Seen from the "southern" side of the Mediterranean, the European project was positively ambitious in its aims and scopes, but quite poorly backed by effective political will and by clear executive tools. This first pitfall has surely more to do with Europe itself. Today's European Union, with its 25 member states, is crippled by bureaucratic weight that translates into diplomatic anemia. Due not only to its internal deliberation procedures, but also because it has to constantly arbitrate among priorities, Brussels' foreign policy is for the time being doomed to remain that of the minimal consensus possible and of the lowest common denominator.
At the structural level, in the course of its ongoing enlargement process, the European idea itself has increasingly lost its original substance, to a point where its mission probably must be formulated once again. This has an inevitable effect on the way Europe perceives the world--whether or not it sees it from a unique and harmonized eye--and on the way it assesses risks and threats as well as stakes. While strategic security and the need to benefit from transatlantic protection are at the top of the agenda of part of Europe, at another level Europe is more concerned with social security, or with the need to contain and control migration inflows. The divide ironically echoes US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's characterization of "old" and "new" Europe, but it surely does have something to do with the conflicting approaches of European partners toward the war in Iraq.
What largely made the Euro-Med project attractive was its articulation of three interrelated levels: a "hard power" political and security level that was supposed to establish a peaceful and stabilized zone; an economic device meant to lead to a free-trade zone of market economies; and a more "soft-power" level that aspired to bridge cultural divides. Assessed ten years later, the Barcelona tripod was far from mutually beneficial. If one may argue that the recurrent setbacks in the Arab-Israel conflict and in the peace process leading to its solution have seriously impeded the first and second levels, one has also to admit that the enormous amounts of financial support granted to "southern" economies have most often ended up fueling the chains of state-led and -protected corruption, and have cynically prolonged the lifeline of otherwise moribund regimes.
Finding itself confined by the US as well as by local actors to the role of "payer not player" in the realm of peace designs, Europe also feels the limitations of its financial power when it comes to political demands, and will probably now have to rediscover the need and use of more balanced carrots and sticks. This is where Europe has to acknowledge another kind of limitation, one pertaining to its partners' political culture: despite and behind the lip service paid to the necessity of boosting an active European diplomacy in order to counterbalance American unilateral policies, Middle Eastern political as well as economic elites are much more attracted--for reasons good or bad--to the lights of Washington, DC, than to the labyrinths of the Brussels bureaucracy.
It would be interesting to reflect one day on the extent to which the conceivers of the Barcelona process took inspiration from another, brilliantly successful European venture, the Helsinki Accords. In a much more difficult international context constrained by the Cold War, and toward a much more rigidly structured regional entity, pro-Soviet Eastern Europe, a younger, more fragile, but also more daring European Union then understood the full range of potential benefits in leveraging economic cooperation in order to attain political flexibility. The idea of a "three basket" device was implemented in a way that led to one of the most crucial developments of the twentieth century.
True, other factors helped in making the Helsinki strategy a winning one, not least of which was the close complicity between Europe and the United States and the spelling out of a clear and unashamed political and strategic goal. On the eve of Barcelona's second decade, it has probably become urgent to revive the original boldness of the Barcelona spirit, that of promoting, nurturing, and defending a common space of shared and acceptable norms and values.- Published 24/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.orgJoseph Bahout is a professor at Sciences-Po Paris, and researcher at Academie Diplomatique Internationale.
Labor migration is not a special concern
an interview with Matyas EorsiBI: What are Central and Eastern Europe's concerns with the Mediterranean region?
Eorsi: First, 9/11. Everybody in this part of the world, all over Central Europe, understands that the Middle East conflict is no longer limited to the Middle East itself. So far, terrorism has not reached Central Europe, it has only targeted the US, London and Madrid, but nobody can tell when someone will decide that the new allies of the United States can become targets.
BI: Are you concerned about friction between Eastern European and North African migrant labor in Western Europe? Have migrant laborers from the Middle East and North Africa reached Hungary?
Eorsi: That is not a special concern for Central Europe. Despite the expectations since we became a full member of the European Union, very few people have left our country to find jobs in Western Europe. There are people from the Mediterranean and beyond who come to Hungary, but primarily as a transit country on their way to the West. Many come from Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and east of the Mediterranean, Iran and Afghanistan. But it's a small-scale problem.
BI: How would you compare the EU's democratization efforts in Central and Eastern Europe over the past 15 years to the Barcelona-based EU democratization effort around the Mediterranean during the past decade?
Eorsi: When the Berlin wall came down it resulted in huge enthusiasm, followed shortly thereafter by a fear as to what to do with these European countries with their terrible economic burden and very bad psychological situation after 50 years of communism. It all happened suddenly, and [produced] a long-term goal of integrating them into the western structure. Because it was the ambition of all Central European countries to become fully integrated into western structures like the Council of Europe, NATO and the EU, it was a necessity for these countries to meet all criteria for membership.
[In contrast,] the Barcelona process did not come as a surprise; it was planned, with a fully different mission. The Euro-Med countries had an association agreement, but not the goal of full membership in the EU. As a consequence, the impact of the EU on the less democratic Mediterranean countries is less successful.
Another difference is that in Central Europe in all our countries we have our extremists, but they are much less violent, or are non-violent, compared to several Mediterranean countries, and much less powerful in terms of public support. Among all the more influential political parties, left, right and center, there is an overwhelming consensus on the mission of these countries to become members of the western structures.
BI: How do the new Eastern European members of the EU address their overall security with respect to the European and American security umbrellas?
Eorsi: There is a general understanding, based on past and recent history, that if our security is endangered, while several EU member countries would still explore further and further diplomatic solutions, we would see only American F-16s taking off from Aviano airbase in Italy. If we recall the war in former Yugoslavia, a recent experience, and WWI and WWII, we say that Europeans are unable to provide military solutions. It was the US that was able to bring peace, and this is a lesson we should all learn.- Published 24/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Matyas Eorsi is deputy leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats in the Hungarian National Assembly, president of the assembly's European Affairs Committee, and president of the Liberal Group in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
What next?
Christian HaneltFor the past 10 years, 35 European and Mediterranean countries have been working together to transform the Mediterranean into a flourishing economic and cultural region. The 25 member states of the European Union and the 10 partners in the southern neighborhood (Turkey, Israel, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and soon perhaps Libya and Mauritania) are dedicated to turning the Mediterranean into a region of peace, prosperity and cooperation. These are ambitious goals, considering the diverse problems in the Mediterranean and the heterogeneity of the Mediterranean states.
Turkey and Europe are affiliated by a customs union and the prospect of accession; with Israel the EU is building a privileged partnership (Israel as a modern industrial nation is not receiving any European development assistance). By contrast, most of the Arab partner countries are facing tremendous challenges: high population growth, unemployment and poverty, as well as limited space for political, public and social engagement. This explains why people from these countries seek a new life and fortune in Europe.
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index has been measuring most of the Arab neighbor countries' deficits in the development of democracy and market economy as well as weaknesses in the management of reform processes. Europe particularly wants to help the Arab countries achieve transformation through trade as well as stabilization through development. It seeks to fill the role of partner rather than mentor.
Three areas of cooperation--politics and security, economy and social welfare, and culture and civil society--provide instruments for transformation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Financial aid is given through MEDA (mesures d'assistance/support measures) programs, and credits and grants are provided by the European Investment Bank, altogether amounting to nearly three billion euros annually. These funds are provided for the economic and administrative modernization of Arab societies, a stronger trans-Mediterranean understanding, and ultimately for a contribution to finding solutions to conflicts in the region, especially the Israeli-Palestinian struggle.
Besides these regional components, the Euro-Mediterranean is in need of two new inputs. First, the Arab states should utilize European aid and support to foster political reforms. And secondly, the European Union should open up its agricultural markets in order to give all Mediterranean partners the possibility to sell their agricultural products in Europe.
Regarding the first input, the European Union should support political reforms in a serious manner. Through good governance and the rule of law, confidence can be built--confidence that is required to inspire Arabs living in exile as well as foreigners and locals to invest in the region. Investments, in turn, will create job opportunities and growth. Such a development creates a social, economic and political perspective, and such a perspective in turn encourages the population to develop its home countries and cease migrating to European countries. The latest elections in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories as well as elections and efforts for political reformation in Morocco, Egypt and Jordan have shown that the publics are calling for participation to actively shape their future.
The European Union should, through its aid programs, support particularly those Arab partners working intensively and seriously toward reforms. To achieve optimal results with limited resources, bilateral and multilateral aid programs should be coordinated and grouped. In this context, cooperation should be sought with the United States.
The fostering and assisting of education needs to be given highest priority through the triad of combating illiteracy, promoting professional training, and scholarships for further education.
The European Union should give special attention, including financially, to those partner countries that promote educational programs and initiatives. Transformation will only succeed if Europe identifies reformers through dialogue, strengthening their work if they desire support, and building up a trans-Mediterranean network of young transformation-thinkers who wish to learn from each other's experiences. The aim is not to destabilize Arab states through regime change, but rather to develop economy, society, rule of law and political participation. Europe should prove its courage by calling for political reforms, supporting them, and not abandoning the Arab reformers.
Secondly, the EU should open up its agricultural markets in order to give all Mediterranean partners the possibility of selling their products there. Here the partner countries in the southern Mediterranean will need not just external financial aid, but also resources that contribute to reform and development as well as improving sustainability of transformation processes. The countries' resources could be better developed if they are allowed to export a larger quantity of agricultural products. Thus Europe has to open up its agricultural market. Such an opening needs a clear timetable.
Here the circle could be closed: those states that have instituted intensive and credible reforms would get additional and enhanced opportunities for export to the European internal market. This would ultimately enable Arab countries to enlarge their budgets for investing in education and development.
On November 27-28 in Barcelona, heads of state and governments from the 25 members of the European Union and their 10 counterparts from the south will discuss their common work program for the next five years. Hopefully, together they will focus their project activities on democracy and education as well as the flexibility of the European agricultural market. A lot can be achieved if that main focus is reflected in clear and transparent criteria and agendas. This may constitute the crucial message of the tenth anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.- Published 24/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Christian Hanelt is project director of the Kronberg Talks and Middle East expert at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany.
Provide economic incentives
an interview with Aboubakr JamaiBI: From the North African standpoint, why did the Barcelona process come into existence ten years ago?
Jamai: The 1995 Barcelona process is composed of three dimensions: security, economy and civil society. Because the stability of the region was vital to Europe, security was the key motivation from the European side. From the North African side it was more a question of economic development and expanding trade with Europe. So there was a contradiction in all this. Also, as much as the North African regimes were willing to have better economic relations with Europe, they were not very welcoming of the civil society dimension. Of course, civil society itself in North Africa pushed for this basket, to use Barcelona to leverage its position vis-a-vis the regimes.
BI: In retrospect, what aspects of Barcelona were successful, and which failed?
Jamai: Security has not really succeeded. In 2024, the Euro-Med was scheduled to produce a charter of peace and stability, but the effort was stifled due to the Israeli-Palestinian and Western Sahara conflicts. Security did not really progress at the level of EU institutions, though at the bilateral level there is progress.
Turning to the economy, you measure success by the level of disbursement of funding for projects. The first five years were a striking failure in this respect. Out of 3 billion euros pledged, only 875 million were disbursed. In 2024-3, the trend was more positive: of 2.3 billion euros pledged, 1.6 billion were disbursed. Indeed in 2024, 83 percent was disbursed. So the mechanism is working more efficiently. On the other hand, in the first five years funding was supposed to come directly to projects and bypass clumsy North African government administrations. Now money is being given directly to the governments. This explains the higher disbursement rates, but you need to question the efficacy of monies disbursed. Meanwhile, the balance of North African-EU trade, without Algerian oil, has worsened from the North African perspective. This means our economies have not grown stronger, with all the negative consequences this has for our societies.
Finally, civil society didn't really advance because the regimes have not been sensitive to what Europe is trying to do. But even though this basket has not been efficient in terms of advancing civil society in Morocco, its existence played a role by empowering people. It could do more, but the EU policy is an important step forward. Also, the relationship between France and Morocco and Tunisia has discouraged the EU from exerting the necessary pressure on these regimes to liberalize politically at a faster rate.
BI: Apropos France, do you see any connection between the recent rioting and the Barcelona issues?
Jamai: This is a French-French problem at this point, really a problem of economic integration.
BI: How would you compare the Barcelona effort to the American effort in the same fields in North Africa?
Jamai: The hard fact is the money. The US gives Egypt and Israel around $5 billion a year. The most optimistic estimate for Barcelona for the first five years commitment was 5 billion euro, the actual reality was around 3 billion, and not all of that was disbursed.
The US is also militarily superior and can intervene. Despite all the criticism of American strategy and the Bush doctrine, when a journalist was jailed in Morocco or Tunis it was not the EU that obtained his/her liberation; it was Colin Powell and the State Department. I would have loved to see the EU be more assertive in terms of human rights.
BI: What would you like Barcelona to do in the coming ten years?
Jamai: We need to think really about the conditionality of aid, comprising not only economic reform but also the level of respect for human rights, free elections, etc. We should find a way to link aid to the advancement of political openness. One of the triggers of openness in Morocco happened in the early 1990s, when the European Parliament voted not to give aid. As a result, King Hassan II made changes, there was amnesty for political prisoners in 1994, and new organizations for human rights emerged. The negotiating power of the EU with Tunisia and Morocco is much greater than what its policy on the ground shows, because they need good economic relations with the EU.
The most important issue for us is regional integration among the southern Mediterranean countries. Our economies are too small to withstand the pressure of economic opening, so if we don't integrate our markets we will be wiped out, and we have completely failed on this level. Another key to advancement in this region is the Western Sahara problem, which prevents closer relations between Morocco and Algeria. The EU can say to Algeria and Morocco, solve these problems and your economic benefits will be huge. The EU can provide economic incentives to make these things happen.- Published 24/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Aboubakr Jamai is the editor of Le Journal Hebdomadaire in Casablanca
The failure of a collective security system?
Dorothee SchmidFor ten years now, the Barcelona process has been trying to organize the Euro-Mediterranean relationship around a new collective philosophy of security. The failure of the political and security basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was obvious and immediate. A more pragmatic approach was invoked after the 9/11 terror attacks, leading to some progress in some specific areas, yet apparently confirming that the Europeans have abandoned their overall regional stabilization design for the time being.
The EMP was indeed initially designed mainly to tackle security issues. It was launched after the fall of the Berlin wall, a historic moment when the Europeans started worrying about an emerging "Mediterranean threat". The security concept bolstering the European initiative was based on an assessment of danger analyzed both in "soft" and "hard" terms: the Mediterranean was considered a highly unstable place because it combined economic backwardness with political unrest and military proliferation. Migration trends also suggested that the social integration of migrants would soon become a top domestic priority for European states, thus feeding the fear of an "internal threat"--a burning topic that re-emerged recently with the riots in France.
The different dimensions of security had therefore to be comprehensively addressed in order to propose long term solutions and work in partnership with Southern Mediterranean countries. In 1995 the Middle East Peace process was progressing, offering a unique opportunity to organize regional dialogue and imagine a collective security framework. The Barcelona Declaration then proposed three different baskets for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, trying at the same time to deal with developmental and social issues and hard security matters. The EMP gradually consolidated as a socialization framework that was supposed to raise the level of mutual trust, encouraging both the formation of a common culture of security and the concrete adoption of confidence-building measures.
Ten years later, these high expectations might appear slightly utopian. The difficulties of building a collective security system were clearly exemplified by the shortcomings of the first basket of the EMP, "Political and Security Partnership", in its explicit objective of "Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability".
Indeed, the base line of the Euro-Med dialogue in security and defense matters has to be the common denominator agreed by all partners. The persistence of conflicts between some of the partners, combined with the political weaknesses of institutions in charge of organizing the dialogue, rapidly hindered the progression of the debate on security issues. The discussion over CBMs was soon interrupted, and the repeated attempts to adopt a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability never met success. This failure is partly due to the rapid degradation of the Israel-Arab relationship after the partial implementation of the Oslo agreements. The resumption of Israeli colonization in the West Bank in 1997 effectively coincided with a general slowdown in the Barcelona process.
These setbacks seem to have been quickly acknowledged by partners on both sides. As a result, the background stabilization task of the EMP was increasingly supported by its economic basket, with mitigated success. It was not until 2024 that the interest for possible security arrangements was revived, after the 9/11 events rattled the partnership's fragile political construction.
In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have become permanent security concerns for most of the European Union member states. These European worries encounter a growing preoccupation of some Southern Mediterranean regimes that face the possibility of internal destabilization. At the same time, the growing American presence in the Middle East also impels all regional stakeholders to react on the security front.
What can be observed now is a partial reorientation of the EMP on security matters, in a more pragmatic style. The partners now tend to seek short-term solutions in order to counter the most obvious threats, and new areas to test enhanced cooperation, possibly at a sub-regional or bilateral level. A rapprochement has been under way for about two years in some domains, including mainly the fight against terrorism and organized crime, informing southern countries on the conception and implementation of European Security and Defense Policy, and cooperation in civil protection and disaster management. The use of the EMP framework to support European efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has also been recently evoked.
This new obsession with security casts its shadow over the partnership's political perspectives. The prominent political objective of the Barcelona process, namely the expansion of democratic reforms, might be temporarily sacrificed for the sake of security interests. The Europeans have not solved this ambiguity yet, as they do not seem to have agreed on a new vision for the region's future. For their part, the southern partners have essentially agreed to play the partnership game in order to re-balance the strategic landscape that has been significantly altered by American activism over the past two years.
The Barcelona process still stands as a unique framework for dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean. All EU member states are now convinced that security in Europe is indivisible from security in the Mediterranean. Yet stronger political input from the Europeans is certainly needed on a few crucial issues, in order to cope with regional security threats in the long term. Encouraging an overall settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors certainly remains the number one task to be undertaken in this respect.- Published 24/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dorothee Schmid is a researcher on Mediterranean/Middle Eastern issues and European policies regarding them at Ifri (Institut français des relations internationales, Paris).
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