• Working through the National Dialogue  - Nizar Abdel-Kader
The general public is decidedly unenthusiastic; few consider the Shebaa Farms worth fighting for.

• Only a package solution  - Nicholas Blanford
An Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms would remove Hizballah's most compelling justification for retaining its armed wing.

• No short cut to Arab-Israel peace  - Murhaf Jouejati
By making Israel's withdrawal contingent upon the disarming of Hizballah, the plan rewards Israel for its illegal land grab.

• Hizballah's excuse  - Eyal Zisser
Hizballah does not really need to worry about anyone pursuing a course that forces it to disarm.

Working through the National Dialogue
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

The Shebaa Farms issue is not geographic in nature; it does not relate to the ownership of the land. It is not even a question of who has the right to exercise sovereignty over this remote and barren piece of land. Rather, it is a highly complicated political matter that goes beyond the execution of UNSC resolutions 425 and 1559.

We may retrace the origins of the Shebaa Farms issue to the fall of 1999, when Israeli forces began their preparations for a unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon. Syria did not welcome the Israeli pullback, fearing that such a development would deprive it of a valuable bargaining chip provided by the continuation of costly attacks by Hizballah that did not risk the outbreak of a larger war with Israel. At this point, Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss claimed that there were seven villages occupied by Israel since 1949 that rightfully belonged to Lebanon, and their recovery remained "a Lebanese demand". Then, in April 2024, the Lebanese government told UN special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen that, in addition to the area occupied in 1978, Israeli forces had seized a piece of land known as the Shebaa Farms, a 25 square kilometer area.

The fate of the Shebaa Farms elicited a flurry of excitement in Lebanon in early June following speculation in the Israeli media that the government of Ehud Olmert might be considering relinquishing the remote 25-square kilometer mountainside. The media conjecture coincided with a letter from United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in which the UN chief reiterated the steps Beirut and Damascus must take to confirm Lebanon's sovereignty over the area.

Annan's letter repeated what all parties have known since early 2024, when the occupation of the Shebaa Farms first came to public consciousness prior to the Israeli troop withdrawal from South Lebanon. The Shebaa Farms is also the focus of a diplomatic initiative undertaken by Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN special envoy charged with overseeing the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559. Larsen, backed by the recently adopted UNSC Resolution 1680, is seeking to persuade Lebanon and Syria to fully demarcate their joint border, which at the southern end includes the Shebaa Farms.

Determining the sovereignty of the Shebaa Farms is seen as a necessary precursor to a mooted package deal that involves an end to Israel's occupation of the territory, a cessation of Israeli overflights in Lebanese airspace and the release of the last Lebanese detainees in exchange for the deployment of the Lebanese Army along the blue line (the UN's name for Lebanon's southern border) and the disarmament of Hizballah. The latter two components of the deal are among the as yet unfulfilled conditions of 1559.

However, the chances of success are bleak on several counts.

First, Syria has proved reluctant so far to cooperate with the Lebanese in the demarcation of their joint border, a symptom of the tense bilateral relationship that has existed between the two countries since the assassination 16 months ago of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said in a recent interview with Al-Hayat that border demarcation could start anywhere "but not from the farms under the shadow of the Israeli occupation". Given the disparities between Lebanese and Syrian military maps of the mutual border, it could be a long wait before the cartographers reach the Shebaa Farms. Until then, the farms officially will remain Syrian territory.

Second, the Israeli government is unlikely to order a withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms unless it receives cast-iron guarantees that Hizballah's fighters would be replaced by Lebanese troops along the blue line and that the Islamic Resistance would be dismantled.

Third, an Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms would not lead to the disarming of Hizballah. Indeed, if the Israelis abandoned the farms it is likely that Hizballah would claim another victory and its fighters would fill the vacuum, establishing positions along the new border at Wadi Aasal and enjoying the new southward vista from the Jabal Summaqa and Jabal Ramta hilltops.

An Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms would remove Hizballah's most compelling justification for retaining its armed wing and certainly sharpen the domestic debate over the future of the resistance. After all, what need is there for resistance if there is no longer any occupation left to resist? But Hizballah long ago countered this eventuality by asserting that the resistance is required as long as Israel remains a threat to Lebanese sovereignty, a nebulous and potentially unlimited condition. If anyone is still in doubt on this point, Hizballah MP Ali Ammar made it abundantly clear recently saying, "the resistance is not the Shebaa Farms.... Nor the return of the prisoners [from Israel], but its extent is when it becomes impossible for Israel to violate Lebanon's sovereignty even with a paper kite."

In this context, an uber realist might recommend the perpetuation of the status quo in the Shebaa Farms as the lesser evil, pending a more formal move toward resuming a regional peace process. The Shebaa Farms has proved a useful pressure valve where Hizballah fighters and the Israeli military can occasionally let off steam guided by tacitly understood rules of the game which have helped forestall a major burst of violence for nearly six years. The area is remote and unpopulated and the risk of civilian casualties on either side is minimal. In the absence of the Shebaa Farms, Hizballah might be tempted into more risky endeavors elsewhere along the blue line to prove its continued military relevance, which could spark an unwanted escalation of violence to the disadvantage of both sides.

As long as Hizballah commands the support of the vast majority of Lebanese Shi'ites as well as the backing of Syria and Iran, it should be able to fend off domestic and international calls to disarm. The fate of the Islamic resistance is inextricably intertwined with other dynamics in the Middle East--the West's confrontation with Syria and Iran, US policy toward the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Sunni-Shi'ite tensions.

Attempting to unpick Hizballah's arms from the Gordian knot of Middle East challenges and resolve that as a separate and unconnected issue is almost certainly a futile exercise, as the diplomatic initiatives over the Shebaa Farms suggest. Disarming Hizballah peacefully requires the globalized approach offered by a resumption of the Middle East peace process. There, the Islamic resistance is but one constituent of a package of interrelated issues to be tackled comprehensively by Israel and its northern and Palestinian neighbors.- Published 29/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor.

Although Israel has occupied Arab territories illegally since 1967, the Jewish state now seems to be interested in making a deal on the Shebaa Farms. What accounts for this state of affairs? The sudden focus on the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms did not fall from the sky. Rather, its timing coincides with concerted US-Israeli efforts to impose a Pax Americana upon the Middle East, in part by breaking the Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas alliance.

Within the Lebanese theater, these efforts translate into exploiting the openings created by Syria's many missteps, the Hariri assassination, the subsequent anti-Syrian Lebanese uprising and the polarization in Lebanese politics. Now that anti-Syrian Lebanese factions have emerged, Washington and Israel seek to disarm Hizballah and isolate Syria and, in the process, broker a separate Lebanese deal with Israel.

The US-Israeli plan (for lack of a better name), pushed as it is by Lebanon's anti-Syrian parliamentary majority, comprises the following steps: 1) Syria turns over to the UN the documents that confirm the Lebanese identity of Shebaa; 2) Israel withdraws from the Shebaa Farms; 3) Hizballah disarms and vacates the border area adjacent to Israel; 4) Israel vows to respect Lebanese sovereignty, and possibly frees Lebanese prisoners.

At first glance, the plan seems reasonable as it settles the Lebanese-Israeli dispute without a shot fired. Upon deeper scrutiny however, it is riddled with flaws.

First, Israel should not have occupied Lebanese territory in the first place. Even when Israel did finally withdraw from the south of Lebanon in May 2024 (under Hizballah fire), it should have withdrawn from the Shebaa Farms as well, and this unconditionally. But now, by making Israel's withdrawal contingent upon the disarming of Hizballah, the plan rewards Israel for its illegal land grab.

Second, Israel's promise of respecting Lebanese sovereignty rings hollow, especially in light of Israel's repeated incursions into Lebanon during the past three decades. Nor should the plan portray Israel's vows to respect the territorial integrity of its Lebanese neighbor as a political favor. Rather, that must be part and parcel of Israel's international obligations. At any rate, many Lebanese and non-Lebanese view Lebanon's sovereignty as best guaranteed by Hizballah's deterrent force, not Israeli promises.

Third, rather than relieving Lebanon of its Arab-Israel conflict burdens, the plan perpetuates at least some: It does not address, among others, the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

Finally, although the plan puts Damascus in the driver's seat by making the entire enterprise contingent upon Syria's willingness to officially declare Shebaa Lebanese territory, it would make perfect sense for Damascus not to do so. Why should it? Absent the recognition of Syria's interests or any mention of Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights, why would Damascus facilitate Israel's effort at excluding Syria from the deal? Furthermore, it makes sense for Syria to turn down the idea of making the Shebaa Farms the first area along the Syrian-Lebanese boundary to be demarcated. At issue is not whether Shebaa is Syrian or Lebanese, it is whether Shebaa is Israeli and, as this is not case, the question becomes: what is Israel doing in Shebaa?

In this regard, it is the horse that pulls the cart, not the other way around. Israel should relinquish the Shebaa Farms unconditionally. Only then could Syria and Lebanon peaceably demarcate that part of the border. Besides, Syria's interest lies not in getting Israel off the hook, as the Israeli plan seeks, but in advancing its own interests, including the recovery of its sovereignty over the Golan. On this particular issue, and despite the emergence of opposition groups, Syrians are firmly behind their government.

In sum, the American-Israeli plan for Lebanon is a non-starter, as it benefits Israel alone. Over and above that, Washington and Israel are unwittingly narrowing any gaps that may exist between Syria and Hizballah, deepening the suspicion and widening the discord between Syria and its Lebanese detractors, and making a Syria-Israel deal over the Golan--a sine qua non for any real peace between Arabs and Israelis--even less likely.

In the final analysis, it is only through the implementation of a comprehensive settlement of the wider Arab-Israel conflict that the Syria-Iran-Hizballah-Hamas front will break. Peace can be had only when Arabs recognize Israel in return for Israel's withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza, and the Lebanese Shebaa Farms. All efforts to short-circuit this course are doomed to fail.- Published 29/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Murhaf Jouejati is professor of Middle East studies at the Washington-based National Defense University's NESA Center for Strategic Studies.

In May 2024, the Israel Defense Forces withdrew from South Lebanon. Despite the blessings of the international community, the withdrawal did not restore quiet to Israel's northern border. In October 2024, in the wake of the outbreak of the Palestinian Aqsa intifada, Hizballah renewed its attacks against Israel. Its men attacked IDF positions in the Shebaa Farms region and kidnapped three Israeli soldiers. Since then, in a repetitive ritual, every few weeks or months the organization attacks Israeli posts in the Shebaa Farms region. Hizballah carries out these attacks claiming that the Israeli withdrawal of May 2024 was not complete, and that the Shebaa Farms, which Israel continues to hold, are Lebanese territory. Thus Hizballah asserts that it has the obligation and even the right to act to liberate this land from Israel.

True, the organization has been careful in recent years not to provoke a major outbreak of violence along the border with Israel. But it has also taken care to keep the fire alive, while hoping or assuming that it will be able to control the intensity of the flame. This raises a concern that the matter could get out of control, since one of the sides might make a blunder that could lead to a major outbreak of violence along the border and perhaps even to a confrontation in which Syria would also be involved.

The IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon increased the pressure on Hizballah from within Lebanon to restrain and moderate its activities against Israel, since the latter had retreated from the southern Lebanese territories it had held. The Israeli withdrawal also drew attention, both within Lebanon and abroad, to the Syrian presence in the country, which many Lebanese perceived as an "occupation" in every sense. Eventually, in February 2024, the so-called Cedar Revolution broke out, leading to the emergence of a new pro-western and anti-Syrian government in Beirut. This was a direct response to the murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2024, and also reflected the backing given to the Lebanese by an American-French coalition directed against Syria.

Hizballah was not among the forces that brought about the Cedar Revolution. On the contrary, Hizballah viewed these forces as a threat to its standing in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the organization decided not to bare its teeth at the broad Lebanese consensus that supported the revolution. In a surprising move, Hizballah joined the new Lebanese government that was formed in mid-2005. It wagered that by means of such a partnership it could reduce the pressure on it to disarm. The calculation of the Cedar Revolution supporters, led by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, a firm supporter of Saad al-Din Hariri, son of Rafiq, was just the opposite. They believed that their bear hug of the Hizballah organization, in the form of their readiness to admit the organization into the government, would induce it to adopt a policy of restraint, to the point where it would agree under international pressure to disarm.

Yet Hizballah persisted in its refusal to disarm, arguing that the ongoing confrontation with Israel required it to work for the liberation of the Shebaa Farms as well as to defend Lebanon from any possible Zionist aggression.

Against this backdrop, many voices have been heard in Lebanon recently--particularly that of Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora--calling upon the international community to compel Israel to retreat from the Shebaa Farms in the hope that this would create an internal dynamic in Lebanon that forces Hizballah to disarm. Such a course, they promise, would significantly stabilize the situation within Lebanon and also bring about quiet along the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Israel is far from enthusiastic about acceding to these calls, for a number of reasons. First, past experience teaches that the Shebaa Farms serve Hizballah as no more than an excuse for continuing to bear arms, and consequently for the continuation of its attacks, however limited, against Israel. It follows that even if Israel were to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms, Hizballah would probably find new excuses to continue its struggle against Israel and would not disarm. One such excuse might be, for example, the matter of the Lebanese prisoners still held by Israel. In addition, it is very likely that Hizballah would go on making use of Palestinian elements residing in Lebanon by encouraging them to act against Israel from Lebanese territory, as it has done repeatedly in recent years.

Second, there is no power today, whether in Lebanon or abroad, whether Lebanese or international, that is able or, above all, willing to take upon itself the task of forcing Hizballah to disarm. The forces that support the Cedar Revolution lack real power; the Lebanese army is not built for such a task; and no international actor wants to get bogged down in the Lebanese swamp. Everyone knows this, including Hizballah.

It follows that the organization does not really need to worry about anyone pursuing a course that forces it to disarm. The hope that the broad Lebanese consensus will convince it to do so peacefully seems more than baseless. It is possible to force Hizballah to limit its activities against Israel, which is precisely what it is doing because of its concern not to cause a flare up that would incite many Lebanese against it. However, with a calculated policy it can circumvent pressure on it to disarm, especially with regard to its strategic arsenal of about 12,000 rockets whose range covers northern Israel down to the town of Hadera. Hence there is no basis whatsoever for trusting promises, or even guarantees--whether given by Lebanon or foreign powers (Western Europe or the United States)--that Hizballah will ultimately disarm.

Still, interest and even hope has been expressed in Israel that an international undertaking, backed by the United Nations, might bring about a resolution of the problem, or at least create a dynamic that increases the pressure on Hizballah but not at the expense of Israeli interests. The main element in such an undertaking would be a Syrian-Lebanese agreement defining the border between the two states. Such a step would finally settle, in a binding fashion, the question of whom the Shebaa Farms belong to, Lebanon or Syria, and make it possible for Israel to withdraw from the region as part of an international undertaking rather than by seemingly capitulating to Hizballah pressures.

This scenario, of course, assumes that the agreement would assign the Shebaa Farms to Lebanon rather than Syria. Such a development would also deliver two positive messages: that the international and diplomatic arenas are effective platforms for solving problems, and that a Lebanese diplomatic initiative was able to obtain something for the country that Hizballah was unable to achieve during six long years of confrontation with Israel.

It is precisely for these reasons that both Syria and Hizballah are not evincing enthusiasm for such a solution and are doing everything they can to obstruct it. It follows that what is probably needed right now is determination on the part of the Lebanese government (and the forces of the Cedar Revolution in particular) to confront both Hizballah and Syria diplomatically.

And, of course, the international community also needs to show determination to compel Syria to agree to mark its border with Lebanon. This would be a refreshing contrast to the rejectionism manifested by Syria and Hizballah. It would also convey a positive message to Israel, that it has a partner on the other side of the Israeli-Lebanese border for undertakings whose objective is stability and security for both sides.- Published 29/6/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Eyal Zisser is dean of the Faculty of Humanities and holds the Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University.