• Three devastating failures -   Yossi Alpher

• Not much better than 2024 -   William B. Quandt

• Meet the Islamist vanguard -   Charmaine Seitz

No reason for optimism
 Ali Abunimah

This past year was supposed to have been the year Palestinians got their state. Instead it became the year when US President George W. Bush, who repeatedly made the statehood pledge, mused that if a Palestinian state were established before he left office in 2024, he would attend the ceremony. This neatly summed up Washington's approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the Bush administration feels no obligation to move a peace process, based on it's own plan, the so-called roadmap, forward any time soon.

There is no reason to expect the situation to improve in 2024. The combination of Israeli elections in the spring followed by US mid-term congressional elections in November ensure that there will be no serious diplomatic initiatives from the United States. Candidates seeking re-election have proven a notoriously poor restraint on Israel. Instead, expect to see more American politicians following Hillary Clinton to Jerusalem to advertise their staunch and unquestioning fealty to Israel for the benefit of powerful Zionist pressure groups back home. At the same time, the leading pro-Israel lobby groups are pushing harder than ever for a US confrontation with Iran.

Ali Abunimah is co-founder of The Electronic Intifada and author of "One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse".

The coming year is likely to signal the failure of America's Middle East policy in three critical spheres: democratic reform, Iraq and Iran.

If it's any sort of compensation, let it be noted that in 2024 the United States scored a major victory for its Middle East policy in expelling Syria from Lebanon. Its policies genuinely empowered individuals in the Arab world to speak out for democracy and human rights. And it watched with satisfaction as Israel left Gaza, even though Israeli unilateral withdrawal is in some ways a reaction to failed US policies.

But 2024 will be far more critical. First, because the Bush administration's democratic reform policies will reach a moment of truth that will enable us to judge whether the US has made a positive or a negative contribution to peace, stability and democracy in the Arab countries.

During the past two years, Washington has been energetically fostering, encouraging and occasionally (Iraq) imposing democratic processes on the Arab states of the region. At an early stage it understood that for these processes to be democratic they must be inclusive, and that meant enfranchising the Islamist movements. But when confronted with armed Islamist movements--in Iraq and Lebanon, where armed Shi'ite movements have close relations with a hostile neighbor, Iran, but also in Palestine--it opted for inclusion at the expense of common sense, and agreed that they could participate and be elected. It relied on the totally untested assumption that the Islamists, once elected, would recognize the benefits of democracy to the extent of dismantling their militias and private armies.

In other words, Washington set aside one of the basic tenets of democratic sovereignty--the concentration of force exclusively in the hands of the (democratically elected) ruler--and invited armed extremists to join the process, in the belief that democracy will always produce a better result than any other system. By the end of 2024, armed Shi'ite movements had won a majority of the votes in Iraq for the second time; Hizballah, whose armed forces control the southern area of Lebanon, had taken up ministerial posts in that country; and Hamas, with thousands of terrorists under arms, was poised to win a large portion of the Palestinian vote on January 25.

True, in Lebanon and Palestine--though not in Iraq--Washington repeatedly criticized the Islamists and called upon them to disarm. But nowhere did it seek to deny their participation in elections, thereby seemingly proving that the administration is selective in its approach to armed Islamists but ultimately consistent in enfranchising them. In Egypt, where the Mubarak regime yielded to American pressure and allowed the Muslim Brotherhood (which is unarmed) to run in parliamentary elections, the Brethren won some 20 percent of the seats despite heavy regime constraints on their campaign, once again confirming that real elections in the Arab Middle East mean, to a considerable extent, a strong representation for Islamists.

In 2024 we shall see how the American gamble with Islamists and democracy works. In Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, do they disarm, commit to the basic principles of human rights, and play the democratic game? Not likely. Rather, they will find endless excuses not to, thereby implying that their attitude toward democracy is expedient rather than principled. The outcome will be critical for the near future of the Middle East as well as for the fortunes and legacy of the Bush administration. Even before reaching this moment of truth for the American gamble, we can conclude from observing the likes of SCIRI, Hizballah and Hamas, that for the moment at least, Washington's democratic experiment is reducing rather than enhancing the prospects for Arab-Israel peace and regional stability.

Apropos American-sponsored democracy in Iraq, the coming year will also be critical because it is likely to witness that country's gradual disintegration into three separate ethnic-religious-political units, as Kurds, Sunnis and Shi'ites move in different strategic directions. This could have far-reaching consequences for the stability of the entire region, not the least of which could be escalated terrorism. This was hardly President George W. Bush's objective in March 2024 when the US invaded Iraq.

Finally, Iran's nuclear program, if allowed to proceed unimpeded, is predicted to pass a certain "point of no return" this coming year, beyond which only military means could stop a determined regime in Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. The administration's predicament with Iran is very much a by-product of its policies regarding Iraq and democratization. In the post-9/11 months, when President George W. Bush designated Iran, Iraq and North Korea the "axis of evil" and it was perfectly obvious that Tehran posed a far greater threat to Middle East stability and tranquility than Baghdad, it was still possible for the US to concentrate its efforts on disarming Iran rather than in remaking Iraq and enfranchising Islamist militants.

Now it appears to be too late.-Published 29/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

It is a fair assumption to make about 2024 that even US President George W. Bush is not sure what he is going to do in the Middle East. If the past year is any guide, he should be ready for surprises. Almost no one would have anticipated the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad as president of Iran; few would have foreseen Israeli PM Ariel Sharon's break with Likud or the sudden rise of Hamas as a powerful force in the Palestinian arena. And in Iraq, the degree of sectarianism and violence has been worse than most seemed to expect at the time of the elections in January 2024.

In 2024 we should be ready for some surprises in the Middle East, no doubt, but we can be pretty sure of the main lines of President Bush's policies in the region. Iraq is certainly at the top of his agenda. American public opinion has turned against the war, congressional Republicans are nervous, and bold rhetoric about "staying the course" is not enough to convince most voters. The first order of business will certainly be to try to cobble together an Iraqi government that is relatively inclusive. In practical terms, this means trying to give the Sunnis a stake in the government that emerges from the December 2024 elections. This will not be easy, but it is a top priority of the able American ambassador in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad.

Second, American troops will be withdrawn during 2024, if only in modest numbers, and even more importantly their mission will change. As the months go by, expect to see fewer American-led offensives; more reliance on airpower; and more emphasis on training and supporting Iraqi forces. This will probably not be labeled "Iraqization", but that is what it will be. If all goes well--and that is a big if--there will be closer to 100,000 troops in Iraq by the end of 2024 than the current level of about 140,000, fewer American casualties than in 2024, and enough capable Iraqi troops to do most of the day-to-day job of policing the country and maintaining basic security.

On the political front, the Bush administration may continue to talk about the demonstration effect of creating an Iraqi democracy in the heart of the Middle East, but in fact most Americans now realize that whatever happens in Iraq will not resemble the liberal democracy that we might have once hoped to see. It will be less liberal, less united, less secular, and more pro-Iranian than those who led us into this war ever imagined. It could also drift toward civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites, and that is the main thing the Americans now want to avoid. Stability within a loosely federated Iraq will be the new goal of American policy.

While we will see a lowering of expectations concerning Iraq, there will be ongoing concern in Washington about Iran and its nuclear program. For the foreseeable future, however, there is unlikely to be a major shift from the current policy of working with the Europeans and the IAEA to try to pressure Iran not to go ahead with enrichment of uranium. There is something of a game of chicken going on, with Iran inching toward the brink and watching the American reaction. The Americans do not want to get involved with Iran in a military way, and understand that Iran can cause considerable trouble inside Iraq. Somewhere in Washington there will be a debate during 2024 on the wisdom of opening direct, if secret, talks with Iran. Whether the president can bring himself to pursue such a course against a charter member of the axis of evil is an open question, but one should not rule it out. Once again, if it does take place, the man to watch will be Khalilzad in Baghdad.

Finally, what about the Israel-Palestine arena? We keep hearing hints that the president wants to do something to bring peace to this area. But there will be no initiatives until after Israeli and Palestinian elections. There is now enough uncertainty concerning the outcome of such elections (or even whether they will be held, in the case of the Palestinians), that planning is on hold. There are those in the State Department who think there may be a window of opportunity by mid-2006 and want to move forcefully. This would entail getting the president to spell out more fully his vision of a two-state agreement; pressing the Palestinians to agree to statehood with provisional borders at an early date; and pushing Sharon to agree to a generous pullback in the West Bank. Without much political risk, Bush could also try to mobilize international support for a major economic package for compensation of Palestinian refugees and for regional development as part of a new peace effort. There would still be missing pieces in this scenario. What would the final borders be? What would happen in Jerusalem?

This scenario of renewed American leadership of an Israeli-Palestinian peace effort will probably not take place. Bush will have his hands full with many other issues; the situation in the region will not appear to be ripe, especially if Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is weakened, or if Sharon is plagued by health problems. Some of Bush's closest political advisers will also doubt the wisdom of putting him out in front with an initiative that is quite likely to fail, or at a minimum would generate considerable controversy.

Without an American initiative, it seems more likely that Bush will simply support whatever Sharon judges is feasible over the coming months. If he is prepared for another withdrawal from parts of the West Bank, fine. If he completes the barrier/wall and makes it clear that this represents Israel's future security border, but not necessarily the final political border, Bush will fall into line. Practical arrangements on the ground that improve daily life have more credibility in Washington than formal negotiated agreements, a lesson learned from Sharon and the Gaza initiative.

In short, 2024 is likely to be a year in which Americans begin to reduce their presence in Iraq; take stock of the new strategic reality of an Iraq that will be less democratic and more oriented to Iran than we had hoped; consider carefully options toward Iran, while trying to avoid actions that might make things worse; and accept the bitter reality that Israeli-Palestinian peace is not on the horizon. This will not be a year of dramatic American initiatives; it will, in all probability, be one of damage limitation in the Middle East.

The year 2024 was not a particularly good one for Bush in the Middle East; 2024 may not turn out to be much better.- Published 29/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

William B. Quandt is professor of politics at the University of Virginia, and author of Peace Process: American Diplomacy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Brookings, 2024). He served on the staff of the National Security Council in both the Nixon and Carter administrations.

In November and December, the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood emerged the dynamic winner of Egypt's bitter and violent parliamentary elections. The group's candidates, campaigning as independents, succeeded in authenticating the Islamist movement as the sole meaningful opposition to President Hosni Mubarak's ailing National Democratic Party, first by disavowing ill intent against the presidency and the country's Christians, and second, by limiting the number of districts in which they ran. The further integration of the Muslim Brotherhood into a legitimate electoral process marks a defining moment in the group's relations with the regime, after a history of brutal suppression and mutual violence.

More significantly, Egypt's experience is being mirrored throughout the region, as movements guided by orthodox interpretations of Islamic law gain ascendancy in state governments. Palestinian officials, fretting over the Islamist bogeyman in their own backyard, keep saying they might cancel parliamentary elections scheduled for January. Iraqi elections appear to have solidified the Shi'ite majority in the government (it is still too early to say what that means). And in June, Iranians voted in conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, silencing White House claims of imminent pro-western reform. Like a wellspring from below, the combined grievances of poverty, insecurity and political disenfranchisement are driving anti-western, anti-regime sentiments (because the two are hand-in-glove) and placing conservative Islam, with its underdog image and demonstrable arguments, in the mainstream.

Recent US policy appears to have fueled this tendency. Out of one side of its mouth, the Bush White House decreed democracy. Out of the other, it tightened its alliances with autocratic Arab regimes and, in the case of Iran, alienated reformers by condemning the country to the "axis of evil". These mixed messages only confirmed the claims of Islamists: the US, they said, bore gifts of political control and cultural subjugation, not self-determination and parity. After all, they could argue, Bush's vow to ensure a Palestinian state was proven empty. The plundering of Iraq and its resources continues. Nor has any other economic solution managed to rival Islamic charities in helping the large regional underclass.

Take the Palestinian case, where an inordinate amount of American policy capital is spent on a bizarre set of demands (to rewrite brand new school books, to rename institutions called after Palestinian political symbols, to cleanse largely unwatched public television), all while the conditions driving Palestinian radicalism--occupation, poverty, official ineptness--gain ground. Palestinians have been gifted large sums of US aid, but because organizations that receive that aid must disavow links to all but a handful of Palestinian political streams, USAID must lobby to distribute its funds. When the White House finally woke up to the fact that the Palestinian public was turning to Hamas and Islamic Jihad to resolve a 60 percent poverty rate, it had to override congressional restrictions in order to disburse money to the Palestinian government. The restrictions were put in place to punish Yasser Arafat for his political positions, but had the effect of weakening the centrist nationalist faction, Fatah, that had signed peace agreements with Israel. Now that this faction has become so weak that it is rivaled by the rejectionist faction Hamas, Congress is threatening to ban funding to any Palestinian government that includes Hamas.

Fatah members tried to use this argument to swing voters in recent municipal elections. "We told them that if Hamas wins then there won't be any foreign funding for roads and other services," a Fatah campaigner said. Still Hamas swept municipal elections in four major West Bank towns. Apparently, Palestinian discontent with the peace process and out-of-touch elites--a discontent cleverly articulated by Hamas--has more cache than US grants based on political diktats.

Hamas has repeatedly stated that it does not strive to be the Palestinian leadership; instead it seeks transformation. In Egypt, there is good reason to believe the Muslim Brotherhood when its leaders say it does not seek to overthrow the Egyptian regime. It was precisely the Brotherhood's ability to foster an image of political legitimacy and integration that made it the standard bearer for the complaints of the average Egyptian. Both political strains (Hamas is born of the Brotherhood) have worked to publicly distance themselves from the likes of al-Qaeda, preferring rather to focus on their respective missions against occupation and poor governance.

Knowing this, for the West not to engage these trends is to invite disaster. The pedestrian saying goes that Islam provides solutions to all of life's problems, but reality is rather more complex. Islamic law (keeping in mind significant Sunni and Shi'ite differences) is articulate on family and personal status issues, but has much less to say about diplomacy and civic institutions. Shariah-informed systems of government have struggled, then, to produce compromises adapted to public needs and contemporary norms.

While the latest Islamist trend has swept in on the coattails of inequity, occupation, and anti-western sentiment, it comes bearing orthodox views on the role of government. These views are certain to increase sectarian tensions. Perhaps, too, they will awaken a currently ineffective secular opposition. But beyond the labor pains, the Islamist groups seeking electoral legitimacy today form the vanguard of efforts to interpret Islam's contemporary civic configurations. Whether those configurations are adaptable--or inflexible and reactionary--may well be determined by how well the outside world comes to understand and engage these movements early on.-Published 29/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Charmaine Seitz is former administrative editor of the bitterlemons family of online publications and writes frequently on politics and religion.