• Iran at threat? -   Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

• A path fraught with danger -   Wayne White

• Not at the risk of regime stability -   Ehud Yaari

Hizballah: Unfinished business
 Ed Blanche

For Israel, Hizballah is unfinished business. Israel's military forces failed to crush the Iranian-backed organization in July and August 2024, to a large extent through their own ineptitude. A US assault on Iran would almost certainly trigger a rematch, which would subject Lebanon to further misery and destruction and possibly even its collapse as a state.

Israel believes another shooting war is coming. So does Hizballah. The Israelis recently held civil defense exercises to counter sustained missile attacks on urban centers and strategic targets like power stations.

Ed Blanche is a Beirut-based analyst and former editor of The Daily Star newspaper.

Anyone with some knowledge about the recent history of Western and Central Asia will be aware that the United States and Israel have been involved in more inter-state wars and intra-state conflicts in the area than any other stakeholder. Israel continues to be embroiled in a conflict over Palestinian territories and has had to mobilize its military forces and civilian population in seven major wars with its neighbors. The United States has launched three invasions in the area in the past 17 years and continues to be engaged in two civil wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus both countries have become, implicitly and explicitly, the primary military actors in the region.

Against that background, any attack on Iran would seriously deteriorate, even globalize, the Greater West Asian crisis. Iran, by virtue of its transnational outreach--into the Persian Gulf area, Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan--would have multiple opportunities to retaliate asymmetrically against US and Israeli interests. The effects of a military attack would not only reverberate militarily, of course. Economists have forecast that any attack on Iran would quadruple the price of oil and gas on the international markets. In other words, any military conflict with Iran would not only reify existing wars in the region, it would intensify them exponentially both in economic and military terms.

We may add a third dimension. If you pit a global military superpower with limited ideological access to the Muslim world together with a regional military power with no ideological access to the Muslim world in a war against one of the constitutive agents of the Muslim world, you are bound to be left with a conflict that is not only determined by military means, but is rigorously fought within an excessively destructive ideological framework. In other words, the agents who consider themselves engaged in a "global war on terror" (Israel and the United States) would be pitted against the agent who considers itself to be fighting a transcendental battle for the emancipation of the "oppressed masses" (the Islamic Republic of Iran).

Any war within such globally charged narratives is bound to produce a conflict with equally global consequences. To think otherwise is to think that nation-states such as Israel, the United States and Iran, which are constituted of transnational ideologies, would retract from their fundamental norms and innermost institutions in a conflict situation. That would negate their very existence. Would any peoples or individuals accept such a nihilistic fate? Did the Vietnamese, Cubans, Palestinians, Chechens, Iraqis or Afghans?

Together, the United States, Israel and Iran at present stand at the edge of a strategic precipice. None of these countries is blessed with a rational leadership that has strategic vision and diplomatic courage. But Israel perhaps faces the greatest challenge from an attack against Iran--not necessarily militarily: Iran's military expenditure is a fraction of Israel's--but in ideological terms, because it is the only country in the area that is still fighting for its very legitimacy.

A military attack against Iran, however engineered and within whatever international constellation, would make it impossible for Israel to live productively and as an equal partner in a region that is primarily Muslim. In the case of a military attack against Iran, Israel would not only be considered an enemy state by the Iranian government, it would enter the historical consciousness of Iranian society as the enemy par excellence. From there it is a long and arduous way back, as the Americans and the British can testify. Is this really what Israeli society wants? Does it really want to add yet another West Asian people to its enemy portfolio?

Ultimately, these are questions that have to be answered in Israel itself. They are questions that will determine the country's relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds as a whole, and the fate of its presence within a region that had a history without it for several millennia. Eventually, Israel will have to carve out a presence for itself within that history that is not considered singularly disruptive. This is the real modus vivendi that we need in West Asia, a regional consciousness that is symbiotic, rather than exclusionary. In the meantime, we are obliged to fight off the destructive forces that have been too readily unleashed in opposition to such a consciousness.- Published 12/4/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam has taught comparative politics and international relations at SOAS since 2024. He is the author of "Iran in World Politics". His newest book entitled "A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations" will be published in November 2024.

At a time when the very real possibility of eventual United States or Israeli military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure looms, it is important to focus on the potentially devastating impact of such action on the stability of the Persian Gulf, the already fragile situation in Iraq, and repercussions even farther afield.

US military contingency plans for major strikes against Iran have been in existence for some time, judging from significant leaks in 2024. This information points to a robust campaign requiring more than 1,000 combat missions and cruise missile launches that could last a number of days. Such a campaign would resemble something closer to a full-scale air war against Iran than a "surgical" strike.

Iran's nuclear infrastructure would not be the only target of such an effort. The US would doubtless also focus on eliminating much of Iran's airpower and any retaliatory capabilities that could be used in the Gulf. Included would be most of the Iranian air force and much of Iran's anti-aircraft defenses to clear the way for strikes on widely-dispersed nuclear targets. In addition, the large array of Iranian anti-ship missiles, Iran's Kilo-Class submarines, Scud-C and ballistic missile assets, mine-laying capabilities, and even the Revolutionary Guards' fleet of small boats trained in swarming tactics against combat vessels and commercial shipping would likely be struck.

Despite the size of this effort, it would be impossible to take out all Iranian assets that could be used to retaliate in the first wave of strikes. Consequently, confronted with a "use or lose" situation, Tehran might well be strongly motivated to strike back quickly with whatever assets had escaped destruction early in such an ambitious air campaign.

Perhaps the worst case scenario for the US and the Arab Gulf states would be an Israeli attack on Iran. In the "fog of war," and with attacks most likely to be conducted at night, Tehran could wrongly conclude that it had been hit by the US (or Israel with the assistance of the US). The latter would not be an altogether unreasonable assumption since the Israelis probably would have to over-fly US-occupied Iraq with Washington's consent in order to reach Iran with a reasonably effective strike package.

The Israelis, however, would be relatively limited in the number of strikes they could carry out at such extreme range. As a result, Israeli attacks would largely be concentrated on nuclear-related targets, taking out only those portions of Iran's air force and air defenses required to reach those targets. Therefore, key Iranian retaliatory capabilities that could be used in the Gulf would most likely be left virtually untouched.

In this situation, stunned by such a blow and possibly uncertain as to the true identity of the attacker for many hours, Tehran would be well-positioned to hit back against US fleet units, US facilities in the Arab Gulf states, commercial shipping, or even petroleum-related targets on the other side of the Gulf employing missiles, aircraft and naval assets. Consequently, in this scenario, before such attacks could be suppressed, substantial damage could be inflicted, including possible Iranian mining operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

In any attack scenario, Tehran also would likely urge Hizballah to restart military operations against Israel from southern Lebanon. In the event of a US attack, it could use pre-positioned covert assets to conduct terrorist operations against US interests throughout the Middle East region and perhaps beyond. In the latter scenario, attempts also might be made by Iranian operatives to attack government and economic targets in the GCC states. Tehran probably would assume that most of the GCC states were complicit in any US attack.

Another damaging retaliatory option open to Iran, most likely in response to a US attack, would be operations inside of Iraq. Indeed, the greater the damage to Iran's potential for retaliation in the Gulf, the more Iraq would likely beckon as the most promising venue for Iranian pay-back.

The Iranians could wreak havoc inside of an already unstable Iraq. They could work through surrogates or send literally hundreds of their own operatives and military personnel across a fairly porous border to attack US targets. Such activity would complicate still further US efforts to bring stability to Iraq. And even if the Iranians chose not to extend any military confrontation with the US into Iraq, many Iraqi Shi'ites would be angered by a US or Israeli attack on Iran, injecting still more tension into Iraq's deeply-troubled internal equation.

Perhaps the worst consequence of a military campaign against Iran would be the absence of an endgame. Saddam Hussein moved militarily against Iran in 1980, a vengeful Iran refused to give in, and Iraq was trapped in an eight-year war. In a similar manner, military action against Iran by the US or Israel could initiate a prolonged crisis in the Gulf region, among other things threatening the flow of oil from the Gulf and driving up world oil prices considerably.- Published 12/4/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Wayne White, former deputy director of the State Department's intelligence office for the Near East and South Asia, is an adjunct scholar at Washington's Middle East Institute.

Iran conscientiously exaggerates its military power, along with the pace of its progress in the nuclear field. It is vital to keep this in mind when examining the possible courses of action at the disposal of the leadership in Tehran in the event of an American attack. Not all the chatter of threats emanating from Revolutionary Guard commanders is credible.

This is particularly so when we assume that any attack--and of course there is no certainty there will be an attack or how effective it will be--would from the outset target a broad range of objectives in addition to known nuclear facilities. These could include Iran's very limited number of active Shehab missile launching bases, airfields and ports, and command and control centers of both the army and the guards.

Based on this reality, we can adopt several assumptions.

For one, the decision regarding Iranian retaliation, its scope and objectives, would at the end of the day be made by the Traditional Conservatives, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei together with Hashemi Rafsanjani and his entourage, and not by the New Conservatives led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. Then too, the central concern confronting these decision-makers, who may already have discussed this secretly, is the preservation of the Islamic Republic regime: strengthening their grip on the country and preventing the emergence of fissures that could invite internal turbulence.

Even after an American strike, the Iranian leadership would still try to avoid a prolonged military confrontation with the US. However energetic the Iranian political discourse regarding the end of American ascendancy in the region, Tehran's leaders are well aware of the American forces' total supremacy.

Accordingly, the most likely pattern of response by Iran would be designed to reassure the leadership that following an exchange of blows with the US it would remain in place, however bloodied. At the same time, the regime would seek to display a sufficient capacity to counterattack so as to generate at least the appearance of a draw or the absence of a decisive victory over Iran.

If indeed this is a realistic set of assumptions, then the options available to Iran include, first and foremost, painful and even spectacular retaliatory operations such as the sinking of a large warship and a series of terrorist attacks on sensitive targets. Ostensibly, the main threat that Iran projects by way of responding to an American strike is to respond by blocking the Strait of Hormuz and complicating the export of oil in tankers from the Gulf. This could entail widespread naval mining, saturating shipping lanes with commando boats and deploying Iran's Russian-made submarines. All these are likely options, however complicated they might be to execute in view of America's heavy naval and military presence and total air superiority. Common sense requires that we anticipate a major Iranian effort along these lines, based on a readiness to bear considerable sacrifices.

There is a real possibility of disrupting the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. But it is doubtful that this tanker route could be paralyzed for long. The opening of secure lanes cleared of mines would constitute an inevitable American follow-up move. Within a relatively short time, Iran would have to decide whether it is going to enter into a prolonged confrontation over energy transport routes and to pay an escalating price for doing so.

It is abundantly clear that in recent years Iran has made preparations to carry out sabotage operations against energy infrastructures on the Arab side of the Gulf--in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. The Iranians have deployed sleeper networks among the large Shi'ite communities of the GCC states, and according to some reports have even recruited the participation of the Lebanese Hizballah. Here again the question would arise: how long would they persist in this approach, given that it would push the Arabs to join with the Americans in a joint defensive effort.

Terrorist attacks outside the Middle East, along the Buenos Aires model, are another option that Iran has invested in preparing. No doubt, Tehran is capable of projecting painful and spectacular operations at great distance. Yet here again, the Iranian leadership would soon have to consider whether it wishes to pursue a strategy that portrays it as a major global terror exporter.

Iraq is perhaps the most tempting arena for an Iranian response in the form of a prolonged campaign based on attrition. It is capable of multiplying several-fold the scope of attacks against American forces in Iraq, deploying the complex and largely concealed infrastructure built up by General Qassem Suleimani of the al-Quds Force and turning some of the Shi'ite groups into active combatants against the "occupation". Further, Iran can threaten the stability of the Kurdish regions in northern Iraq and confront a leader like President Jalal Talabani with a cruel dilemma.

As for Israel, Iran is constantly signaling that if attacked it would direct efforts in that direction as well. But Israel is not a decisive arena for Iran; rather, it can provide an appropriate backdrop for the entire confrontation. Thus the Iranians are liable to launch Shehab missiles against Israel, direct Hizballah to fire long-range rockets, and initiate a variety of high-level terrorist attacks. But here one important reservation must be noted: the missiles may never reach their targets and Israel may respond this time with a more effective operation in Lebanon than that of last summer.

Were the Iranians to assess that Syria would join the fray, their calculations might be different. But there is currently no indication that President Bashar Asad is prepared to do so. Indeed, there are growing indications that Damascus no longer sees eye-to-eye with Iran regarding the fate of Iraq. Asad is not pulling out of his pact with Iran, but neither can he be counted on automatically to take its side.

Thus a number of heavy constraints would affect Iran's response. The Iranians would make every effort to react sharply, quickly and across a wide spectrum of targets. But they are not likely to view a prolonged conflict as serving their interests, except perhaps in Iraq. In any event, they would seek to maintain broad security margins regarding the stability of their regime. Already we can hear voices from Iran expressing doubts regarding the benefit of pursuing nuclear weapons. These voices will only grow stronger as the price Iran is likely to pay becomes clearer.- Published 12/4/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ehud Yaari is Middle East commentator of Israel TV channel 2.