• Iranian policy divisive - an interview with  Nawaf Obaid

• Turkey: defying public opinion -   Soli Ozel

• Egypt and the Lebanon war -   Abdel Monem Said Aly

Damascus should beware delusions of grandeur
 Rime Allaf

Following an unexpected proxy victory in Lebanon, the Syrian regime currently seems intoxicated with power and confidence, reveling in its recovered status as an incontrovertible accomplice to any regional arrangement. For the time being, everything seems to be vindicating its stated positions and alliances in the ongoing war for regional domination, and the latest episode's various losers (from Washington through London to Lebanon) can't help but notice the schadenfreude glowing from Damascus.

Indeed, the Syrian regime is not even trying to be subtle about its mood. It had been on the defensive for a long period trying to deal with an isolation it partly brought upon itself after a series of strategic miscalculations and that was partly forced on it by a truly condescending American disposition. Blamed repeatedly for every problem in the region, the Syrian regime now seems to be reaping the rewards for its perseverance in sticking to its guns, as many in the proverbial Arab street begin to wonder why Hizballah has managed such successes, and why these shouldn't be repeated elsewhere--simultaneously--and as the perceived line between authentic Arabism and popular Islamism begins to fade.

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at London's Chatham House.

BI: Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt and Jordan, came in for a lot of popular criticism because of its initial position on Hizballah's action in the lead-up to the war. How has this played itself out now after the ceasefire?

Obaid: The initial policy hasn't really changed. The only difference is that the concentration now is more on rebuilding the necessary infrastructure for the Lebanese people. We've seen huge Saudi aid allocated to the Lebanese government.

BI: Did any of that initial popular Arab criticism register in Saudi Arabia?

Obaid: Even in Saudi Arabia there was a lot criticism of the government's policy. But after the ceasefire, things have slowly been changing because the actual extent of the damage is now being realized, as is the fact that Hizballah will not be able to rebuild what they have promised. And the apology by Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah for the war was a big change in the perception that Hizballah had actually been victorious.

So what we've seen is Saudi Arabia go ahead with a huge aid package and last week Riyadh announced a program to pay for all Lebanese students from kindergarten all the way through to university, for the school year, because most of the educational facilities in the south of the country have been destroyed.

BI: Is there some element of competition here between Saudi Arabia and Hizballah or Iran?

Obaid: The initial Saudi aid package was announced ten days into the war. Since then there has been money from the Saudi Red Crescent and this huge recent addition for the education sector.

I wouldn't say there is direct competition, but indirectly, of course, there is. It is certainly being perceived as such, especially from the Hizballah side, which, just after the war, promised to pay for reconstruction.

BI: To what extent can the war and ceasefire be seen in terms of strategic regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

Obaid: Iran has not made secret its desire to extend its influence in countries with a majority Shi'ite population. There are only two, Bahrain and Iraq, but in Lebanon the Shi'ite community constitutes the single largest group.

Initially, Hizballah was branded as victorious, especially after the ceasefire, after holding out to what is considered the might of the Israeli army. But in the mid- to long-term, I think there will be a realization that it is hard to spin this war as victorious, especially with the degree of damage Lebanon has suffered because of Hizballah's action. So in the mid- to long-term, I think the realization will be that the loser was the Lebanese people, and Hizballah will be blamed.

BI: What are the long-term ramifications of such a realization?

Obaid: The long term consequences will be that Hizballah--and we are beginning to see it--will be neutralized. Hizballah will not be able to repeat the actions that inflamed this issue, and there is going to be more and more suspicion vis-a-vis Iran and Iranian policies in the Middle East, specifically in dealing with Shi'ite communities. We already see in Lebanon the debate about Nasrallah's apology. There are now tensions emerging on the surface in Iraq between major Iraqi Shi'ite figures and Iran. And I believe there will be a slow reconsideration of Iran's relationship with the Arab countries that have a majority Shi'ite community.

BI: In this context, what role can Saudi Arabia play? Is there room for rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in terms of policies toward the rest of the region?

Obaid: As much as Iran is doing what we're seeing it's doing, so far there is actually a close working relationship between the two countries. The only problem is there is an understanding that whatever the Saudi government is told on an official level by Iran is not necessarily what is actually happening, specifically in Iraq, but also in Lebanon. And Saudi Arabia is very careful not to pursue a similar policy regarding Sunni communities to what the Iranians are doing with respect to Shi'ite communities, because that could lead to chaos and potentially to war.

So in Lebanon, the aid is given to the Lebanese government for all the Lebanese people. The aid for education is specifically given to everyone, from Christian to Shi'ite. This is a conscious policy, and in this respect one consequence of the war is a realization that Iranian policy is being disruptive and Saudi Arabia is trying to do the opposite.

BI: Is there a feeling in Saudi Arabia that Iran understands that?

Obaid: From what we've seen so far, Iran is still encouraging a disruptive policy. The initial small aid that was widely publicized in the press was about Hizballah giving money to all the Shi'ites that suffered from the Israeli attacks. And Iranian policy is to help specifically Hizballah, and, in Iraq, funding and helping the major Shi'ite organizations. This shows that Iran is still pursuing this policy.

Saudi Arabia is very concerned about this. We see a disconnect at the official level of what is being told to Riyadh and what is actually happening on the ground, and the latest reminder was in Bahrain where the government had to stop the sale of land to front companies acting on behalf of Iranian charities and intended specifically for the Shi'ite community.

This [Iranian] policy is divisive and will lead to violence and civil war if it is not curtailed. And this is what Saudi Arabia is trying to avoid.

BI: Was Saudi Arabia happy with the ceasefire resolution?

Obaid: Saudi Arabia was the main supporter of the resolution, especially after the US-French resolution was rejected. Now there is a resolution in which all Israeli forces will leave Lebanon and the UN will come in. But we have to bear in mind that there is another country that needs to be engaged, and where the consequences of the war are likely to be more detrimental, and that is Syria.- Published 14/9/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nawaf Obaid is managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, a consultancy based in Riyadh.

On September 5, 2024 the Turkish parliament voted 340 to 192, along strictly partisan lines, in favor of sending troops to Lebanon to join the UNIFIL contingent beefed up by UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The Justice and Development Party government defied overwhelming public opposition and risked alienating its own base by taking a distinctly unpopular position. The Israeli war against Hizballah was widely disliked in Turkey and emotions there ran high against Israel and the US. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself harshly criticized Israel's attack in different forums. In such an emotional atmosphere, when the time came to debate peacekeeping operations most of the public saw in the possible deployment of Turkish troops an effort to protect Israel and do Washington's bidding.

Some argued that the prime minister was preparing the ground for his upcoming meeting with President Geirge W. Bush. Others were concerned lest Turkish troops militarily antagonize Hizballah or, assuming the ceasefire would be fragile, get caught in the crossfire. In short, much of the public debate was played out in emotional terms and barely touched on the wider strategic landscape. In turn, those who favored troop deployment did so from an aggressive position, arguing that as a regional power Turkey had a historic duty to intervene and that its influence and prestige would thereby increase. The government's position was also diametrically opposed to that of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who took a harsh stance against sending troops. He argued that Turkey had no national interest at stake and was openly critical of the government's enthusiasm.

Before the government called for an extraordinary session of parliament to debate and vote on the matter, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul attended the Rome summit and visited Lebanon, Israel and Syria to make sure that all the relevant parties would welcome Turkey's participation in a peacekeeping force once the Security Council passed the relevant resolution.

In the wake of the vote, the Financial Times reported that the result was "more than a signal (of) Ankara's determination to participate in what it considers an urgent humanitarian cause". Despite the fact that the Turkish contribution would be mostly limited to naval operations and that ground forces would only be deployed to protect Turkish Red Crescent personnel and other officials, for the newspaper's Ankara correspondent the decision highlighted Turkey's aspiration to be considered an important regional player. It enabled Turkey to serve on an equal footing with European Union countries. Finally, considering Turkey's desire to have a seat at the Security Council in 2024-2010, this was a good investment.

These considerations, particularly the self-perception of Turkey as an important regional actor that could not remain aloof toward such a proximate crisis, no doubt played their part in the government's thinking. In his defense of the government's policy in the parliament, Foreign Minister Gul also intimated that broader strategic considerations guided government thinking. "In short," he stated, "the Lebanese crisis fully exposed Turkey's strategic position where East and West meet and clearly highlighted the Mediterranean dimension of our identity... suffice it to mention the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to underscore our ties to [the eastern Mediterranean]."

Emphatically denying that Turkish troops would be used to disarm Hizballah, Gul then defended the decision. He argued that, "this position is consistent with our status as a bridge between civilizations...and our claims that the European Union will become a global power with Turkey."

Therein lies the true significance of the Turkish decision. The Lebanon war can only be appreciated in the broader context of regional balance of power, where it is related to the American-Iranian struggle to shape the region and define Iran's role in it. The strengthening of the Lebanese state is the stated goal of 1701 and the aim of the West. This will be a challenge to both Syria and Iran, particularly if the mission succeeds. Turkey, which enjoys cordial relations with both Tehran and Damascus and whose government as well as public are sympathetic toward Hizballah, thus unequivocally took the side of its western allies.

This choice also reflects Turkey's newfound commonality of interests with the established Arab states. Concerned with the growing influence of Shi'ite Iran, the Sunni Arab states are determined to contain Tehran's hegemonic aspirations. This explains their criticism of Hizballah and the effective, if undeclared, support for Israel's war that drew fire from their own publics. In these efforts to contain Iran, Turkey is considered an important ally. It is as part of this quest to forge alliances to balance Iran and to limit the effects of the Shi'ite ascendance that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia recently visited Turkey, the first visit of its kind in 40 years.

To generate and maintain stability in Lebanon, a lot will now hinge on how successful UNIFIL is and whether or not the EU continues to show political determination and assert itself as a political actor in the affairs of the region. The mission is very risky and its failure may trigger yet another round of armed conflict. In these efforts Turkey, which enjoys good and open relations with all the parties to a multitude of very messy problems, can obviously play an important and constructive role. This appears to be both the calculation and the aspiration of the government.- Published 14/9/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Soli Ozel is professor of international relations at Istanbul Bilgi University and columnist for the daily Haberturk.

For Egypt, the recent Lebanese war was a total surprise. Israel was busy with its little war in Gaza to rescue a single kidnapped soldier. But Hizballah should have noticed the massive Israeli response to the Palestinian kidnapping. The moment Egypt learned of Hizballah kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, there was certainty that Israel would respond with a military operation on a large scale. Foreign Minister Ahmad Abul Ghait was dispatched to Damascus to ask the Syrians to use their influence on Hizballah to release the Israeli soldiers. The Syrians claimed they had been surprised as well and promised to use their good offices with Hizballah. In exchange, Egypt promised to use its good offices with Israel to delay any immediate violent response.

The failure of that Egyptian last-ditch attempt to prevent the eruption of war was not the only one. Before the war started, an Egyptian attempt to mediate an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the release of the kidnapped Israeli soldier in exchange for the later release of a large number of Palestinian prisoners failed as well. Khaled Meshaal, the Hamas leader in Damascus, vetoed the deal after it was accepted by the Hamas leadership in Gaza. Both failures were a result of positions taken by two radical Islamic groups, sponsored by radical regimes in the region--or so they were perceived in Cairo.

The first Egyptian reaction to the crisis was to criticize Hizballah adventurism. The second was to lead an Arab group, together with Saudi Arabia, that shared negative views regarding Hizballah miscalculations. This created an early rift in the Arab position in the crisis with those who thought that at a time of war with Israel, Arabs should support other Arabs, no matter what. Egypt preferred to keep communications open with Israel and the United States in a crisis whose duration no one could estimate.

Indeed, the crisis lasted longer than any one expected. Each side proved capable of surprising the other. Israel's massive response and excessive use of force were soon to affect Arab--and Egyptian--public opinion in ways that were difficult to ignore from Cairo and other Arab moderate capitals. The "music" of Israel's declared far-reaching aim of changing the map of the Middle East was not welcome in a country that perceives changing maps only in terms of fragmentation and instability. Condoleezza Rice's statement regarding the birth of a "New Middle East" bespoke another American miscalculation wherein strategy is mixed tragically with history. On the other hand, Hassan Nasrallah's statement that, unless he was joined by other Arab states, large countries would become smaller (Egypt) and rich countries would become poorer (Saudi Arabia), sounded like a threat in Cairo and Riyadh.

Egypt knew that it had little influence over either Israel or Hizballah. After all, Egypt appreciates that in time of war, military operations dictate political positions and not the other way around. The end result of all these considerations was the evolution of an Egyptian strategy to deal with the crisis.

First, Egypt and others needed to deal with a party to the conflict that was not involved in the actual fighting. The Lebanese state was there to fill a vacuum in a way that all parties to the conflict required. PM Fuad Siniora proved to be capable of using the "tyranny" of the weak to fill a space that Hizballah had created by intention or miscalculation. Empowering the Lebanese state was a step that Israel wanted and that Hizballah would be hard put to object to. So Egypt and others proceeded in this direction. Formal and informal Egyptian delegations, with Israeli consent of course, were sent with symbolic aid to Beirut. Egypt committed itself to repair the Lebanese power stations.

Second, Egypt sought to sustain an Arab position that supports the Lebanese state, not Hizballah, particularly after it was formulated in Siniora's seven-point plan. Saudi Arabia's commitment of massive financial help for reconstruction contributed to restoring the centrality of the Arab moderates after Nasrallah declared that Iran would rebuild Lebanon "with no political conditions". Egyptian-Saudi efforts were further consolidated by the convening of the Arab League ministerial meeting in Beirut. The formation of an Arab League delegation led by Amr Musa to go to New York for the Security Council meetings was intended to move the crisis from the battlefield to diplomacy.

Third, for a peace process to be possible in future, the ideal conclusion to the crisis was to have neither clear victors nor losers in the war. The American-French proposal would have given Israel a victory that it did not achieve on the battlefield. Resolution 1701 tilted toward Israel but also gave all parties room to declare victory while being humbled by the war. The rest will be left to history.

The present situation opens an opportunity for another shot at peace. That will be Egypt's next move toward turning a crisis into an opportunity.- Published 14/9/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Abdel Monem Said Aly is director of Al Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies in Cairo.