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Edition 2 Volume 4 - January 19, 2024

Saudi Arabia under Abdullah

King Abdullah and the Royal Saudi Court  - John R. Bradley
Prince Turki's posting to Washington marked the opening shots of the king's intensely private campaign to wrest control of the royal court.

Saudi succession  - Simon Henderson
Senior Saudis sneer at any concern by outsiders about successions.

Abdullah emerges as a reformist  - Afshin Molavi
The Saudi ship is quietly but firmly shifting course now and the captain, King Abdullah, is fully in control.

Security turnaround  - an interview withNawaf Obaid
When the US leaves Iraq, there will be a complete break-up.

The virtuous king  - Adel al-Toraifi
Tremendous reforms are still needed in order to transform Saudi Arabia into a democratic state.


King Abdullah and the Royal Saudi Court
 John R. Bradley

Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah is adopting a far more cautious approach to reform than many had predicted would be the case before he ascended the throne last August, following the long-anticipated death of his half-brother King Fahd. It is not difficult to see why, given the short-term stability afforded the regime by a buoyant economy and a highly reduced domestic terror threat. There is simply little pressure on the king to introduce a radical agenda.

For a start, the government is flush with oil money. And most al-Qaeda-linked Saudi terror cells have been eradicated in a series of clashes with the security forces. The chaos in Iraq, meanwhile, has sidetracked those in Washington pushing for democratic change in the wider Middle East. More good news: Following more than a decade of negotiations, the green light has finally been given for Saudi accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).


The royal decrees King Abdullah has issued so far help to consolidate his image as a man of the people, but have achieved little else. The most widely publicized is one that discourages subjects from kissing his hand when they petition him over personal grievances. The problem, argue critics of the regime, is precisely the arbitrary nature of royal rule that such petitioning represents, in the absence of the institutions and mechanisms of a civil society.

Behind the scenes, however, the king is quietly addressing a number of complex domestic challenges. Perhaps the most difficult of them for him to achieve, and for outside observers to document: asserting his personal authority over the vast royal court.

A week before Abdullah became king, Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to Washington for 22 years, was replaced by Prince Turki al-Faisal. Prince Turki is a brother of the foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal. And Prince Saud is King Abdullah's closest ally.

Prince Turki's posting to Washington, then, marked the opening shots of the king's intensely private campaign to wrest control of the royal court by appointing his own people to important positions. Saudi observers have long argued that there is a rift between the reform-minded king, who was a half-brother of the late King Fahd, and more conservative full brothers of the late king, such as Interior Minister Prince Naif and Defense Minister Prince Sultan.

In a move that also suggests the king's desire to post allies to key positions, in December he announced the appointment of his own half-brother, Prince Miqrin, as head of the General Intelligence Department (GID), the Saudi equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency. He meanwhile accepted the resignation of Prince Saud bin Fahd, a son of the late King Fahd, as the deputy head of the GID. A week earlier, the Saudi National Security Council (SNSC) had been established, with the former envoy to Washington, Prince Bandar, named as its secretary-general.

The SNSC can declare war as well as investigate security agencies if they are negligent or become involved in acts that threaten public security. Although Prince Bandar is the son of Defense Minister Prince Sultan, the two are not close; and he is said to have bad relations, too, with Interior Minister Prince Naif. As head of the kingdom's security forces, Prince Naif--a reactionary and the king's main rival--could, therefore, view Prince Bandar's appointment as head of the SNSC as a challenge to his own authority.

Moreover, the conservative full brothers are close to the ultra-conservative Wahhabi religious establishment, whose ranks are made up primarily of the descendants of the 18th-century religious reformer Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab. They are known as the al-Asheikh family, and they have ruled in effective partnership with the House of Saud since the founding of the kingdom. Both the current justice minister, Abdullah al-Asheikh, and the grand mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Asheikh are descendants of Abdul Wahhab.

Limiting the role and influence of the al-Asheikh family must be part and parcel of moves to curb extremism and promote reforms. In that context, it is perhaps significant that one of the king's first moves after ascending the throne was to sack Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Alsheikh from his post as Chief of Royal Protocol, replacing him with commoner Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Tibaishi.

However, a dark blot on the otherwise intricate landscape of King Abdullah's appointments is the fact that all of the about 50 of them hail from al-Najd, the central region that is the historic power base of both the House of Saud and the House of al-Asheikh. There has not been a single reported appointment from outside the al-Najd region. Shiites, women, Hijazis, southerners and northerners--groups that have historically felt marginalized and discriminated against--have been totally excluded. They have no reason, thus far, to believe anything King Abdullah may do will change their lot.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


John R. Bradley is the author of "Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution" (2008) and, most recently, "After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts" (2012).

Saudi succession
 Simon Henderson

"The king is dead. God save the king!" is not quite how they say it in Saudi Arabia. But the Arabic and Islamic equivalent is going to be heard more often in the next few years. King Fahd was 84 when he died last summer. King Abdullah, who replaced him, is 83 this year. Crown Prince Sultan, the designated next-in-line, is 82. Although modern medical science means the al-Sauds are living longer (Fahd's longevity set a record), a rapid series of successions seems inevitable.

Is this important for the world? Yes. Saudi Arabia is a leader (along with Egypt) of the Arab world. It also sees itself as the leader of the Islamic world because of its "custodianship" of the two holy places, Mecca and Medina. And, of course, it has the world's largest oil reserves, reputedly a quarter of the world's total, and is the world's largest oil exporter. Whoever is king of Saudi Arabia--or acts in his name, as Abdullah did for nearly ten years while Fahd was unwell--is an immensely important decision-maker.

Saudi Arabia is much more than Kuwait, where the ruler died this month, even though the northern Gulf emirate has ten percent of the world's oil and is a significant exporter. It is certainly more than Dubai, whose ruler has also just died, the comparatively oil-less sheikhdom and traditional port which is transforming itself into a world-class, albeit a trifle too hot for most, vacation resort. But the successions in these places illustrate some of the problems of hereditary feudal quasi-monarchies: the new Kuwaiti emir is older than his deceased cousin and already incapacitated. The new ruler of Dubai is reputedly more able than his nominal superior, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, the senior and certainly richest statelet of the United Arab Emirates federation.

Senior Saudis sneer at any concern by outsiders about successions. The members of the House of Saud don't exactly say they have a plan. Instead, they call it a system. Succession might go to the next-in-line, provided he is healthy and has the relevant administrative experience. But if this is going to throw up the wrong person, then the senior princes will get into a huddle and tell the contender that the rules have just changed. This would seem to be what is going on now in the kingdom. The probable next in line after Sultan is generally considered to be Nayef, the interior minister. But Nayef is considered mercurial. (A survey in The Economist this month described him as "moody, abrasive, capricious and prone to intrigue." Presumably, if Nayef has been told what was written, one could now add "paranoid" as well.)

When Fahd died, Nayef was not made second deputy prime minister, the slot that has existed since 1968 for the crown prince-in-waiting. Indeed, nobody was given the title although, arguably, such a job is needed even more now than previously. There are indications that Nayef bid for the job in the last few days of Fahd's life. Indeed, the announcement of Fahd's death might have been delayed a few days while a deal was being sought. The July 28 statement from the Interior Ministry spokesman that Fahd's health had "improved" is possibly noteworthy. (Fahd's death was announced on August 1, two months after he was taken into hospital with pneumonia.) Although Nayef's bid to become second deputy prime minister was clearly unsuccessful, it wasn't a complete failure since the post is left vacant.

In Saudi terms, the absence of a decision means no agreement or consensus was reached. The informed belief is that a compromise candidate such as Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh province, will eventually emerge. Born in 1936, so a comparatively youthful 70 this year, he has the experience and respect. His major weakness is a question mark about his heart--two of his sons have already died of coronary failure.

Although in public and semi-public comments western ambassadors profess optimism that the Saudi system of succession can cope, in private they can be more candid. Their views are worth listening to as their access to the House of Saud is greater than most. One recently explained his view that the real challenge would emerge in ten years time. This is when the reservoir of the sons of King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the kingdom in 1932, effectively dries up. After that the king will have to be chosen from the next generation, Abdul Aziz's grandsons. But which line will be chosen? Even among the Sudairis--Fahd, Sultan, Nayef and Salman all had the same mother--the competition will be intense.

Ten years hence is also when the flood of young Saudis produced by one of the highest birth rates in the world will bring about unprecedented strains on the higher education and employment market. Even if oil prices remain high, the budgetary strain will be immense. It will concern us all.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is a former BBC and Financial Times correspondent based in Islamabad, Pakistan.


Abdullah emerges as a reformist
 Afshin Molavi

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad stole the headlines last month during the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit with his incendiary remarks calling for Israel to be "wiped off the map." As a result, an event that might have showcased the new king of Saudi Arabia--a moderate, pan-Islamic, reform-minded modernizer--on an international stage, deteriorated into a media circus that raised questions about Muslim radicalism and presented exactly the opposite image than that which King Abdullah sought to cultivate.

King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the sixth head of the modern Saudi state, saw the Mecca summit as the first step in his ambitious plan to trigger a Muslim world renaissance to jolt the world's more than one billion Muslims away from what he described as "political, economic, and social underdevelopment that has evolved into a major crisis." In a stinging rebuke of Islamic extremists, he lashed out at al-Qaeda, describing its followers in Islamically-loaded terminology as "corrupters of the earth"--a charge tantamount to blasphemy. He also called on fellow Muslim leaders to create a poverty fund and a natural disaster relief fund for the Islamic world. It was an impressive performance and was meant to be, as one Saudi analyst said, "King Abdullah's coming out party," a chance for him to shine on a world stage.

Instead, he was overshadowed by Ahmadinezhad, whose comments reflected the worst of the Muslim world. But shadows are not new to King Abdullah who, for nearly a quarter century, waited in the shadows as crown prince, though he served as de facto ruler for ten of those years after a stroke incapacitated then King Fahd. As nominal ruler, Abdullah retained considerable powers, but the shadow of Fahd, his sons and their princely allies constrained him from implementing fully his nationalist, integrative, reformist vision at home and his moderate, pan-Islamic foreign policy abroad. As a consequence, Abdullah, it seemed at times, served as first mate on a drifting ship, plugging holes and generally guiding it in the right direction, but unable to shift course dramatically.

The Saudi ship is quietly but firmly shifting course now and the captain, King Abdullah, is fully in control. This is good news for global stability, for oil markets, for the war on terror and the future of the Muslim world. In his first six months in power unencumbered by the shadow of Fahd, Abdullah has already taken several dramatic steps, including releasing liberal dissidents from jail, reaching out to the Shi'ite minority, promising greater rights for women, shining an internal light on princely corruption, and tolerating a degree of press freedom unknown in Saudi history. Meanwhile, Saudi civil society is bursting with new energy, structural economic reforms and high oil prices have paved the way for what is shaping up to be a sustained boom, and the domestic terror threat is waning.

Though opinion polls are not common in Saudi Arabia, anecdotal evidence suggests King Abdullah is a popular figure at home. In my travels to four cities across the kingdom last month, I was struck by the diverse range of people who praised Abdullah, from marginalized Shi'ite young men in the Eastern Province to cosmopolitan Jeddah intellectuals wary of al-Saud rule. Many, especially Shi'ites, spoke approvingly of Abdullah's integrative vision, others praised his personal piety or his vigorous support for Palestinian self-determination but, mostly, ordinary Saudis expressed satisfaction at his clean hands. Tired of princely corruption and worried by high un- and under-employment despite record oil prices, many ordinary Saudis have grown to resent the perks and privileges of the some 7,000 princes in the kingdom. "King Abdullah and his sons are clean," one young man told me, "and that is worth more than you can imagine."

The king's domestic popularity will allow him to tackle some tough problems, including the reform of an entrenched Wahabi religious establishment that continues to purvey a largely intolerant brand of Islam. Unlike Fahd, whose personal religious credentials were shaky owing to his playboy past, Abdullah has the gravitas to face down the religious establishment as an equal: a pious man of faith interested in reform. He has already done so in the crucial battleground of education. While Saudi schools still have far too many radically anti-western teachers sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, many students told me that the new, recently-trained teachers express more moderate and tolerant views.

King Abdullah's religious credentials will also be useful as he seeks to fill the gaping leadership vacuum in the Muslim world, a world that has dramatically failed to live up to the enormous potential of its people and now faces a precarious moment of rising Shi'ite-Sunni tension related to events in Iraq. King Abdullah's recent meeting with fiery Iraqi Shi'ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, his groundbreaking public meetings with Saudi Shi'ites, televised live, and his behind-the-scenes diplomacy with Iran on the Iraq issue reflect his desire to reduce Shi'ite-Sunni tensions.

At this perilous moment, King Abdullah has the potential to be one of the most important Muslim leaders of the twenty first century and a positive force for the future of the Islamic world. As the king of Saudi Arabia, home of the two holiest mosques, and ruler of a nation with the world's largest oil reserves, the king has both the ideological and economic might to make a lasting imprint on the Muslim world. Over the past three decades Saudi Arabia's imprint has largely been negative, using its money and prestige to spread Wahabism globally, fund (or turn a blind eye to the funding of) radical madrassahs, cultivate a religious ethos of intolerance at home that poisoned young minds, and support retrograde regimes like the Taliban.

In one of the great "what might have been" questions of history, Saudi Arabia squandered an extraordinary opportunity to help build a modern, economically dynamic, socially tolerant Muslim world. Instead, it significantly contributed to "the crisis" that Abdullah describes today.

A new oil boom and a cautiously reform-minded king now have the opportunity to erase some of those wrongs. King Abdullah seems to be on the right track. His success will not be defined by great speeches or chest-thumping tirades. It will be defined by quiet acts of diplomacy that prevent conflict, the creation of new institutions that bolster Muslim world economies (reorganization and modernization of the Islamic Development Bank should be a top priority), and the spreading of an Islam that tolerates diversity and welcomes change. Though the path remains long and the obstacles large, the first six months of his rule suggest that King Abdullah and Saudi Arabia have taken the right initial steps.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Afshin Molavi, a journalist and fellow at the Washington DC-based New America Foundation, was a Dubai-based correspondent with Reuters.


Security turnaround
an interview with Nawaf Obaid

BI: How would you rank Saudi Arabia's strategic security threats?

Obaid: First and foremost is obviously terrorism and al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, this has a domestic and a foreign component. Number two is what will happen in Iraq. We have a sober assessment as to whether Iraq can sustain itself as a viable entity. Third is the Iranian factor; the Iranian nuclear program is less a priority than the existing environment of government in Iran. And finally, soft security or domestic issues.

BI: How has King Abdullah's approach to these issues been different than that of his predecessor?

Obaid: We're becoming much more assertive, we're not just waiting for things to happen, but are looking at policy options. For example, in light of what happened in Iraq, the king has assumed a new mantle of leadership in the region. We are trying to increase communications with Iraq and Iran. So the style has changed, it's more proactive, there is more leadership.

BI: Can you expand a bit on your concerns regarding Iraq?

Obaid: We believe that because of the existing situation on the ground a viable state will not emerge on its own. The situation will be as it is today [only] as long as the United States is present in Iraq. When the US leaves there will be a complete break-up. There will be some sort of civil war over Kirkuk between the Kurds, who aren't interested in a federal Iraq but rather want independence, and Islamist Sunnis. [There will be] a bigger problem in the south, where there will be a big Sunni-Shi'ite clash on border issues. We are asking ourselves what the Iranians will do with the Iraqi Shi'ites, on our border.

BI: Turning to Iran, what do you mean by concern over the environment of government?

Obaid: I mean the atmosphere there. All the new people named to senior positions by the president are from the same background as him. They believe Iran is always under siege. Therefore they seek to project power beyond Iran's borders. In Mecca, President Ahmadinezhad told our king that he considers Saudi Arabia as Iran's alter ego in the region: Iran represents the Shi'ite world and Saudi Arabia the Sunni world. This is very dangerous talk, positioning Iran as regional leader. [This explains] the logic of what they do in Iraq and the nuclear sphere. They will do whatever it takes to get nuclear weapons.

BI: But Ahmadinezhad is not the ultimate decision-maker in Iran.

Obaid: Yes, but he works hand-in-hand with [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei. We believe there are no ideological differences between them. At Mecca, King Abdullah prevented Ahmadinezhad from giving his original Holocaust speech and attacking Israel; Ahmadinezhad made [these statements as] off-the-cuff remarks as he was leaving.

BI: Turning to the terrorism issue, is Saudi Arabia now on top of the problem?

Obaid: Regarding al-Qaeda's main infrastructure, yes, it has been decimated, we've gone 13 months without an attack in Saudi Arabia, while the attacks at the end of 2024 failed. But there are still remnants, and our main focus now is on drying up funds. They still have some money for operations. But 95 percent of the command echelon is dead or in prison.

BI: Finally, perhaps a word on soft or domestic security issues.

Obaid: Here we begin with illegal immigration and border problems, smuggling etc. Yemen and Iraq are at the fore. We're getting more illegal smuggling into Saudi Arabia from Iraq than when Saddam was in power. [Saudi] Jihadis go to Iraq to fight, but Iraqis and Syrians try to enter Saudi Arabia illegally, with illegal goods.

Domestically, physical security is better. On the political front, the King is opening up to the minority Shi'ites: they are being given more religious rights, they can open up their own mosques in the Eastern Province and celebrate rituals like the Ashura. They have been brought into the national dialogue and offered more positions in the Shura Council and the government.

On the economic front, the current windfall in oil prices is being channeled into specific public policy initiatives. There is no ridiculous spending as in the oil boom of 20 years ago. The king has freed prisoners of conscience. In six months he has single handedly done a lot of good domestically from the standpoint of strategic security: the media campaign against terrorism, the changes in the education curriculum. All this has alleviated the security situation so much. There's been a turnaround.

BI: You haven't mentioned the Palestinian issue.

Obaid: It is the number one political priority for Abdullah. He is willing to give the Palestinian territories all the aid and oil necessary to become viable and to securitize matters, thereby reducing terrorist attacks and giving Israel security. This is where his [March 2024] peace plan comes into force. Saudi Arabia is the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority, and this will continue.

BI: And if Hamas wins the Palestinian elections?

Obaid: A Hamas victory won't make a difference. Look how Hizballah is asking Saudi Arabia to mediate in Lebanon.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Nawaf Obaid is senior fellow at King Faisal Center for Research & Islamic Studies in Riyadh.


The virtuous king
 Adel al-Toraifi

During the first signs of the late King Fahd's illness in 1995, Saudis woke up suddenly to the question of succession. Saudis had come to picture King Fahd as a modernist leader well versed in domestic politics. Inheriting a welfare state in the late 1970s due to high oil revenues, Fahd enjoyed a strong and powerful image among his citizens and abroad. Indeed, Fahd's public persona was so strong it overwhelmed everyone else, including the crown prince, Abdullah.

In 1997, King Fahd handed Abdullah authority over two key issues in Saudi policymaking: foreign affairs and the economy. Thus did Abdullah begin to prove himself as a leader. His involvement in regional politics as the representative of the Saudi state in different world conferences and gatherings brought him great success among the Saudi public. Yet, he also faced growing problems inside the kingdom, including unemployment, poverty, weak public services and growing public criticism and calls for reform. In effect, Abdullah was running only half the system. The other half was run either by those responsible for state security or the retinue of Fahd.

Thus, when Fahd died last August there was no question about succession, but also high expectations of change. Within days of accession, Abdullah's portrait adorned city buildings and rear windows of public owned vehicles. It was now the era of the "Virtuous King", one newspaper headline said. But what brought about such expectations compared to the doubts that shook the nation in the late 1990s?

In the early 1980s, Abdullah was not favored much by western observers. Since Abdullah enjoyed good relations with Arab leaders in the region, he was thought to be a pro-Arab nationalist and an opponent of the West's regional policy. But this was a false reading of his character.

The aftermath of September 11 provides a good insight into the complications that Abdullah had to contend with prior to his accession. With the US administration pressing for a full makeover of the Saudi state, Abdullah was placed in a difficult situation. On the one hand, he wanted to show he could stand up to Washington, and on the other he understood the importance to the kingdom of fighting terrorism and reform. As one taxi driver told me: "he wants to do things his way". To do so, he had to convince not only the Americans to understand him but also his brothers.

On the regional front, Abdullah won approval for his Middle East peace initiative at the Arab Summit 2024 in Beirut, which brought him favorable international attention. Following the tensions in Saudi-American relation, Abdullah implemented a gradual reform in religious schools and as regards Friday sermons in mosques to allay American concerns of a growing terrorism threat from Saudi Arabia. And in April 2024, when George W. Bush was preparing his speech on American energy strategy during the peak of the oil prices, Abdullah visited the American president in Crawford, Texas, to assure him of controlled oil prices and with a promise of establishing new refineries. With Saudi Arabia embroiled in a direct fight against terrorism on its own soil, Abdullah became a close ally.

In the last two years, Abdullah's fears for the country began to fade on another front too. Oil prices were steadily increasing after seven years of ups and downs. The increased revenue brought with it the possibility of re-invigorating the welfare state.

A healthy welfare state provides a monarchy with stability. If people are assured more and more secure wealth, calls for greater participation in authority lessen. In 2024, the internal reform movement was at the height of its powers and delivered a call for a constitutional monarchy, but the situation dramatically changed after the stock market boom generated by the high economic performance of state-owned oil companies. Just lend your ear to Saudi social gathering these days and you will immediately realize the difference: from a deep detestation of government corruption to a deep analysis of the stock market and the best ways to earn a quick and immense profit.

Nevertheless, King Abdullah has remained true to his reform promises. Days after his inauguration, he freed the political prisoners in the "constitutional monarchy" case. Leaks to the press expressed his disappointment with how Saudi security authorities had dealt with that case, yet no rift in the regime was created by an official condemnation of the Interior Ministry's performance.

In other ways, the new king has already made a significant difference in the lives of Saudis. He authorized a 15 percent pay rise for government employees, established a new human rights committee with wide-ranging powers, canceled the National Media Council, which was used to channel the domestic media, signed the WTO entrance agreement, established a "Fighting Poverty" national campaign, donated $543 million to a new housing project for needy families, re-implemented the mass overseas scholarships that had been frozen for 15 years, and last, but not least, made it easier for the average citizen to gain direct access to the king than it has ever been.

The image of Abdullah as the "Virtuous King", however, should not fool anyone into thinking that Saudi Arabia's problems are at an end. Tremendous reforms are still needed in order to transform Saudi Arabia into a democratic state. There is hope, but the struggle for human rights, freedom of speech, religious openness, juridical independence and political participation are still at an early stage.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Adel al-Toraifi is a political affairs commentator on the opinion pages of al-Riyadh newspaper. He is currently a Chevening Fellow at the Center for Studies in Security and Democracy at Birmingham University.




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