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Edition 46 Volume 4 - December 14, 2024
How Middle East crises interact: I
End of the American era -
Ghassan Atiyyah A solution must not come at the expense of any country in the area, lest the losing party turn into the opposition.
The linkages point to a Quartet role -
Christian Hanelt Single-handed European mediation efforts will not contribute decisively to the de-escalation of the conflicts in the region.
Arabness still alive and kicking -
Aboubakr Jamai While Arabs think of themselves as Muslims, they stress their Arabness. Hence their solidarity with the Palestinians and now with the Iraqis and the Lebanese.
Inextricable from each other -
Ghassan Khatib The double standard that has resulted from the US compromising international legality because of its relations with Israel is a major cause of the regional hostility toward America.
End of the American era Ghassan Atiyyah The events of 9/11 gave the United States an opportunity to enforce its domination in the Middle East. This is hardly unique in the history of the region, which has witnessed British domination and later American-Soviet competition. The United States' influence reached its peak in the Kuwait war of 1991 when it was able to lead the region and the world into a war against Iraq (one America did not start) in order to restore the freedom of Kuwait.
By the same standard, the status of the United States in the region and the world reached rock bottom as a result of the war the US did initiate to occupy Iraq.
The architects of American policy believed a success in Iraq would open the doors to a solution to the Palestinian problem and a democratic transformation of the region. Based on this premise, Washington excluded the possibility that the regional countries would play any role in Iraq. However, America's lack of viable options in Iraq opened the door to chaos and a void that Iran has been able to fill, becoming the strongest regional power in the Middle East confronting Israel.
America's botch-up in Iraq was reflected in Lebanon. First, Syria was forced to pull out its forces following the assassination of ex-President Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent international (especially American-French) pressure. Today, through its allies, Syria is once again a key player in the future of Lebanon.
Furthermore, Israel's lack of success in its war against Hizballah weakened its ability to impose military solutions in the region. This followed the failure of its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza to guarantee peace for Israel or a solution to the Palestinian problem.
At the level of democratic transformation, following the US setback in Iraq Washington has realized that it needs moderate Arab countries to deal with the Iraqi, Palestinian and Lebanese cases. Thus stability rather than democracy became its priority.
As for the war on terror, American post-Saddam policy has had an adverse affect and has rendered Iraq a spawning ground for terrorism and a headquarters for al-Qaeda's activities. That movement recently announced from al-Anbar (western Iraq) the formation of the Islamic Iraq Emirates.
To sum up, while the ramifications of the United States' failure in Iraq are clear, the alternative for dealing with the Iraqi case and the problems of the region are not.
The lessons learned from the events of recent years in the Middle East point to the following conclusions:
- The end of American domination in determining the fate of the region, though this does not mean an end to its role or significance.
- The complex inter-relationship among the region's problems means they cannot be untangled and isolated from one another. The contradictions among the region's countries make any victory of one side a defeat for another. America's military victory in Iraq was an incentive for Syria and Iran to sabotage stability there; Iranian influence in Iraq makes a Gulf counter-intervention inevitable.
- Military power is no longer enough to end the ethnic, sectarian and national struggles. What is needed is an approach that links military strength with economic, political and geo-political factors.
- Political reform and democratic transformation are a cumulative and extended process. They cannot be enforced by military might, quick fixes or patronizing measures.
- The international factor represented by the United Nations and the European Union proved its importance in Lebanon after it was disregarded by Washington and Israel.
Hence, the United States is no longer able to solve the Iraqi predicament on its own. But what is the alternative?
One option is to deal with the Iraqi case through a regional approach in which all neighboring countries are involved, including Iran and Syria. The goal would be to create a security system for the region's countries that ends the repeated cycles of conflict between Iraq and Iran and safeguards the legitimate interests of all the region's countries. Within this context, all warring Iraqi parties--including the armed opposition but with the exception of al-Qaeda, which has an international rather than an Iraqi agenda--would be participants in a national conciliation conference under international auspices that grants legitimacy to any agreement reached on a new basis for a future Iraq and overcomes any differences resulting from the current Iraqi constitution.
This formula is predicated on there being "no winners, no losers", whether in Iraq or regionally. A solution must not come at the expense of any country in the area, lest the losing party turn into the opposition, as in the case of Syria in Lebanon and Iran in Iraq. Such a regional deal would be the most capable of creating a foundation of regional security with international legitimacy and support. In the framework of this regional/international deal, the foundations would also be put in place for a permanent settlement to the Palestinian issue based on the formula of land for peace and on the basis of two states, Israeli and Palestinian. It would also allow Lebanon to maintain its independence without becoming a battlefield between Israel on the one hand and Syria and Iran on the other.
The problem with this option is the American position. The US may not consider the United Nations, Europe and Russia qualified partners. It might consider any opening to "nuclear" Iran as an unacceptable concession and would therefore prefer a military and economic confrontation with Iran; another option would be to persuade Syria to abandon Iran, especially since there are Israeli voices pushing in that direction.
At the Iraqi level, Washington may prefer to work on creating new alliances to persuade the Higher Islamic Revolutionary Council under the leadership of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim to move away from the Moktada Sadr movement and its alliance with the (Sunni) Islamic Party in confronting the armed Sunni/Baathist opposition.
Still, Iran and Syria could stand in the way of such a deal if they consider themselves victorious in the long run and see no need to "save" America from its predicament.
All of these obstacles could render the creation of a new regional balance of power the preferable option in confronting Iran and Syria. This new balance of power could take the form of an alliance that includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan (and Israel, implicitly) and perhaps Turkey in coordination with America in confronting the Iran/Syria/Hizballah axis. At the Iraqi level, the political process would be abandoned by imposing an emergency government and the dissolution of the parliament. The sectarian conflict in Iraq would turn into a regional sectarian conflict between the Shi'ites and Sunnis, which would make Iraq (and Lebanon) the venue for settling accounts. History would repeat itself.- Published 14/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.orgGhassan Atiyyah is the director of the Baghdad-based Iraqi Foundation for Development and Democracy, which he founded in August 2024. The linkages point to a Quartet role Christian HaneltThe distinct layers of Middle East conflict--Israel-Arab, the future of the Lebanese state, the disintegration of Iraq, the Iranian nuclear program as well as the burden of socio-economic and political transformation for Arab countries (rich in oil, but lacking natural resources)--are not only interlinked, but also have a regional and even international impact. Three examples suffice:
Iran strives for recognition as regional power in the Middle East and uses its nuclear program to state its claim. Subsequent regional and international protests have induced the Iranian leadership to demonstrate its power in the entire Middle Eastern region. With its close relations to Syria, Hizballah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad it can weigh into the Israel-Arab conflict. Iran is able to direct relationships among Arab states, e.g., Syria-Lebanon and Syria-Iraq, and holds sway over the future and stability of Iraq via Shi'ite groups. Similarly, the re-emerging Shi'ite groups in other Arab countries are here and there influenced by Tehran.
The ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians has not only raised expectations of an improvement of the situation, but has also contributed to constructive discussions at the recent Euro-Med foreign ministers' meeting in Tampere. The ministers even agreed on further milestones (e.g., on education) for the implementation of their five-year program.
The statehood of Lebanon is at risk. The struggle for power and influence among the various ethnic and religious groups has been reopened with the pullout of the Syrian troops and the warfare between Israel and Hizballah and has heightened tension due to the interests and polarization of external actors. Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, France and the US all play their part. The tension between Sunnis and Shi'ites further complicates the situation, as does the Israel-Arab conflict. Most of all, however, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the mandate of the UNIFIL-plus protection force is not only to monitor the ceasefire, but also to guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty.
On the basis of this tableau of conflicts, the list of European interests vis-a-vis Israel, Turkey, Iran and the Arab countries is extensive. Under the banner of security and transformation, Europe is motivated by a special responsibility for the existence of the state of Israel in the region, strives for a just and comprehensive solution of the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israel-Arab conflict and assigns high priority to the dialogue with Islam and to promoting disarmament. It also has a pronounced interest in secure transport routes for its growing oil and gas imports from the region and is interested in a positive social and economic transformation in the Arab countries, if only because the creation of free trade zones in the Euro-Mediterranean space as well as between the EU and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council has increased trade and economic cooperation, a veritable boost for the European economy. Finally, Europe is imminently interested in a reduction of or at least more control over migration flows from Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean.
These interests induce Europe to seek a more intensive engagement in Northern Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf region. Thus, German and European UN-troops are supervising the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon and the sovereignty of Lebanon, European customs officers are facilitating the control of merchandise traffic between Gaza and Egypt and Europeans are training Iraqi policemen and generals in the United Arab Emirates. European diplomats play a crucial role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the nuclear conflict with Iran, European experts monitor elections and European development workers are active locally. Then too, European track II initiatives seek answers to complicated questions in and around the region and are connecting people of different cultural, language and ethnic backgrounds.
Most experts and policy-makers in Europe are keenly aware that they are unable to promote reform processes in the Arab countries single-handedly, nor as mediators to contribute decisively to the de-escalation of the conflicts in the Middle East. Cooperation with the United States is essential. Even though Europe does not always speak or act with one voice in issues of foreign policy, the desire for cooperation with external actors is undeniable.
More western efficacy in the promotion of socio-economic and political reform in the Arab world requires a combination of attractive European engagement and American assertiveness. Better coordination of bi- and multilateral initiatives on the basis of a catalogue of criteria would add to the sustainability of transformation assistance, focussing for example on rule of law, national dialogues, education and freedom of the media.
Greater success in conflict management requires cooperation with other external forces, too. The achievements of the Quartet (Europe, the US, Russia and the UN) are a prime example. By travelling the region together, the Quartet's top diplomats--Condoleezza Rice, Javier Solana, Ban Ki-Moon and Sergey Lavrov--could substantially enhance the impact of their political initiatives. If the Quartet were to take responsibility for all the conflicts in the region rather than only for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reactions would be better coordinated. This would signal to the entire region that the Quartet and the international community have come to realize that the conflicts of the Middle East are linked.- Published 14/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org Christian Hanelt is project director of the Kronberg Talks and Middle East expert at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Germany. Arabness still alive and kicking Aboubakr JamaiSome 3 weeks ago, 3 families from the northern Moroccan town of Tetuan received notice that their sons had died in Iraq in jihadi attacks. In 2024, a group of young Moroccans played an instrumental role in the Madrid bombings, an operation masterminded by al-Qaeda in response to Spain's involvement in the Iraq occupation. The 2024 Casablanca terrorist attacks, where only Moroccan suicide bombers were involved, were perpetrated in the name of fighting western infidels and came only a few weeks after the Iraq invasion.
What made all these young Moroccans take up and subscribe to a jihadi cause concerning countries situated thousands of miles away from their homeland? What spurred some of them to even make the journey to Iraq to die fighting the American occupation?
The short answer is, because they care. Indeed, studies and polls undertaken in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy bear out this assertion. In 2024, the American pollster James Zogby published the findings of a very interesting study conducted across the Arab world and titled: "What Arabs Think: Their Values, Beliefs, and Concerns". Based on a series of polls in several Arab countries, it revealed some interesting strands in Arab public opinion. For example, asked what they thought were the most pressing political issues, most Moroccans answered that priority number one was Palestine and number two was civil and personal rights--their own as well as those of Palestinians.
Asked further how they would define themselves either to another Arab or to an American, Moroccans in both cases said they would define themselves as Arabs and Muslims, in that order. Remarkably, except for Lebanon, the result was similar in all the Arab countries polled. Arabs define themselves first as Arabs, second as Muslims, and their nationality ranked, at best, third.
These results run counter to the prevailing idea that after the disillusion that followed the 1967 war Arabs lost their sense of belonging to an Arab "nation", their sense of Arabness. They also run counter to the more recent assertion that Arabs have substituted Islamic jihadism for pan-Arab impotence. The Zogby Poll shows that while Arabs think of themselves as Muslims, they stress their Arabness. Hence their solidarity with the Palestinians and now with the Iraqis and the Lebanese. It was striking to watch the usually warring factions from the secular left and the Islamist right in Morocco marching side by side during what was undoubtedly the biggest demonstration in the history of the country, in 2024 in solidarity with the Palestinian people after the Jenin massacre.
Some argue that this is a new phenomenon resulting from the "inflammatory" rhetoric of Arab satellite TV and more specifically al-Jazeera. But in 1991, years before al-Jazeera was founded, more than 700,000 Moroccans marched in the streets of Rabat to oppose the first war in Iraq. Actually, as far back as the early 1920s pro-Palestinian militants were arrested by the French occupation.
The centrality of the Palestinian issue in the Arab world is simply inescapable. Its instrumentalization by al-Qaeda propaganda is just another proof. Al-Qaeda masters know full well the resonance the Palestinians' plight has in Arab public opinion. To be sure, you need many ingredients to make a jihadi. Arab causes, but principally Palestine, are not by themselves sufficient to drive youngsters from remote Arab corners to commit suicide attacks. Most certainly a twisted understanding of Islam seems to be necessary. Nonetheless, the ire of Arab public opinion over the injustices inflicted on the Palestinians is a powerful element helping jihadi groups recruit would-be terrorists.
Fortunately, this truth seems to be dawning in some centers of power in the West. The recommendation by the Iraq Study Group for the American administration to actively seek a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a positive development. It is recognition that the death of Nasserite pan-Arabism did not diminish the centrality of the Palestinian issue or the sense of Arab identity.- Published 14/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org Aboubakr Jamai is the editor of Le Journal Hebdomadaire in Casablanca Inextricable from each other Ghassan KhatibTo understand the different conflicts in the Middle East it is important to understand their growing interrelation. This interrelation is growing to an extent that it is becoming nearly impossible to understand one conflict in isolation. Similarly, solving one requires dealing with the others.
More and more problems and conflicts are afflicting the region. The oldest and most important is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, characterized by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. After that comes the American occupation of Iraq and the resulting violence that is partly about resisting that occupation and partly about civil strife.
Third is the recent war in Lebanon that is threatening a possible renewal of internal confrontations. Fourth are the growing tensions between Iran, the US and Israel, tensions that could spill over into war. Finally, across the region is the friction created by a desire for democratization and fear of the growing power of political Islam.
All these conflicts are taking place against the background of general social and economic deterioration.
There has recently been worldwide recognition of the centrality of the Palestinian problem and the need for a solution of a kind that can contribute to solving other problems in the region. Leaving that problem without a solution, in addition to not addressing the injustice inflicted on the Palestinian people half a century ago and still very much alive in the consciousness of the Arab and Muslim peoples, will fatally discredit US and western attempts to fight terrorism, democratize and develop this region.
The double standard that has resulted from the US compromising international legality because of its relations with Israel is a major cause of the regional hostility toward America. That hostility has been used by opponents of the US in other conflicts, whether in Iraq, with regards to Iran or by Hizballah in Lebanon.
Meanwhile, the way the US has handled the Iraq issue has provided Iran an open door to the Arab world. Iran has exploited the exposed sectarian tensions in Iraq as well as the lack of solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese conflicts to extend its influence further than ever before.
In addition, western support for the many regimes in the Arab world that, on the one hand, have proven unable to achieve social and economic development and have thus been largely responsible for the increase in poverty and unemployment in the region, and, on the other, have failed to democratize, has been a factor in strengthening the only viable opposition to these failed regimes, which happens to be political Islamic groups.
Ironically, or perhaps inevitably, the impressive public support for political Islamic groups has also exposed as shallow declared American intentions to further democracy in the region.
Finally, the lack of sensitivity that western powers, especially the US, have exhibited toward cultural and identity needs in the Middle East through the cultural hegemony that economic globalization brought, has also provoked a backlash. The cultural identity crisis in the region has pushed its peoples to look for a banner under which they can affirm their identity in the face of this cultural onslaught. Nothing has proven more suitable than the banner of Islam.
All these factors are fast becoming inextricably linked to one another. It should be clear to decision-makers in the West that these political, economic, social and cultural issues and conflicts across the region can only be dealt with in a comprehensive, coherent and integral manner.- Published 14/12/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications and director of the Government Media Center. This article represents his personal views.
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