• A Palestinian choice -   Danielle Pletka

• By choice or by the devil -   Abdel Monem Said Aly

• Getting worse quickly - an interview with  David Shearer

So what! And then?
 Christian Berger

It has been a long-held belief by many observers of the Middle East conflict that if the Palestinian Authority did not exist already we would have to invent it. Now that the PA seems to be moving closer to a possible collapse, is this still the case? Financial deprivation caused by the lack of access to funds--the larger part of PA-owned taxes and other revenues is being withheld by Israel and direct international financial assistance is either stopped or not getting through because banks fear legal repercussions in the US--may well be the reason for the PA not being any longer in a position to carry out its functions.

The notion of a possible collapse is symptomatic of much bigger problems that endanger the peace process and the eventual implementation of the two-state solution. Is this not the legacy of an unresolved conflict, a "ceasefire" that never turned into peace? Are we witnessing the transformation of a protracted conflict into a frozen conflict?

Christian Berger is European Commission representative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Previously he served as EU representative on the team of Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn, and was responsible for crisis response and peace-building in the European Commission. This article reflects his personal views and not necessarily those of the European Commission.

Much ink has been spilled over the question of the collapse of the Hamas-led Palestinian government. Should the United States concert all its energy toward causing a collapse? Must the international community, its collective heartstrings stretched by the prospect of a humanitarian crisis, avert a collapse with a cash infusion? What will it mean for the War on Terror? The dream of a two-state solution?

But what exactly is "collapse" and what will it mean? Hamas, the political group in control of the Palestinian Authority is already in fiscal crisis. Hamas, the terrorist organization, appears to be doing well. Hamas (government) doesn't have money to pay salaries. Hamas (terrorist group) has sufficient resources to re-equip and arm a 3,000-man militia in Gaza. Therefore, it is safe to assume that whatever collapse observers believe could be imminent is unlikely to affect the agenda of the terror group Hamas--to eradicate the State of Israel.

Second, collapse could mean the dissolution of civil society: riots, demonstrations, factional warfare in the streets. Fateh and Hamas have begun their own campaigns of targeted killings. But will that mean the government falls? Will there be new elections? A trusteeship? Confederation with Jordan?

Answers to these questions are not incidental to the formulation of policy. Because, of course, an election would merely reinstall Hamas, which won overwhelmingly the last time. A trusteeship should be inconceivable--an anachronism in this day and age; certainly, in the wake of the disastrous American attempt to govern Iraq, Washington should wash its hands of any such idea. A confederation, an idea enjoying a resurgence lately, would be resisted by Jordan's Hashemite ruler as a death knell.

Some have suggested that pushing Hamas toward "collapse" or merely isolating it to the point of political impotence will empower Fateh's Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president. Abbas, a weak-kneed leader with a lengthy track record of failure, looks pretty good next to Ismail Haniyeh, the hardline Hamas prime minister.

In addition, Abbas' lost convictions appear to have returned in recent months. He has thrown his weight behind the Palestinian National Accord, a vague quasi-endorsement of the two-state solution issued by Palestinian prisoners. Indeed, he has even threatened to call a referendum on the question if the government does not sign up. In addition, Abbas is planning to meet with new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and has declared a willingness to negotiate directly with Israel.

The fact that the Palestinian president has no power to deliver to Israel (or to the Palestinian people, if their election results are any indication) has not deterred ardent peace processors. But making peace with powerless partners is ridiculous, and Israel is unlikely to be enticed down such a dead-end road.

As far as the United States is concerned, the law is clear. Aid to the Palestinians has been sharply curtailed. Thus far, the Bush administration has held firmly to its demand that Hamas recognize Israel's right to exist and renounce violence. But in the months since Hamas' victory, Washington's allies have proven less steadfast. The European Union is itching to resume payments to the Palestinian Authority, including some government employees' salaries. The US Department of State, unenthused about the salaries, is nonetheless pondering a pool of "humanitarian" aid.

This is nothing short of capitulation. Aid funneled through an international fund will not be subject to US congressional restrictions. It will immediately lift pressure on the Hamas government. It will free money for state terror. Too cruel?

Though the Palestinians were until recently the world's number one beneficiary of per capita aid, an end to international assistance is indeed harsh. But let us recall that the Palestinian people freely and overwhelming elected Hamas. This was not (though some may quibble) an act of God. Hamas too has a choice; these consequences can be averted through the simple and customary expedient of recognizing the agreements forged by past governments, and acknowledging Israel's right to exist and renouncing violence. We cannot force this choice on Hamas, but its constituents can.

If this is still more than some can stomach, consider the rest of the world. For how long did the people of Darfur languish and die before nations rebooted their collective conscience? How much aid flowed to the Afghans when they were crushed by the Taliban?

The Palestinian people and their government have choices to make. They will live with the consequences of those choices. Israel, too, must decide whether to divorce itself from the West Bank and Gaza, recognizing that what may be over the fence is a terrorist state. But the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, whatever that means, will not end the terrorism, nor will cash handouts.

The Palestinians must decide the way forward for themselves. And no amount of cajoling, strategizing or talking can change this most basic fact. The United States should support moderate parties, and encourage pluralistic democracy. But at the end of the day, Washington can only hold open the door to peace and freedom; no one can be forced to walk through.- Published 1/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

At the height of the second intifada, in October 2024, I was one of those who called publicly upon the Palestinian National Authority to dissolve itself. At the time, it seemed to me that the PNA's legitimacy was being undermined by two opposing forces: Hamas and the other radical movements, Islamic and non-Islamic; and Israel.

The first made it impossible for the PNA to fulfill its obligations under Palestinian-Israeli agreements for preventing the use of force against Israel, whether through terrorism or resistance. The second, by building settlements and reoccupying Palestinian territories, made it impossible for the PNA to be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It was one of those ironies of history in which two arch enemies work in unison to achieve the same strategic goal: ending the possibility of a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli question.

My appeal at the time was meant to affirm that the Oslo process had in practice come to an end. Israel, the international community and the different Palestinian forces, including Hamas, would once again face the same strategic choices they had encountered before the Oslo process was launched.

Yet the PNA, having failed in substance, nevertheless remained resilient in form. Whether under the leadership of Yasser Arafat or Mahmoud Abbas, the PNA lost its powers to manage both Palestinian lives and the Palestinian cause. The Israeli propensity for unilateral steps, including building the separation wall, and the success of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections opened the door for a fundamentally new Palestinian situation: the PNA, built upon the legitimacy of the Oslo process, is now led by a force that is in total opposition to this process. In fact, as Hamas became the leader of the Palestinian people not only did the Oslo process come into question and not only was the two-state solution put to a test, but the entire peaceful approach to the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict may have reached its end.

Fortunately, this is not the only development. The Palestinian people have continued to support the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Fateh and the majority of the Palestinian political forces continue to believe in the two-state solution to the Palestinian historical calamity. As a result, a classic contradiction between national goals and sources of legitimacy has evolved in Palestinian society. The current climate of severe economic distress, siege of the Palestinian polity, isolation from the outside world, dissemination of arms among all factions and highly weakened forces of law and order are all ingredients of chaos and possible civil war. The signs are already there in the latest clashes between Hamas and Fateh forces, the deployment of organized Hamas security groups and their forced withdrawal at the hands of mainly Fateh security forces.

The emergence of a possible Somalia-like situation in the Palestinian territories is of great concern to Egypt. The declaration by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior about the training and financing of the recent terrorist operation in the Sinai resort town of Dhahab by Qaeda groups in Gaza bespeaks more to come in the event of a total collapse of the PNA. This collapse, in turn, would make the Palestinian territories a hotbed of regional terrorism, with links to Iraqi Qaeda groups and with Iranian revolutionary meddling. Chaos in Palestine would threaten Egyptian national security with terrorism, drug trafficking and regional instability.

Of no less importance, the entire regional peace build-up that Egypt helped to create over the past three decades would become severely vulnerable. Confrontation with Israel would be part of Palestinian chaos; this was the case during the civil war in Lebanon. Israeli use of force, based on past experience would be excessive, and would put Egyptian Arab responsibilities to a test that Egypt has always tried to avoid. The possible extension of the Palestinian chaos into Jordan would not only jeopardize the Jordanian-Israeli peace, but could extend the violence to the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese borders as well.

In reality, the collapse of the PNA would not only end any Palestinian political option for Israel but would also put an end to the role that the PLO has played in Arab political and diplomatic circles. As the main PLO personalities would be involved in a bloody confrontation in the Palestinian territories, it would be very difficult for the remaining leadership in Tunis, without Arafat this time, to lead the Palestinian people.

Nature would be taking its course in "Palestine", where reason lost its way and the principal actors failed to realize that order, as bad as it might be, is much better than chaos.- Published 1/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Abdel Monem Said Aly is director of Al Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies in Cairo.

BI: The UN has just asked for what was described as an "unprecedented increase" in the level of humanitarian assistance for the occupied Palestinian territories. How bad is the situation at the moment?

Shearer: It's bad, it's getting much worse and we expect it to get much worse quickly. The reason is that people have started from a very low level in terms of their savings and coping mechanisms after the last five years of the intifada. For three months now, Palestinian Authority workers' salaries have not been paid and these people support one quarter of the population. As of now, a quarter of all Palestinians are without a breadwinner. This will massively increase poverty levels.

In addition, those PA workers include the doctors and the nurses, the policemen, the teachers etc., who are responsible for providing the services as any government does. We fear that over time, those structures will slowly start to disintegrate because these people will not, or are not going to be able, to get into work.

The third thing we worry about is that the non-payment of security staff will fuel the insecurity that's apparent at the moment. If that worsens it will negatively affect potential investment into the territory and make our jobs as relief providers much more difficult.

BI: But this appeal is for humanitarian assistance. This cannot be a replacement for the work of the PA, can it?

Shearer: No. What this appeal will do is two things: it will plug some gaps in some of the services the PA is unable to provide and try to support the continuation of some PA services, as much as we can; and it will aim to soften the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable.

But it will certainly not stop the general slide downwards. We simply cannot--the UN cannot and neither can any of the other international agencies--take over and replace the complex and wide range of services provided by the PA.

BI: How close is the PA to complete collapse?

Shearer: I think the word collapse is a little misleading. I don't think we will wake up one morning and find that the PA has collapsed. I think what we will see is a slow degrading and disintegration of services.

For example, looking at the health structure, if nurses and doctors are not being paid, what we will see happening more frequently is people not turning up to work or turning up to work less frequently. The simple reason is that many have to come from out of town and they have to buy the bus fare. They have to weigh up whether they want to spend that money on getting to work or on their family. People are going to have to make very simple economic decisions. The remarkable thing is that after three months of not getting paid, people are still turning up to work.

Take the example of the vaccination service. The Palestinians have a very high level of vaccinations, comparable to any western country. UNICEF has secured all the vaccinations needed for the West Bank and Gaza. A big difficulty for UNICEF is getting the vaccines into Gaza through the Karni crossing. Then, once the vaccines are at the hospitals, the Palestinian health ministry has to distribute them and administer them. That requires staff and the staff have to turn up to work. But even if there is staff, what we are now finding is that there is still a problem because the cars they use don't have fuel or they are in need of repair because the PA cannot pay for it.

Even when they do get on the road, in the West Bank they have to navigate a huge array of roadblocks and checkpoints. In many cases, at checkpoints cool boxes are opened and that can compromise the effectiveness of the vaccines.

So there is a complex of problems in just getting and putting a vaccination service in place. And, ultimately, it depends on health staff turning up and their ability to move around.

BI: If this situation continues, the PA is unable to pay its employees, and as you say people will make simple economic decisions, won't the PA eventually simply stop functioning?

Shearer: I don't think it will completely stop functioning. Some people will leave, possibly others will join who will work voluntarily. What will happen is that the PA's effectiveness will be seriously compromised over time. Remember that donor countries have invested over seven billion dollars into creating and building the PA. There's a good chance that this money--or at least much of it--will be wasted.

The key issue is that if the PA stops functioning there will be a much worse humanitarian crisis then there is now. There is no way that we or anybody else can step in and take over.

BI: You say no one can step in. In the case that the PA stops functioning, what will happen? Israel, under international law, is responsible for those under its occupation. What is the likely scenario?

Shearer: Israel, under international law, bears the responsibility for the people under its occupation, i.e., the Palestinians. Since the Oslo Accords, donors have put seven billion dollars into creating the PA and maintaining it. In a sense, the creation of the PA took the responsibility away from Israel and put it on the shoulders of Palestinians to administer their own services.

But the obligation [on Israel] is still there, and as things erode and the PA becomes increasingly unable to administer its own services, Israel will be looked at as having the primary responsibility to make sure Palestinians don't suffer.

BI: There are attempts to get funding to the Palestinians by bypassing the PA. Is there a way to avoid the near-collapse of the PA without a political solution?

Shearer: There are stopgap measures that can be looked at. I think the temporary international mechanism that was announced by the Quartet and which the EU is leading at the moment is an attempt to keep basic services functioning without putting money through the PA. It's still very early to see how successful that mechanism is going to be. We are waiting to see how it will work and the quantity and extent of what it can do.

But it's likely that the mechanism will be fairly modest and therefore will not replace to any extent the coverage of services and the extent of the salaries that the PA has been paying.

BI: Isn't there, through these rather torturous measures to get funding somehow to Palestinians, a kind of duplication going on since there is already a structure to deal with these things in the PA? Are donors trying to build a parallel structure to the PA?

Shearer: For the last ten or more years the international community has been adamant about trying to build one structure with one treasury account that can give the greatest degree of transparency. The more mechanisms that are set up, and this also refers to the way we provide assistance, the more duplication and opaqueness will occur that will obscure the real need and not guarantee full coverage.

For example, within the PA there is a very effective system of dispensing drugs and supplies to hospitals and health clinics through its central pharmacy. Some donors are now insisting that while they are prepared to provide medicines and drugs, those medicines and drugs should be delivered directly to hospitals and clinics, bypassing the central pharmacy.

What that conceivably means is that some hospitals may get double the amount they need, while others might not get anything at all because there will multiple suppliers possibly with different types of drug protocols delivering to a variety of centers.

What we are saying is, if donors and agencies are going to supply drugs and medicines, put them through the mechanism that is in place, the central pharmacy. Otherwise we simply can't keep track of what place has what and who needs what. Again, what we are trying to do is build on and support the structures that are already in place because they function very effectively.

BI: How concerned are you?

Shearer: I am very concerned. Take any country and say to it, as of tomorrow no civil servants will be paid, no policemen, soldiers, doctors, or teachers will be paid. Try and think through what that will mean--in any country--in terms of people continuing to do their jobs. What would it mean in terms of poverty, the non-payment of loans, the non-availability of credit, in terms of crime and lawlessness?

The Palestinian territory is no different in real terms from any other place. We are looking at an extremely serious situation. And this situation comes on top of the tightest restrictions on Palestinian movement--through over 500 roadblocks and checkpoints--that I have witnessed anywhere.- Published 1/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

David Shearer is the head of the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.