• Hizballah overshadows the Arab regimes -   Hassan A. Barari

• Israel sans frontieres -   George Giacaman

• The danger to Gulf countries -   Mohammed Abdel Qader Jasem

• Saudi Arabia and the war in Lebanon -   Nawaf Obaid

Between the street and the regimes
 Mohamed Abdel Salam

Analysts of "street politics" in the Arab world believe that if Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah, nominated himself as "hypothetical" president of the Arab world, he would win. This would happen despite the fact that he is not a Sunni Muslim, in a region where Sunnis represent 90 percent of the population; that he took an initiative considered by Arab governments as reckless; and despite the disproportionate destruction that has befallen Lebanon as a result of it. And it would happen despite the fear in many Arab countries that this is a "proxy war" linked to Iran. Nasrallah has cleared all these hurdles to reach the status of Arab national hero.

All this can be explained with reference to the perception of the Arab street rather than by Nasrallah's actions. The Arab street sees Nasrallah (and thus Hizballah) as a symbol of resistance against Israel and perhaps against the United States. He has stood firmly against aggressive Israeli policies and taught Israel a lesson the Arab regular armies failed to do, regardless of the consequences. Like Saddam Hussein, he is one of those personalities that have been strongly supported by the street at various times despite the catastrophes they cause. Like in the movies, the street does not much care for the plot, but pays attention to the scenes. The vote of the street can be gained by any actor that, like Nasrallah, says a resounding "no" to existing policy, whatever his tendencies and regardless of his destiny.

Mohamed Abdel Salam heads the Regional Security Program at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.

The sudden eruption of the war in Lebanon and the widely perceived steadfastness of Hizballah in the face of what Arabs see as Israeli aggression has catapulted the party and its leader Hassan Nasrallah into unprecedented prominence on the Arab street. Contrary to the impotent image of Arab regimes, Hizballah has proved itself capable of handling Israeli aggression. Thus, the longer Hizballah can hold out against painful Israeli aerial attacks the more embarrassing this will be to Arab leaders.

Interestingly, Arab leaders are seen by the public as American puppets who have no standing on their own. Some even liken them to the medieval Arab princes who helped the Crusaders occupy Arab land. Much of Arab public criticism has been leveled against the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They are seen as tacitly supporting the onslaught against the Shi'ite Hizballah, lest Iran consolidate a tangible presence in the area.

Initial official statements by Saudi Arabia slammed Hizballah for recklessly provoking Israel to wage a war against Lebanon. The Americans and Israelis saw the Saudi statements as a wink and a nod for the war. The Saudis' recent attempt to pay lip service to the street by condemning Israeli aggression did little to change the initial image of them as docile toward Israel and the United States. Indeed, American sources have emphasized that Arab leaders are only taking a verbal hard line against Israel for domestic reasons; they really support the war against Hizballah.

Despite the initial reservations of some Arabs regarding the wisdom of abducting the two soldiers, the continuation of the war and heavy Lebanese civilian losses have produced a consensus among the Arab street that Israel is both aggressor and criminal. Indeed, this war has electrified Arab public opinion. For this reason, Hizballah's relentless attempt to inflict damage on the north of Israel is seen as a legitimate measure of self-defense, especially in the face of the unchecked Israeli offense.

The Jordanian position regarding the latest escalation is very complex and fluid. The regime is widely seen in Jordan as showing understanding for the Israeli aggression. But with hundreds of Lebanese civilians killed by Israel, King Abdullah II has found it more difficult than ever not to condemn Israel. He has, for example, ordered the dispatch of medical aid to the Lebanese. A close look at the Jordanian press from the inception of this latest crisis reveals that the continuation of the war has changed the position of some writers who previously criticized Hizballah.

Indeed, it is this excessive Israeli use of force that has changed the tide across the Arab world, particularly in Jordan. Initial warnings from enlightened writers and journalists properly indicating that Hizballah was serving an Iranian agenda have diminished in light of the increasing number of Lebanese civilian casualties. The last straw was when Israel bombed and killed 60 civilians in Qana, invoking the memory of the Israeli attack in April 1996.

The leader of Hizballah made a strategic miscalculation when he failed to estimate the magnitude of the Israeli reaction and American enthusiasm for the war. Yet he has won over public opinion in the Arab world. He has managed to present himself as a decisive and capable leader, ready and willing to fight to the end.

Israel's perceived military "invincibility" has been shattered in the eyes of the Arab public. Hizballah has struck a severe blow to Israeli morale. It has managed to turn thousands of Israelis into refugees.

There is a commonly-held belief among the public that Hassan Nasrallah will manage to dictate the terms of a ceasefire: there will be a prisoner exchange and Israel will leave the Shebaa farms. Should this happen, Nasrallah can claim victory, even if he has to remove his party deep into Lebanon and dismantle its weaponry. The question whether or not force pays will come to the fore again. The number of people who believe that Israel understands only the language of force will increase.

Arab public opinion already believes that Hizballah has won against both Israel and the United States, notwithstanding the destruction of Lebanon. The Americans and Israelis are once again giving victory to extremists, thus critically emasculating moderate forces and their allies. Palestinian factions might be tempted to emulate Hizballah's tactics. Put differently, the public sees Hizballah and its leader as a positive force that has managed to expose the weakness and docility of Arab leaders.- Published 3/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Hassan A. Barari is professor of Middle East studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and the author of "Israelism: Arab Scholarship on Israel, A Critical Assessment" (London: Ithaca, 2024)

Someone said recently that had Hassan Nasrallah not been a Shi'ite, he would have been another Gamal Abdel Nasser, and would have stolen the entire Arab "street" from under the noses of Arab regimes.

In fact, Nasrallah came close to that following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that started on July 12. This, in spite of the open criticism leveled against Hizballah by several Arab governments following the capture of the two Israeli soldiers, which was dubbed an act of uncalculated adventurism by some of these regimes.

It is true that Nasrallah is only a symbol of what Hizballah stands for in the perception of the Arab public. But every party or movement requires leaders who are able to articulate to the broad public its goals and aims. Hassan Nasrallah has managed to do this with great success. This is partly due to his personal gifts: articulate, persuasive, adept at building rapport with the audience, with a shy smile appearing frequently on his face, as if to deflate or calibrate any possible tension generated by some of his remarks.

But it is what Hizballah stands for, as symbolized by Nasrallah, that is largely responsible for the rift between Arab publics and regimes. And it has to do with core issues related to the conflict with Israel and the lack of a just and stable peace.

Beyond the immediate political and media hype and demagogic demonization of any resistance to US and Israeli policies in the region, the core issues are not new. Israel is an occupying power and has so far refused to make peace except on terms acceptable to it, which the Arab public finds tantamount to abject surrender. And the present US administration backs Israel almost unconditionally.

Most Arabs also believe that Israel only understands the language of force, hence resistance is key. This is where Hizballah comes in as a successful model where Arab regimes have failed. Lebanese resistance to Israel's 18-year occupation of South Lebanon was a crucial factor in Israel's withdrawal in May 2024 from that region.

The facts are well known to those that do not wish to be blind to them. Throughout its history, Israel has pursued an "Iron Wall" policy (to borrow the title of Avi Shlaim's book) toward various Arab peace initiatives. This is not the place to document them in full. I will only refer to the Saudi Peace Initiative approved by Arab governments in a summit conference in Beirut in March 2024.

That initiative offered peace between Israel and all Arab states taking part in the summit, including Syria and Palestine, in return for ending Israel's occupation of Arab land. Former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon completely ignored the initiative, as it would have entailed, more or less, a return to the 1967 line as far as territory is concerned.

Underlying this is the fact that Israel's expansionist territorial aims on Arab land remain open. This is due to several factors, but I would like to refer to one specific factor that impedes any progress toward peace.

In a televised interview Hassan Nasrallah gave during the current invasion of Lebanon, he referred to the prisoners' exchange that took place between Hizballah and Israel in January 2024. He argued that the fractious nature of Israeli party-politics and "out-bidding" (muzayadat) in the coalition government on the eve of the prisoner exchange, left several Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails and out of the deal. The release of those prisoners was the reason given by Hizballah for capturing the two soldiers that supplied Israel with the casus belli to ignite the present conflagration.

The broader aspects of this scenario lie in the fact that Israel has been far too successful in neutralizing outside pressure, thanks largely to the influence of the Israel lobby in the US. As a result, the Arab-Israel conflict has become largely a domestic Israeli issue, subject to the vagaries of local politics and electoral considerations.

Many an Israeli commentator has bemoaned this state of affairs, which is more than a decade old. "Saving Israel from itself" was not a slogan raised by Arab commentators. Some Israelis continue to hope that a "statesman" will emerge and achieve a durable and stable peace with Palestinians and Arabs. Domestic Israeli politics, however, are highly unlikely to allow for the emergence of such a figure.

There is therefore a clear abdication of responsibility on the part of the "international community", and principally the US. As a result, when the dust settles at the end of the present invasion of Lebanon, we can only look forward to continued and protracted conflict as long as the core issues remain unresolved.- Published 3/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

George Giacaman teaches at Birzeit University and contributes political analysis to Arab and international media.

Before the end of the first week of the Israeli war on Hizballah in Lebanon, I was in Manama, Bahrain, where Shi'ites comprise the majority of the population in a country run by the Sunni al-Khalifeh family. I was waiting for a friend who was coming to the Gulf from the United States for a short period before traveling to Lebanon for his summer vacation. My friend was late and informed me he would not be able to make our appointment because of a huge demonstration in one of the main streets in support of Hizballah. He would definitely not be able to vacation in Lebanon because of Hizballah as well.

A few days later, I returned to Kuwait where Hizballah's popularity has waned over the past few years among the Shi'ite community, which constitutes 20 percent of the population. The group also does not enjoy much backing among Sunnis. Nevertheless, I saw a huge gathering in which the crowds raised Hizballah flags and shouted pro-Hizballah slogans. Later, I found the crowd included both Shi'ites and Sunnis.

Then I made a second visit to Bahrain. As I was going along one of Manama's main streets, I saw at a distance the yellow banners of Hizballah waving high in the sky. The traffic was going at a very slow pace. It later became clear that eight Bahraini young men were stopping passing cars and demanding that occupants donate money to support Hizballah. I noticed that it was not enough for them to close off the main street but they also purposely closed off an adjacent side street so no passersby could avoid donating.

The raising of Hizbullah flags in the Gulf countries is a matter for concern. In these countries, there are active and dormant al-Qaeda cells from which terrorist groups including Hizballah are funded. I think the ferocity of the Israeli bombing of Lebanon, the loss of innocent victims and the destruction of the infrastructure of an Arab country is not the only reason for the Arab "street's" sympathy with Hizballah. Rather, the feeling of powerlessness of the Arab regimes and the conviction of some of the necessity of eliminating Hizballah encouraged them to be tolerant of their peoples' sympathy toward Hizballah. In order that popular sympathy with Hizballah not turn into mutiny against these regimes, which mostly suffer internal problems, not one Arab regime has dared to crack down on demonstrators.

Furthermore, the risk that this sympathy with Hizballah will spread and the organization be transformed from one affiliated with Iran, which does not enjoy much sympathy, to a symbol of defending Islam and Arab dignity beyond the Shi'ite sect and beyond Lebanon and Palestine, is extremely dangerous. When Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who are all Sunnis, share with Hassan Nassrallah and Hizballah loyalists, who are Shi'ites, the mission of "defending Islam" this means we may be facing a new wave of joint Sunni-Shi'ite terrorism. I believe the Gulf states will be the scene for the upcoming phase of terrorist acts. Iran supported groups affiliated with it to carry out terrorist actions during its war with Iraq, against countries that supported Saddam Hussein at the time.

I fear the consequences for this region of a "unification" of the terrorist agenda of al-Qaeda and Hizballah, especially if we consider that eliminating Hizballah in southern Lebanon will not eliminate its cells in the Gulf region. On the contrary, these cells, which had stagnated in Kuwait, regained their vitality after they succeeded in winning two seats in the Kuwaiti parliament during general elections a few weeks ago.

Extremism and terrorism have no single home. If Israel succeeds in destroying Hizballah as a military organization, it will have, through this war, paved the way for the spread of the "yellow tide" to the Gulf countries. With the intensity of the confrontation between Iran and the international community over the nuclear file, Iraq will not be the only "Iranian field" that will witness American-Iranian confrontations. It is very likely, if we are to go by what happened during the Iraq-Iran war, that Hizballah cells and other Shi'ite terrorist organizations supported by Iran will move into three Gulf states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain--and a wave of Shi'ite-flavored violence will start all over again.

The question that is difficult to answer at this stage is whether the governments in the Gulf can handle the consequences of Shi'ite terrorism? The ramifications of the situation in Iraq are still more or less contained. Gulf countries do not suffer from the daily terrorism in Iraq. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have little objection to their citizens carrying out a "jihad" in Iraq instead of a "jihad" in their own countries. However, the "jihad" of Hizballah in the Gulf will bear an extremely heavy price.

Extremism does not have a single home. Hizballah is not buildings, trenches and hideouts in South Lebanon. It is an idea in various forms spread throughout more than one Arab country. One aspect of this idea is destructive and vengeful. How can we in the Gulf deal with its transfer to us? - Published 3/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mohammed Abdel Qader Jasem is a Kuwaiti lawyer and writer.

After over a decade of bloody conflict, the late Saudi King Fahd organized the Taif Accords in 1989 that ended the civil war in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia then went on to finance much of that country's reconstruction. Could the kingdom play a similar role today? There is reason to hope that it could, because Saudi Arabia has both the strategic interest and the authority to limit the influence of Iran, which is responsible for much of the current violence. But before this can be accomplished, an immediate ceasefire is needed and Security Council Resolution 1559 must be fully implemented. Without these steps, the Saudi leadership will not be in a position to push for the disarmament of Hizballah and a return to peace.

Saudi Arabia was the first to condemn Hizballah's provocation. "There is a difference," the Saudi Foreign Ministry said in a bluntly worded statement, "between legitimate resistance and the reckless adventures undertaken by" Hizballah. Shortly after, a senior cleric in the Saudi religious establishment issued a fatwa condemning the group. Unfortunately, the brutal response by Israel--in which hundreds of civilians have been killed--has undermined Saudi efforts to rein in both Hizballah and Iran. For this to occur, the US government must first use its considerable leverage over Israel to press for an immediate ceasefire. This should be followed by an exchange of Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and the return of the Shebaa Farms to Lebanon. At this point, Saudi Arabia would be in a position to build a strong Arab coalition to fight for the permanent disarmament of Hizballah.

The next step would be the isolation of Iran and an attempt to undermine its ability to sow future chaos and bloodshed in the region. For years, Iran has planted the seeds of war in Lebanon. Since creating Hizballah in 1982, Iran--and to a lesser extent, Syria--has provided the group with generous financial and military support, arming it with thousands of rockets. It is estimated that Iran provides between $100-150 million every year in cash and weapons to Hizballah. And rather than condemning the group for launching its unprovoked attack, Tehran praised it--even before the Israelis initiated their bloody and incommensurate counter-offensive. Responding to calls for the disarmament of Hizballah, President Mahmoud Ahmedinezhad flatly stated that this simply "will not happen." This was taken as a green light by Hizballah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, to continue his attacks against Israel. Meanwhile, leaders in Tehran criticized Saudi Arabia and others Arab states for not sufficiently fanning the flames of conflict.

These actions are an attempt to bolster Iran's standing in the region and to position it as a leader of the Muslim world. Such a scenario is highly unlikely, however, since Iran lacks the religious authority (it is Shi'ite), ethnic credentials (a non-Arab state), and the economic might (exporting just a quarter of the oil that Saudi Arabia does). Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is likely to maintain its leading role in the region. The kingdom has pledged an initial $1.55 billion in assistance to Lebanon--a $550 million grant to help reconstruct the infrastructure that Israel is recklessly destroying and a $1 billion loan to shore up Lebanon's currency reserves. At least another $500 million is promised for reconstruction. The Saudi government is also strengthening its strategic position. It has increased defense spending by tens of billions of dollars as well as troop strength by 25 percent. As importantly, it has invested billions to increase its spare oil production capacity. In fact, enough spare capacity should be in place by early 2024 to offset all Iranian exports, thereby mitigating against the loss of Iranian oil, either through political choice or war. These policies ensure an effective counterbalance to Iran and limit the ability of certain circles in Tehran to further destabilize the region.

Saudi Arabia not only has a strategic interest in reining in Iran, but is well positioned to do so. With the price of oil at a high, the kingdom's influence as the world's central banker of energy is at its apex, making it the economic powerhouse of the Middle East. This, coupled with the fact that it is the birthplace of Islam and home to its two holiest sites, gives it considerable influence over both regional governments and Sunnis, who make up 85-90 percent of the world's Muslims. For all of these reasons, Saudi Arabia will be critical to disarming Hizballah, containing the militant policies emanating from Tehran, and eventually implementing a lasting peace in the region. In fact, the resurrection of the Abdullah peace plan, which was embraced by the majority of the Arab world, will be much more likely in the post-war environment. But before this goal can be achieved, the Bush administration must stop Israel's senseless destruction of Lebanon and the international community must broker a deal that includes an exchange of prisoners and the return of Lebanese lands.- Published 3/8/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nawaf Obaid is managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a consultancy based in Riyadh.