• Nationalism v Pan-Arabism: A continuing tug of war -   Saad N. Jawad

• Arab nationalism is a misnomer -   Eric Rouleau

• Back to the Fold -   Abdel Monem Said Aly

An Islamic predicament
 Ghazi Hamad

There is, of course, an immediate link to be made between the war in Iraq and Palestine; that both are wars of liberation against foreign occupying powers, the US and Israel respectively. Correspondingly, Islamic organizations across the region, but especially in Palestine, have been unanimous and vocal in their opposition to the US occupation of Iraq and in support of the resistance.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have both called on Iraqis to, in the words of assassinated Hamas leader Abdel Asis Rantisi , form an army of "martyrdom fighters" to resist the US occupation, a resistance that has been termed "a duty, to which all energies must be directed".

Ghazi Hamad is a Hamas official from the Gaza Strip.

The history of Iraqi politics was and still is a history of struggle between advocates of Arab nationalism and advocates of Iraqi nationalism. The former believe in the close connection between Iraq and the rest of the Arab nation, while the latter believe in concentrating on Iraq and leaving any attachment to other Arabs in a secondary place. This is a struggle that goes back to the founding of the state.

Following the British occupation of Iraq in 1914-17, those supporting Iraqi nationalism held the upper hand. All attempts to change the course of Iraqi politics under the monarchy, 1921-1958, were foiled by the royal regime supported by the British government. The most serious attempt was in 1941 and led to Iraqi-British military confrontations and the re-occupation of Iraq by the British army.

The success of the Egyptian revolution in 1952 and the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser gave a great boost to Arab nationalist feelings all over the Arab world; Iraq was no exception. To confront the growing tendency, which culminated in Egyptian-Syrian unity (the United Arab Republic), the Iraqi royal regime created the Hashemite Union with Jordan. There were also attempts by the regime, headed by Nouri al-Said, to include Syria and Kuwait in this union. Before such attempts could succeed, however, the Iraqi monarchy was toppled. Although Arab nationalist officers played a leading role in the change (in fact the Iraqi monarchy's support of the Suez war against Egypt ultimately undermined any popular support it might have had), Arab unionists were soon removed and replaced by Iraqi communists who were against joining the UAR.

They lasted until 1963, but although Arab nationalists dominated Iraqi politics from that second coup d'etat and until 2024 and the American occupation, nothing serious was done by any of the subsequent Iraqi regimes to conclude real unity between Iraq and any of the Arab countries. The most prominent attempts were in 1963 between Iraq, Egypt and Syria, in 1964 with Egypt, in 1979 with Syria and in 1990 with Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. All these attempts were quickly doomed.

The removal of the Baathist regime in Iraq by the American forces and the occupation that ensued ushered in the end of Arab nationalist feeling and elements in Iraq. All those who came with the American forces and were allowed to govern Iraq were anti-Arab nationalists and promoted instead Iraqi national tendencies. In fact, Iraq is witnessing a very serious effort to separate it from its Arab environment. All previous political mistakes have been blamed on the Arab world and Arabs in general. The ability of the Baathist regime to remain in power 35 years has been blamed on the support of Arab countries. Of course this is not true. On the contrary, Iraq's debt to Arab countries, which constitute the largest chunk of national debt, was illegally enlarged exactly to further weaken Iraq. Most of the debts were the result of an agreement to export oil on behalf of Iraq, to be settled at the end of the Iraq-Iran war. After 1990 and the invasion of Kuwait, however, these debts were treated as debts with interest.

Nevertheless, one can fairly conclude that despite the strong boost and prominence the US occupation gave to Iraqi nationalists, the regional reality and the failure of the American (mis)adventure and those Iraqis who supported it in creating a new democratic, stable and flourishing Iraq will play into the hand of the Arab nationalists yet again. In fact, this failure is being successfully exploited by Arab nationalists to prove that the US has no interest whatsoever in creating a new Iraq or solving any of its problems, and the only way to get out of the enormous problems created by the occupation is with the brotherly help of other Arab countries. The American resort to the Arab League to help them get out of the Iraq impasse will only strengthen this feeling.- Published 1/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Saad N. Jawad is a professor of political science at Baghdad University.

Is Iraq still an Arab nation? No longer, according to its new constitution. Although the constitution states that "Islam is the official religion of the state and a fundamental source of legislation" and that Iraq is "part of the Islamic world", it does not mention either the Arab identity of the country or it's belonging to the Arab community. Arabic is only one of two official languages, the other being Kurdish.

Iraq is thus the first state in the region to be bi-national in accordance with regular democratic norms. However, the constitution does not make a clean break with the country's predominantly Arab environment: it states that Iraq "is a founding and active member of the Arab League and is committed to its covenant". Clearly, this is the outcome of an elaborate compromise between the Arab majority and the Kurdish minority of the newly-established federation.

It would be a mistake to distinguish Sunnis from Shi'ites in this respect. Their identity is virtually the same: they consider themselves simultaneously as Iraqis, Muslims and Arabs in spite of their present political differences. The Shi'ites have more than once demonstrated their nationalism; they were the spearhead of the resistance movement to the British occupation during and after World War I, and they fought the Iranian forces in the eight year conflict (1980-1988) that pitted Baghdad against Tehran in spite of their hatred for Saddam Hussein and their probable sympathies for the Khomeini regime. As nationalist as the Sunnis, their present cooperation with the United States is purely tactical and has been dictated by two objectives: first, getting rid of Saddam Hussein; then, suppressing Sunni hegemony over the Iraqi state, both established by the British in the early 1920s. They will probably ask for the withdrawal of coalition troops as soon as they feel capable of crushing the Sunni armed insurgency.

So Arab nationalism is not dead in Iraq as some may be tempted to believe. It was the fashion a few years ago to argue that Egypt was not really Arab; "experts" explained at length, after peace was concluded between Menahem Begin and Anwar Sadat, that the people of the Nile Valley are, in reality, the descendants of the ancient pharaohs who were led astray into the Arab fold by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the founder of the Egyptian republic and predecessor of Sadat. A separate peace between Cairo and Jerusalem and the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab League seemed to confirm this appealing theory. True, Sadat--followed by his people--did put "Egypt, first", but this did not mean that they had lost all interest in the Palestinian cause, as experience ultimately demonstrated. Egyptians turned out to be what they are: Egyptians, Muslims and Arabs.

This said, Arab nationalism has little to do with pan-Arabism. The latter has been dead and buried since the end of the Nasser era at the close of the 1960s. The Egyptian president publicly forsook the idea of Arab unity after his frustrating experience in Syria. Despite the fact that the Syrians were those who insisted in 1958 that Nasser accept the merger of the two countries, it was they who took the initiative to break up the United Arab Republic only three years later. Syrian nationalism, in spite of its Arab dimension, prevailed over the myth of pan-Arabism, a basic concept in the ideology of the Baathists who then ruled, and still rule, the country.

During the same period, Nasser faced fierce opposition on the part of the Iraqi revolutionary regime established in 1958 by General Abdel Karim Qassem, who championed local nationalism. Nasser drew the lessons of these and other failures and proclaimed in 1962 that Arab unity could only be realized between countries that shared the same ideology, "scientific socialism", while Arab solidarity based on "anti-imperialism" was henceforth paramount. That was the end of the short and stormy history of active pan-Arabism. With the exception of Colonel Qadhafi's Libya, no other Arab country has ever tried since 1970 to unite with another "brother" state.

On the other hand, Arab nationalism, as distinct from pan-Arabism, is a misnomer. It designates in practice a widespread feeling of solidarity (mostly passive) among neighborly peoples who share common language, history, woes and aspirations. For some at least, Arab unity is desirable but unattainable. The Arab League, which is supposed to reflect and put into practice solidarity among its members, if judged by public opinion at large has proven a great disappointment. It has been inefficient in dealing with major issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the American invasion of Iraq.

In the latter case, it recently proved that it can be useful in certain circumstances. Amr Musa, the secretary general of the League, was able--to the great surprise of some observers--to convene a "national reconciliation" meeting in Cairo, to which virtually all Iraqi factions accepted to attend. The Shi'ites and the Kurds, although suspicious of this predominantly Sunni organization that did nothing to weaken Saddam Hussein, accepted the mediation inthe hope that it would contribute to reducing the Sunni-inspired insurgency. As for Iraqi Sunnis, they obviously believe that the League will help them obtain a greater share of power in Baghdad.

In relative terms, the conference was a success. Virtually all factions, including insurgents, were represented; agreement was reached on most items on the agenda, although how much will be implemented in practice remains to be seen. Paradoxically, the Kurds played a major role in bridging differences between Arab groups, Shi'ite and Sunni. Clearly, the Arab League still has a future as a regional organization.- Published 1/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Eric Rouleau, journalist and author, was French ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia. From 1955 to 1985 he was a special correspondent and editorial writer for Le Monde.

For four days (November19 to 22), the Arab League in Cairo hosted Iraqi political and sectarian factions in a conference for national reconciliation. The meeting witnessed not only Iraq's return to the Arab fold after prolonged resistance by many Iraqis, but also a decision by the Arab world to embrace the Iraqi question that for almost three years has been handled exclusively by the US and the international community.

For both Iraq and the Arab world, the meeting constituted a departure from a process of estrangement that started before the American invasion of Iraq and continued in various forms thereafter until Amr Musa, the secretary general of the League, finally visited Baghdad in October to arrange for the Cairo Conference. With this visit, Musa broke with the League's seemingly contradictory pose of legally accepting the new post-Saddam Iraqi state while denying its political legitimacy. And by attending the meeting in Egypt, the diverse Iraqi political forces broke with their pretence that Iraq no longer needs the Arab world.

What happened in Iraq regarding association with the Arab world after the fall of Saddam Hussein and his regime in Baghdad is no different than similar developments following major historical turning points in other Arab countries, such as Egypt in the 1970s and Kuwait in the 1990s. The pattern usually begins with a questioning of the value of association with other Arab countries in the Arab League or outside of it. The questions are usually followed by the claim that national interests should supersede pan-Arab interests. Sacrifices for the Arab cause are often stressed in a fanfare of propaganda, accompanied by the call to consider the needs of the country first. Isolationist policies toward the rest of the Arabs are promoted.

In many cases, this policy does not last for long. Internal and external considerations soon push the Arab country in question back into the fold, as Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, and others can testify.

With Iraq, the pattern this time was not very different. Iraqis of different sectarian background blamed the Arab world twice: once for abandoning them to the bloody dictatorial claws of Saddam Hussein and his regime, and once for leaving them without help or care after his downfall. The Arab world was blamed not only for exploiting Iraqi resources under the banner of pan-Arabism in the past, but also for legitimizing and supporting the insurgency that has bedeviled Iraq since the war. In a way Iraqis, or at least the majority of Iraq's new political elites, are proud to compare their new democracy to Arab dictatorships and eager to contrast their new association with the West with Arab-western tensions since the events of 9/11. Despite their continued formal presence in the Arab League, different Iraqi sectarian factions have stressed the slogan " Iraq first" and promised a new Iraq that is democratic, federal, modern, and above all breaks with autocratic Arab traditions.

The Arab League, which did not support the American invasion of Iraq and denied the war any Arab source of legitimacy, initially entertained serious doubts about the new Iraqi political elite and its patriotism. Despite surrendering the Iraqi seat to the Iraqi Ruling Council and its successor institutions and accepting the UN Security Council process for dealing with the Iraq question, the majority of Arab countries never reconciled with what they conceived as an occupation-installed political power that had no legitimacy beyond the American-protected green zone in Baghdad. The empowerment of Iraqi Shi'ites and their political coalition with the separatist Kurds heightened concerns among the predominantly Sunni Arab world over the fate of Iraqi Sunnis in a new Iraq whose Arab identity had been weakened. The result was a dual Arab policy: offering lip service to the stability of Iraq while leaving the country to its own fate. All Arab League resolutions to support Iraq were ignored, and the small Arab diplomatic presence was withdrawn from Baghdad with the first fatalities among diplomats.

However, as the general Arab pattern has demonstrated, this process of estrangement proved unsustainable. The continuation of the insurgency in Iraq, the possibility of Iraq fragmenting into three states in the course of a very bloody civil war, and the heavy Iranian presence in the country all persuaded the new Iraqi political elite to seek Arab help for salvation and balance.

Salvation was to be accomplished by convincing the rebellious Sunnis that although they are a minority in Iraq, they are part of a very large Arab Sunni majority in the region. And balance was to be achieved by seeking a stronger Arab presence to face the new conservative Iranian presence. The signs of weakening American support for the war in Iraq also worked against those who wanted to maintain isolation from the Arab world. Meanwhile, on the Arab side the fear of a breakdown in Iraq was mounting, along with concern over the spread of a new wave of terror as well as apprehension over the Iranian presence. Fear of the spread of the new Iraqi model of violence and separation--not democracy, to be sure--sounded an alarm that the Arab world did not want to hear.

The result was Iraq's return to the Arab fold. Baghdad was asked to indicate its Arab allegiance and to promise to give Sunnis a new shot at revising the constitution after the coming legislative elections. In Cairo, "resistance" was condoned while "terrorism" was denounced. In exchange, the Arab League will provide legitimacy for the new Iraqi political system, urge Sunnis to cooperate, and help sustain a reconciliation process scheduled to start in February.- Published 1/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Abdel Monem Said Aly is director of Al Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies in Cairo.