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Edition 27 Volume 4 - July 20, 2024
Lebanon and Israel: the regional dimension
As Lebanon burns, Syria finds supporters again
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Rime Allaf In Syria, the peculiar sight of a brand new trinity consisting of Nasrallah and Moqtada Sadr flanking Bashar Assad is being paraded.
Could Tehran emerge as the ultimate winner? -
Iason Athanasiadis It was no accident that Riyadh issued a statement condemning Hizballah's "miscalculated adventures".
The risks of winning -
Akram Baker Nasrallah has effectively driven a mighty nail into the coffin of the US misadventure in Iraq.
Israel's response is proportional to Hizballah's challenge
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an interview with
Efraim Halevy We'll have at least another eight days of fighting, and therefore it is too early to call the outcome.
A Lebanese initiative -
Chibli Mallat The Lebanese government needs to act as the sole and exclusive legal agent in any solution on behalf of Lebanon.
As Lebanon burns, Syria finds supporters again
Rime Allaf By the time the atrocities of Israel's latest aggression on Lebanon have been digested, the victims counted and buried, and the astronomical physical damage estimated, the region will be adjusting to a new status quo probably not intended by Israel and its allies. Neither the elimination or disarmament of Hizballah nor the sidelining of Iran or Syria is likely to happen in this manner, and the latter even stands to gain much political ground. While reports of Syrian influence on Hizballah's decisions are certainly exaggerated, it is highly likely that Syrian advice regarding the capture of Israeli soldiers would have been encouragement, rather than dissuasion, and facilitation rather than impediment.
At its simplest level, the outcome of the violent Israeli attack is the demonstration, once and for all--as the Syrian regime has been claiming all along--that the international support for Lebanon's freedom and independence is nothing more than a defunct slogan from a mock Cedar Revolution, applying only to Syria in the context of dangerous plans for the region. By refusing to condemn Israel or to demand a halt to its aggression (implying the acceptance of a buffer zone in Lebanon after the country has been brought to its knees), accepting the de facto "collateral damage" that comes with it, the G8 has hammered the nail into the coffin of Lebanese sovereignty and simultaneously proven Syria right on many fronts, especially as the G8 countries continue to blame Damascus (and Tehran) for the savage destruction wrought by Israel. With this attitude, these powers have made the Syrian regime's position seem more credible and consistent, and its complaints about UNSC Resolution 1559 rational.
Notwithstanding the tiring official Syrian rhetoric and the self-congratulatory tone of reports of Syrian help on state television, which has been in "breaking news" mode since Israel attacked, it is difficult to dispute the conclusions drawn by the regime as it watches developments, probably with some glee. The first batch of escapees from Lebanon, many of them from the Gulf, automatically turned to Damascus, filling its hotels and crowding its airport, conveniently proving Syria's Arabist credentials, especially in times of need.
With less affluent refugees flocking across the borders, and with its main allies in Lebanon still managing to maintain their stride despite (or perhaps because of) the horrific pounding by Israel, Syrian officials are now enjoying the opportunity to look and act magnanimous--especially in comparison with other Arab regimes that have shocked many in the Arab world with their unprecedented condemnation of Hizballah. In such circumstances, the cold shoulder influential Arab countries are giving Syria bears little weight, even giving the Syrian regime an unexpected popularity on the street level.
Indeed, the more Israel pounds Lebanon and Palestine and the more its "right to defend itself" is asserted by its supporters, the more a new arrangement of pictures of anti-American figures appear in demonstrations around the Arab world: pictures of political clerics (such as Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, or the Iraqi Mahdi Army's Moqtada Sadr) are more common these days, but so are combinations with secular, nationalist leaders. In Cairo, photos of Nasrallah were brandished side-by-side with those of Gamal Abdel Nasser this week, while in Syria, the peculiar sight of a brand new trinity consisting of Nasrallah and Sadr flanking Bashar Assad is being paraded. The intended message is clear: these are the ones who are steadfastly defending national rights in the Arab world.
Clearly, there are some blemishes in this picture of selfless patriotism. Most importantly, Syria did not come rushing to the aid of Lebanon, regardless of defense treaties and "brotherly ties" so strong that diplomatic relations are deemed unnecessary by the Syrian regime. Syria's declarations of support have come from the safety of its own borders and actual assistance has been minimal. For all its perceived self-importance, the Syrian regime has done very little to aid Lebanon economically (and nothing at all militarily), and continues to focus its efforts on strengthening only its allies.
Just before Israel began its assault, Syrian activists calling for the sovereignty of Lebanon and for relations based on mutual respect were being dragged from their homes and thrown into jail where they remain, and the regime was demanding public apologies from the Lebanese who had dared do likewise. Support for Lebanon will remain limited to support for the Lebanese who acknowledge Syria's position as a leader in this relationship, not as an equal partner.
But whatever the flaws in this self-perception, Syria--with a great deal of Israeli and "international" help--has managed to reverse an isolation it did not like. Although Saudi Arabia and Egypt have decried Hizballah's actions and tried to avoid Syria, the latter has regained significance on the Lebanese front. President Bush's belief that perhaps Assad could end it all was, in itself, an admission of Syria's importance to the US and its allies in the region, and surely the cause of much satisfaction in Damascus, especially given American and Israeli reluctance to take the fight to Syria's own turf as 1559 comes on the agenda again.
Other matters such as the demarcation of borders, or assassination investigations, will be put on the back burner for the time being. So far, as Lebanon's systematic destruction continues, Syria's supporters are daring to speak out again; undoubtedly, the Syrian regime has been the biggest beneficiary of Israeli brutality and American incompetence.- Published 20/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.orgRime Allaf is an associate fellow at London's Chatham House. Could Tehran emerge as the ultimate winner? Iason AthanasiadisLebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt calls it "an Iranian war". The Washington Post quoted an un-named Bush administration official saying "there is a hegemonic Persian threat [running] through Damascus, through the southern suburbs of Beirut and to the Palestinians in Hamas." Russian President Vladimir Putin cryptically hinted that "it is our impression that... Israelis [are] pursuing wider goals."
So what is Israel's ongoing military campaign in Lebanon really about? Why does once-distant Tehran suddenly loom over the Levant battlefield? And who will come out of this affair with the most political capital?
Certainly not Lebanon. Its shattered infrastructure testifies to the cynical use of this small nation as a proxy battleground once again. Syria is similarly content to stay on the sidelines, too weak to engage as it did in the Soviet-sponsored, heady adventuring of the 1960s and 70s.
But exactly 50 years after the Suez War spelled the end of British and French imperial hegemony in the Middle East and marked the emergence of Israel's military power, this new conflict could mark a new chapter: the ascendancy of Iran.
That is definitely the feeling in Tehran. Iranian analysts see the Middle East as being at the twilight of American unilateralism and on the eve of a new multi-polarity that will see Moscow and Beijing added to the global actors jostling for influence here. The end result will be something closer to the Cold War stand-off between regional powers. It will also spell an end to the American and Israeli-led military destabilization that has characterized the region for the past 16 years. Iran and Syria will likely see their regional influence boosted in the process.
These are not the vibes in Tehran alone. Iran's Arab neighbors have been tracking the rise in influence of their Persian neighbor, unseen since the days of the Shah.
Speaking to me in Tehran, Middle East specialist Kayhan Barzegar offered a vignette from a recent Persian Gulf conference that perfectly illustrates the concern among Arab states over their waning influence. "Saudi participants discussed the Arab perspective on Iran," Barzegar said. "They described Iran and the US as two elephants. When they fight, or even when they make love, the grass underneath gets trampled."
If Iran is an elephant and the Arab world the turf on which it carries out many of its foreign policy calculations, it makes for a terrifying Middle East tomorrow. But Barzegar is confident of his prediction. He argues that Israel, Turkey and Iran are the great powers of today's Middle East. None of them are Arab. So with former political heavyweights Egypt and Syria remaining silent as Israeli jets pound Lebanon, Saudi Arabia criticizing Hizballah in a tone without precedent and Iraq and Palestine in flames, have we arrived at another twilight for the Arab world?
"The new Iran has emerged in the Middle East, and America and Europe are coming to terms with it," Barzegar concludes.
That is exactly what is keeping Arab leaders awake at night. It was no accident that Riyadh issued a statement condemning Hizballah's "miscalculated adventures carried out by elements inside the state and those behind them" on the third day of the Israeli attack. Iranian national security chief Ali Larijani knew who the Saudis were referring to when he made a lightning visit to Riyadh the very next day for "consultations on bilateral relations and regional developments", as acute an indication of trouble as the region's stifled media can express.
The timing of Israel's latest adventure marks another anniversary: ten years since the ill-fated Grapes of Wrath campaign, another Israeli invasion of Lebanon that led to the strengthening of Hizballah and, four years later, the ultimate withdrawal of the Israeli army from southern Lebanon.
This time, the stakes are infinitely higher. With Iraq removed from the region's power equations and dangerously destabilized, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are feeling distinctly weak as they confront a resurgent Shi'ite Islamic Republic. That goes a long way toward explaining their pregnant silence in the face of Israel's ongoing campaign.
"Regional leaders want to find a way to navigate unease on their streets and deal with the strategic threats [in order] to take down Hizballah and Hamas, to come out of the crisis where they are not as ascendant," the same un-named US official told The Washington Post.
Washington will be worried lest this latest spin of the dice backfires as disastrously as Iraq and Afghanistan. After all, two foreign policy failures in the greater Middle East arena are possibly salvageable. A third could spell the end of Washington's brief stranglehold over the region and the muscling-in of new international actors.
At a time when Israel would be stretched in extending a conventional military campaign to Tehran's door-step, a strengthened Iran could emerge from the current chaos. The development of Tehran as a powerful anti-western regional pole would make it a prime candidate for further geopolitical investment by Moscow and Beijing, two powers that have watched America's adventures in the region from the sidelines for the past 16 years. Lebanon 2024 could be remembered as the return of a multi-polar Middle East.- Published 20/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org Iason Athanasiadis is an Istanbul-based writer and photographer who lived in Iran from 2024 to 2024.
The risks of winning Akram BakerWith the brazen attack on Israeli forces last week, and the outrageously disproportionate Israeli military response underway, Hassan Nasrallah has effectively driven a mighty nail into the coffin of the US misadventure in Iraq. As a byproduct, Hizballah may have also taken a first step toward Sunni-Shi'ite reconciliation.
It is important to understand that Hizballah is first and foremost a national Lebanese movement that is almost exclusively focused on the Land of the Cedars. The border attack and immediate aftermath--which left eight Israeli soldiers dead and two in the hands of Hizballah--was ostensibly carried out to secure the release of long-serving Lebanese prisoners being held illegally in Israeli jails, some for over 20 years. However it was much more than a meticulously planned military operation. Nasrallah, Hizballah's secretary general, understood that he had a golden opportunity, however slight, to shift the balance of power in the region. While the inherent risks of such a move are invariably high, one cannot say that the logic behind him rolling the dice doesn't have merit.
The circumstances that allowed Nasrallah to act arose from a number of factors. First and foremost is the Iraqi quagmire, where the US is hopelessly bogged down, desperately fighting off an ever more powerful Sunni insurgency. The US's nominal allies in Iraq, the majority Shi'ites, have been skillfully playing their hand by more or less refraining from an all-out war against the US-led coalition, leveraging their political and street clout to hold out for absolute supremacy in the country. By implicitly threatening to throw their significant weight behind the anti-American insurgency (even if it is in a different form) if their demands are not met, it is the Shi'ites, and by extension Iran, who are holding the balance of power between the two great rivers. At the same time, flush with petro-dollars and a nascent nuclear program, Tehran is increasingly confident that the US does not possess the military and political capability to inflict strategic damage on their country while tied up next door. President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad and the Supreme Council are acutely aware that they can cause serious havoc to US interests by proxy in Iraq if attacked. The US government is also obviously conscious of this fact.
The second variable in the equation is Syria. Battered and wounded in Lebanon following the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri, Syrian President Bashar Assad has been looking for ways to regain the initiative. Syrian military intelligence is suspected of destabilizing the country by orchestrating a series of lethal car bombings in Beirut since the abrupt withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon last year. Assad's only hope of regaining a solid foothold in Lebanon is through Hizballah and he needed to leverage any power he had.
Israel, despite its constant and empty cries of innocence, has also played a dangerous game in Lebanon since its hasty withdrawal from the country in 2024. By hanging on to an insignificant piece of land (the Sheba'a Farms), refusing to hand over maps showing where Israel laid land mines during the occupation, and constantly violating the sovereign airspace and territorial waters of Lebanon for the past six years, successive Israeli governments have actively poured poison into the already toxic mix that is Lebanese politics.
As is the case in Gaza, Israel may have removed its forces, but it never allowed either the Lebanese or Palestinian governments to fully exercise control over their land. Add on the brutalities of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, especially the daily bombardment of Gaza and the rising number of civilian casualties, and it is clear that Israel has almost been daring someone to hit back. With an abundance of blind support from Washington--where everything is viewed through the warped lens of the "war on terror"--Israel felt immune to the consequences of its actions. By isolating and starving the duly-elected, Hamas-led Palestinian Authority and people, and incessantly shelling Gaza, Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz--non-military men leading a militaristic country--set out to prove that they also could be as tough as any general. When fighters from the Palestinian Resistance Committees succeeded in stinging the IDF in Gaza a few weeks ago with the capture of an Israeli corporal, Olmert categorically ruled out releasing Palestinian prisoners in an exchange, thereby climbing up a tree from which he couldn't come down.
By branding as terrorists or terrorist sympathizers every party, organization, or government that doesn't completely tow their line, Israel, the US, and to a lesser extent the EU have discredited moderates throughout the region and opened the way for more militant organizations. By completely marginalizing Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas for 18 months, Israel more than anyone helped Hamas in gaining an electoral victory. Since the traditionally moderate leadership couldn't gain anything tangible, like the release of prisoners or an easing of the draconian Israeli travel restrictions, the scene was set for any organization promising action.
In carrying out the attack a week ago, Nasrallah was taking advantage of all these circumstances. While operational links between Hizballah and Iran are not really clear, the political and spiritual affiliations are. It is difficult to believe that Iran, at some level, didn't give at least tacit approval to Hizballah prior to executing such a major attack. Again, the stakes are just too high.
The big question right now is how this gamble is going to play out. Israel seems to have no interest in any kind of diplomatic solution and has upped the ante. If Hizballah is able to withstand the Israeli onslaught for another two weeks, inflicting damage to Israeli soldiers and cities while Lebanese casualties mount by the hour and the US stands by idly, then it is possible we will witness growing unrest among the Shi'ite community in Iraq and among Sunni Egyptians and Jordanians, not to mention the newly emboldened Palestinians. This will raise the pressure on the US to rein in Israel, which, if the past is any measure, Israel will acquiesce to. Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners will be reunited with their families, and Hizballah will yet again be the heroes of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Nasrallah, Iran, and Syria will have been correct in their risk assessment, and the moderates throughout the Arab world will pay the price for Israel and the West's folly.
To avoid this scenario, Israel needs to immediately end its illegal and immoral bombing of Lebanon and Gaza, release prisoners to Abbas and the Lebanese government, and start a meaningful and substantial negotiating process with the Palestinians. Hizballah has shown it has the capability to inflict pain on Israel and the US should be extremely wary of turning the Shi'ites against them in Iraq. The only way to bring about a win-win situation is to shift the paradigm in the opposite direction. The world's leaders need to step forward now or bear the consequences.- Published 20/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org Akram Baker is an independent Palestinian political analyst. He is co-president of the Arab Western Summit of Skills, a platform for Arab professionals dedicated to reform and development in the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Israel's response is proportional to Hizballah's challenge
an interview with Efraim HalevyBI: What should Israel's immediate wartime objectives be in the current conflict?
Halevy: I believe that Israel's immediate objectives should be, first, a cessation of hostilities that includes deterrence of the terrorist groups from launching raids into Israel and Israeli-held territory for some time to come; second, obtaining the release of the three captured soldiers at the lowest possible cost; and third, initiating a political process between Israel and those parties that accept and adhere to the norms of international law and conduct, with the goal of reaching a long term interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and a state of calm between Israel and its northern neighbor.
BI: Does Israel also have broader strategic goals as well in this conflict?
Halevy: There are indeed additional strategic goals. One is to reduce the effectiveness of Iran's interference in areas directly of concern to Israel, including Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and among the Arab community of Israel. A second is to reduce the profile of Syria as a regional power in the Middle East and to encourage groups in the region to become disaffected with Iranian support. And a third is to try, in the mid-term, to build bridges between Israel and as many Islamic countries and groups in the Middle East as possible that have the potential of opposing al-Qaeda's international Islamist terror.
BI: How feasible are these goals?
Halevy: A lot will hinge on the outcome of the present confrontation. The greater Israel's success on the battlefield, the greater the capacity to achieve a large degree of these aims; the less the success, the less the chances. As we speak, on the eighth day of the war in the north, things are still very much in the balance. We'll have at least another eight days of fighting, and therefore it is too early to call the outcome.
BI: How do you view the international role in ending this conflict and achieving or thwarting these aims?
Halevy: There are two aspects here. One is the international role in creating channels of communication between Israel and its adversaries since there is no possible dialogue between them at this time. The second role, now being floated, is for an international force to be deployed inside Lebanon, along its border with Israel, to act as a buffer or preventive presence. My view of this second point is that there is only merit in dispatching such a force if all the other elements of an agreement have been reached and the force will deter warring parties from crossing the border. But it should not be counted on for a combat role in the present situation and won't have a capacity to disarm fighters.
BI: Is the Lebanese government capable of working with the parties, including Israel, to achieve these goals? Is reliance on it realistic?
Halevy: Only if Hizballah cooperates. Only if it feels weakened in the field will it acquiesce. In the absence of that, as far as Hizballah is concerned, once the Israel Air Force pounding tapers off, Hizballah will not signal to the Lebanese government any desire to reach a deal with Israel.
BI: Can you comment on the role of Israeli strategic mistakes and of the United States' democratic reform policy for the Middle East in enhancing the power of the Islamist movements that Israel is now confronting?
Halevy: There are those who say we got into this because for many years Israel ignored this threat to its north, turned its eyes away, did not wish to confront Hizballah as it became a political party, joined the Lebanese Cabinet, became more self-assured and dared to take initiatives like that of July 12, thinking Israel would be deterred from responding.
As for America's democratic program, democracy is an evolving culture and not a ready-made item to be bought off the shelf. It has to be grown over years. The idea that you can catapult Arab society into democracy is false. It took some other cultures centuries.
BI: How do you respond to the claim that Israel's military response is disproportional?
Halevy: There is a problem in discussing disproportionality. How do you measure it? By the number of people killed, the size of forces thrown into battle, the amount of damage caused? Hizballah launched a deliberate attack on Israel's sovereignty, a challenge to Israel. It jeered openly at Israel's leaders and transformed an incident into something much bigger than it was, though it was painful in itself, casting it into the role of a strategic event. This was a clear escalation of the relationship on the ground. In terms of the significance of the act I don't think there was a disproportional response by Israel. Hizballah itself clearly stated that this was an act linked to the south, to the kidnapping there, too. It broadened the horizon and gave the event an almost symbolically regional significance. Israel responded in kind and hit back forcefully to cause real pain and damage to the other side.- Published 20/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org Efraim Halevy was head of the Mossad from 1998 to 2024 and served as PM Ariel Sharon's national security adviser from 2024 to 2024. He currently heads the Center for Strategic and Policy Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
A Lebanese initiative Chibli MallatIn times of world crisis, Jean Monnet teaches us to think creatively. Not only because of his well known phrase, "we need to see each crisis as an opportunity," but also because the opening chapter of his Memoirs reveals how he was hours away from arranging for a full union between Britain and France against Hitler's attack. Had he succeeded, World War II might have been much shorter. It certainly would have been very different.
Where would we like to see Israel, Lebanon and Palestine at the end of the crisis? And how can we stop the bloodshed as quickly and as permanently as possible?
Amidst the flurry of proposals, two logics of peace are competing. One is Lebanese-Israeli, the other is regional. While my preference is for as comprehensive a settlement as possible, a full regional solution is more difficult to work out: the more parties to the solution, the more complicated and intertwined the interests. The main obstacle to a regional solution, as things stand, is that Israel, the United States and the European Union refuse to talk with Hamas as the government of Palestine. This refusal makes it much harder to see an effective partner both for reaching an agreement and for the implementation of whatever arrangement might be hammered out by proxy.
This is not the case in a narrower Lebanese-focused arrangement. It departs from the fact that Lebanon is the most aggrieved party--both by the unilateral action of Hizballah and by the massive retaliation by Israel. This means that the Lebanese government needs to act as the sole and exclusive legal agent in any solution on behalf of Lebanon. This is also why it is up to the Lebanese government to table a Security Council resolution that is principled and workable.
With my team in Beirut and New York, we proposed a draft Security Council resolution from the very first day of the crisis on July 12. Its preamble states the unacceptability of the action that triggered the crisis in terms of both international law (violation of the blue line) and domestic law (Hizballah, a non-state party, triggering war). It reaffirms relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the need for Lebanon as a whole to decide upon war and peace, another term for the state's monopoly over violence and the government's exclusive responsibility over borders.
The operative clauses of the draft resolution are three. First is the release of the two Israeli soldiers; second, negotiations between the Israeli government and the Lebanese government through the Security Council over all outstanding issues. The ceasefire should be operational at the beginning of this second phase. A third clause would keep spoilers at bay by the Security Council threatening to name leaders locally and regionally who might prevent the implementation of the two previous clauses. This should reduce the appetite for extremist posturing.
The second clause is the most important. It means that Lebanon is back in full control of its territory, and details can be hammered out later, in a non-violent and inevitably protracted process to sort the disagreements, and they are many, including over the Lebanese citizens still held in Israel.
Since that proposal was made, the G-8 issued the first important collective statement in St Petersburg over this crisis. Its operative clauses have a four-phased plan: release of the two Israeli soldiers, end of Hizballah military action, end of Israeli military action, release of the Palestinian MPs and ministers abducted by Israel. Since that statement several key actors, including the EU and the United Nations secretary general, have proposed the deployment of international troops on the Lebanese-Israeli border, under various forms. Lebanese statesman Ghassan Tueni has advocated the revival of a clause in UN Security Council Resolution 425 that gives deterrent power to UNIFIL, which has been stationed with little effect in South Lebanon since 1978. Others advocate NATO troops. Russia and the EU have expressed readiness to send troops. More ideas will be floated in a week of intense diplomacy.
For reasons outlined above, and in reaction to the G8 statement, I am reluctant to see the Lebanese solution formally tied to the Gaza issue, even if the readiness of the Israeli government to release the Palestinian ministers and deputies is welcome. On the deployment of troops Europe has expressed great generosity, but the political-diplomatic arrangement comes first. In a significant development, the majority of the Lebanese government has found a way to lessen the resistance of Hizballah to a process that may appear as unconditional surrender to Israel's requests. Israeli soldiers can be released into the Lebanese government's care, and this request should develop into an official position of the Lebanese government.
Until a lasting ceasefire is at hand, the Israeli government should resist three temptations: the reoccupation of any part of Lebanon, equating the Hizballah leadership with al-Qaeda and invoking a policy of assassinations that is by nature irreversible, and the punishment of the whole of Lebanon for an action that a small faction has brought upon a largely reluctant population and government. For my part, I have never taken comfort in the killing of Israelis.
I have no illusion about the difficulty of the diplomatic solution, but a Jean Monnet spirit needs to prevail: realistic, comprehensive, statesmanlike and pacifist.- Published 20/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org Chibli Mallat is EU Jean Monnet Professor at Saint Joseph's University in Beirut and a Lebanese presidential candidate.
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