• Reduce arms smuggling -   Shlomo Brom

• The only way in or out - an interview with  Stuart Shepherd

• Unilateral action is not the answer -   Gamal A. G. Soltan

Give the keys back
an interview with Saleem Abu Safia

BI: How is the current arrangement at Rafah working out?

Abu Safia: First of all, let me affirm that the Palestinian side has respected and been committed to the Agreement on Movement and Access, AMA, that was signed in November 2024. The Israelis have not shown this commitment. Here I am not talking only about the Rafah crossing but all the crossings. We accepted European supervision at Rafah to monitor the performance of both sides. As far as I know the number of violations of the agreement that were recorded on the Israeli side are greater than those on the Palestinian side.

Saleem Abu Safia is the general manager of the Palestinian crossings.

When Prime Minister Ariel Sharon formulated his disengagement plan, one of the contentious issues was the fate of the area of the Gaza-Sinai border, the so-called Philadelphi corridor. The security community in Israel argued that an Israeli withdrawal from this area would open the road for large-scale smuggling of weapons that would eventually pose a serious security threat. It suggested that the IDF retain its control over the narrow strip of land along the border even after the disengagement.

Sharon decided eventually to withdraw fully from the Gaza Strip, including this area, for two reasons. First, he wanted his disengagement plan to enjoy international legitimacy; he sought an international seal of approval for the Israel-Gaza border that could be achieved only with full withdrawal. Second, Sharon believed that an ongoing Israeli presence in this land strip in any case could not stop all the smuggling and would only generate more friction, whereas Israel could agree with the international community and Egypt on arrangements that would limit smuggling.

Indeed, on the eve of implementation of disengagement Israel reached agreements with the US and Egypt that covered two points: positioning of international monitors at the Rafah border crossing and deployment of additional Egyptian troops to the border area to enable Egypt to fulfill its commitment to prevent smuggling of arms. This last point was necessary because the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty limits the deployment of Egyptian military troops in this area.

More than a year has passed since the disengagement and it seems that the pessimistic predictions of those that opposed IDF withdrawal from this area have been vindicated. The European Union monitors are operating quite well at the Rafah border crossing, but Egypt has failed miserably to block the smuggling of vast quantities of weapons and explosives through tunnels that are dug under the border fence/wall. According to Israeli estimates, hundreds of tunnels are operating along the border.

The smuggling is influencing the balance of power in the Gaza Strip because of the quantity and quality of the weapons that are involved. Thousands of rifles and huge amounts of ammunition have reached Gaza, while the armed Palestinian groups have succeeded in obtaining new categories of weapons that were not available to them before the disengagement, e.g., tons of military standard explosives, anti-tank missiles, military standard rockets, and probably also man-portable anti-aircraft missiles. The smuggling has also enabled the armed groups to upgrade the performance of rockets that are produced inside the Gaza Strip--the main weapon used against civilian targets in Israel and the main cause of the recent escalation in violence.

It is not clear why Egypt is failing in its operation to stop the smuggling. Presumably Egypt cannot stop it entirely because it is extremely difficult to completely seal a border. It is especially difficult when the smugglers' incentive is so strong: for them, this is not only a political matter; it is first and primarily a source of income for two impoverished communities on the Palestinian and Egyptian sides of the border.

Nevertheless, the Egyptians can do better. If the IDF could uncover more then ten tunnels and destroy them during a limited military operation in which a very short length of the border area was occupied for a few days, the Egyptians can detect the tunnels more easily in an area that is fully controlled by them. Indeed, when pressure is put on Egypt and its security forces are more active they are more successful.

Some in Israel speculate that the Egyptian effort to detect these tunnels is very limited in scope because of lack of motivation: "Why should the Egyptians oppose the flow of weapons to their poor Palestinian brothers that are facing the ruthless Israeli killing machine?" According to this explanation, Egypt never intended to keep its commitment to Israel. The problem with this thesis is that it contradicts the very reasonable premise that Egypt is interested in stabilizing the situation in Gaza and preventing the overflow of trouble to its side of the border. Since the Palestinian elections at the beginning of this year, Egypt has also evinced an interest in preventing any further strengthening of Hamas, a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

Assuming Egypt does have a strong motivation to stop the smuggling, one can only conclude that this failure is simply a show of Egyptian incompetence. Egypt is not capable of operating effectively against the smugglers because of corruption and lack of effective control in these areas of Sinai. The authorities also appear to be afraid of clashes with the local population. Every Egyptian should be concerned with the implications for the internal security situation in Egypt of the fact that tons of explosives and thousands of rifles and other weapons are making their way from places like Sudan through Egypt to Gaza and the Egyptian security apparatus cannot intercept them.

Based on the experience of the war in Lebanon, the Israeli government is under strong pressure not to allow a similar build-up of the armed militias in the Gaza Strip and to prevent it by force if necessary. A strong political and security lobby is calling for the reoccupation of the Philadelphi corridor. The ceasefire concluded on November 26 may weaken these pressures, but not for long: continued smuggling of weapons will probably be one of the main potential reasons for the collapse of the ceasefire. On the other hand, reoccupation of this area would create a constant source of violent friction between the two sides.

Anyone who looks at the ceasefire as the first step in a process of stabilization that provides the right environment for a resumption of mutual engagement and a political process should understand that solving the problem of the Philadelphi corridor is an essential element of this process. The four parties--Israel, Egypt, the international community and the Palestinian Authority--should reexamine the security arrangements along the border and modify them.

One of the ideas that should be considered is deploying international monitors along the border. They would act in cooperation with the Egyptian security forces and the PA security forces on both sides of the border. On the Egyptian side they would be linked with the MFO, the international force already deployed in Sinai, and on the Palestinian side with the monitors in Rafah. Another potential idea is creating a relatively wide exposed area on both sides of the border by evacuating the residents and providing them with alternative and improved housing. Resumption of security cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian security forces might also improve the effectiveness of counter-smuggling activities, but this is not expected to happen soon.

One cannot realistically expect a complete halt to a smuggling operation along this border that is based on personal financial gain. But much can and should be done to limit the scope of the problem.- Published 30/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom is a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv.

BI: You have just been to Rafah. What is the situation at the border?

Shepherd: Rafah was one of the benchmarks of the November 15, 2024, Agreement on Movement and Access, AMA. Since then and until June 25 this year, the crossing was open every single day for both arrivals and departures. That was obviously a major development for the population of Gaza, having that freedom for the first time in years.

Since June 25, and the seizure of Corporal Gilad Shalit at Kerem Shalom, which is adjacent to Rafah, the opening of the crossing has been very erratic. We've had arbitrary closures, and the crossing has only been open an average of five to six days a month.

This periodic opening is permitted to stop people congregating on the border. On the Egyptian side, there are limited facilities and most people have to stay all the way down at El Arish. As soon as there is any indication that the border will open they then move en masse to the border.

On the Gaza side it's easier, because people only have to travel one or two hours from their homes. But advance notice is the exception. People tend to hear literally the day before and this makes planning exceptionally difficult.

Today, we were told there were about 100 people there this morning, but by the time we got there, only about 20-30 people were left, already resigned to not crossing.

BI: What are the humanitarian consequences of these closures.

Shepherd: There is a personal level. Today, for example, we met a man from Beit Hanoun who was due to visit Damascus, where his brother is sick and the family needs assistance. This chap is desperately trying to get to Cairo to catch the flight to Damascus. But his flight leaves tomorrow and he said he had sold personal items to be able to afford it in the first place. After tomorrow, he said, the ticket will be invalid.

On a more general level, there is the need to transfer patients, particularly for tertiary care. There is not necessarily the sufficient degree of specialization in Gaza for neuro-surgical conditions or people suffering from advanced stages of cancer. With the regular opening of Rafah, there was the possibility for patients to go out pretty much when they wished for medical treatment.

Now those patients either have to get through Rafah on those few days a month it's open or go through Erez to Israel. Noticeably, Israel has allowed additional numbers of patients to leave via Erez. There was a dip in July, which I think was a reaction to the incident at Kerem Shalom, but what we are seeing now is that about 90 percent of applicants who request treatment in Israel are accepted.

BI: The AMA was greeted with some fanfare. Why is Rafah so important?

Shepherd: Rafah is the only entry and exit point for Palestinians from Gaza. Erez is now only used for medical referrals and the small number of Palestinians working for international agencies. Senior Palestinian Authority officials used to be able to leave through Erez, but that stopped after the change of government. For the majority of the population therefore, Rafah is the only way in or out.

BI: You mentioned that up until the capture of Shalit, the mechanism at Rafah worked.

Shepherd: Yes. In terms of the figures it was working well. Rafah was open an average of nine-and-a-half hours a day, and our figures show an average of 650 people going either way daily. What we have to remember is that when the Israelis were in direct control, movement was extremely problematic. Palestinian males between the ages of 16 and 35 found it extremely difficult to leave. Colleagues of mine fell in that category and were unable to go to Geneva for training for example.

The AMA was very important in allowing people to go about their normal lives in terms of visiting families, or taking up educational or business opportunities abroad, which had been pretty much denied them since 2024.

BI: The change, you say, occurred with the capture of Shalit. Is this then a punitive measure?

Shepherd: The way I understand the Israeli rationale is that they have concerns that the people holding Shalit might try to take him out of Gaza either via Rafah or by boat. Palestinian fishermen have been unable to access the majority of the seas off the Gaza coastline for the last five months.

BI: A senior UN official recently described Gaza as a "big prison". Is that a description you would agree with?

Shepherd: That phrase has been used about Gaza on a regular basis. You have 1.4 million people in Gaza who have very limited options to leave the country or to even engage in commerce. It's not just Rafah, there is also the Karni crossing where the ability to export has been extremely limited, an average of 12 trucks a day have left Gaza for external markets this year. In addition, Palestinian workers living in Gaza have been denied entry to their work places in Israel via the Erez crossing since March 12.

I think the figures and the situation speaks for itself. Whether I agree or not that it can be described as a prison, clearly people's lives in Gaza are subject to severe restrictions.- Published 30/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Stuart Shepherd is the humanitarian affairs officer in Gaza for the UN's Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA.

The recent intensification of violence between Israel and the Palestinians is disturbing in many ways. Most disturbing of all are the signs that new weapons technologies and tactics are being transferred to the territories, particularly to the Gaza Strip. Tunnels under the Philadelphi corridor along the Egyptian border with Gaza are among the vehicles of arms transfer into Gaza.

Reports from Israel about Israeli plans to bomb or reoccupy the Philadelphi corridor to destroy the cross-border tunnels has raised tension in Egypt. Cairo is particularly alarmed because, since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza little more than a year ago, Egypt has assumed security responsibility in the Philadelphi corridor area. A security breach across the borders between Egypt and Gaza exposes Egyptian-Israeli relations to additional pressure. Insofar as these pressures are security-related this is serious, since security is an area that both Egypt and Israel have hitherto successfully protected from the ups and downs that have characterized their relations in other fields.

A unilateral Israeli action in the Philadelpi corridor area is likely to add tension to Egyptian-Israeli relations. It ignores the fact that security along the Egyptian-Israeli-Palestinian borders is a concern for Egypt as well as for Israel. The changing security environment in Sinai is no longer disputed. The terrorist attacks against the main tourist destinations of Taba, Nueiba, Sharm al-Sheikh and Dahab in the past two years have shattered Sinai's peaceful image. The repeated functional failure of the border control points between Egypt and Gaza in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal has caused further concern in Egypt.

The tunnels under the Philadelphi corridor are used to smuggle arms and other banned materials and people in both directions. Solid evidence indicates that the rising security threat in Sinai is linked to activities taking place across the Egyptian border with Gaza. Therefore, Egypt and Israel have an equal interest in guarding against the illegal activities taking place in the border area. While coordinating Egyptian-Israeli security policies in the border area might be difficult, coordinated policies should be more sustainable than unilateral actions.

Israel and Egypt need to enhance their security cooperation so that they can deal with the changing security environment in the region. Peace in Sinai was the outcome of Egypt's and Israel's joint success in managing and resolving their interstate conflict. Current security threats in Sinai are different in quality. It is non-state actors that pose the serious security threats both Egypt and Israel are now facing. Egyptian terrorist organizations and the support they are likely to be receiving from their counterparts across the border in Gaza are the principal security threat currently directed against Sinai and the border region.

Moreover, of all the diverse arrangements between Israel and the Palestinians, arrangements in the Philadelphia corridor have additional, multilateral importance due to Egypt's involvement. The negotiations that led to these arrangements took place between Egypt and Israel, in the context of the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, while Palestinian involvement was marginal and indirect. Thus reoccupation of the Philadelphi corridor would be the first explicit violation of a security arrangement between Israel and Egypt. Such a precedent would damage the mutual confidence between Israel and Egypt in a sensitive security field. Further Egyptian involvement in Palestinian-Israeli security arrangements in the future would be less likely, though it might be needed badly. There could be similar consequences regarding other countries, e.g., Jordan, whose contribution might be needed in future security arrangements.

The current controversy regarding a possible unilateral Israeli move in the Philadelphi corridor region is a typical example of the spill-over effect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The volatile regional situation provides a conducive environment for that effect to be intensified. Existing security arrangements are far from sufficient to meet the current challenges. The ongoing violence between Palestinian guerrillas and Israel politically restricts the possibility of further Egyptian-Israeli cooperation regarding the security of the border area. Only progress in the political process can facilitate future Israeli-Egyptian cooperation.

The revival of the peace process is the answer to many of the current problems in the region, including the problems on the borders between Egypt, Israel and Palestine. Recent developments in Israeli-Palestinian relations offer hope. Thus Israel's threat to reoccupy the Philadelphia corridor is a serious development. Were it to happen, this would cause a serious setback for efforts to reverse the cycle of violence that has dominated Israeli-Palestinian relations in the year 2024. On the other hand, for a reversal of the course of violence to be consolidated, Egyptian involvement is necessary. Yet winning Egyptian cooperation is unlikely should bombing or reoccupation of the Philadelphi corridor take place.- Published 30/11/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Gamal A. G. Soltan is the director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.