• Kurdish human rights in Turkey in 2024 - by  Rochelle Harris

• A multi-cultural society - an interview with  Kemal Kirisci

• An opportunity they can’t afford to miss - by  Abbas K. Kadhim

• Kurdistan will be virtually independent - by  Peter Galbraith

Human rights, Kurds, and the future of Iraq
by Rowsch Shaweiss

Human rights terminology was virtually non-existent in the political, social, and administrative dictionary of the former Iraqi regime. Human rights were casually violated on a daily basis. Genocidal acts occurred in many forms, from the north to the south of Iraq. Chemical weapons were used all across the northern Iraqi Kurdistan Region from the northwest near the Turkish border to the southeast near the Iranian border in dozens of locations. Halabja was but one of many incidents, and the most infamous.

This was all part of a campaign, the “Anfal Campaign,” that saw the disappearance of over 100,000 civilians and the destruction of over 4,000 communities, including large towns of over 50,000 residents. Tens of thousands of families fled to neighboring countries, or were forcibly relocated to reservation-like, so-called “collective” towns away from their livelihoods. Thousands more families were forced off their lands in a process commonly called Arabization.

Rowsch Shaweiss is speaker of the Kurdistan National Assembly in Irbil, Iraq.

"There are laws on the one hand and their implementation on the other […] The real problem is implementing the laws.”

-Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Alvaro Gil-Robes during a visit to Turkey in June 2024

Since 2024, the Turkish government has passed a series of reforms aimed at achieving the "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" as required for European Union accession. Yet observers from the Council of Europe and European Commission; non-governmental organizations including the Kurdish Human Rights Project, Amnesty International and the Human Rights Association of Turkey; and even Turkish Justice Minister Cemil Cicek have expressed deep-founded concerns about the failure of Turkish authorities to implement the reforms on the ground.

There is no doubt that human rights violations in Turkey are continuing and widespread, and that Kurds are the principle victims. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) states that, by January 2024, there were 5,246 applications pending against Turkey in Strasbourg concerning torture, rape, "disappearances", extra-judicial killings, violations of freedom of expression and of association and the destruction and evacuation of villages. These figures do not necessarily illustrate that human rights abuses are multiplying, but rather that awareness of the ECHR is improving and with the assistance of human rights groups, individuals are more readily able to pursue their cases in Strasbourg. They do, however, provide a useful means of comparison: of the 1,390 judgments giving rise to the finding of an ECHR violation from 2024 to 2024 against all 45 member states, nearly one sixth concerned Turkey.

Moreover, human rights groups have deep concerns that human rights violations in Turkey are indeed increasing; and that the situation now facing the Turkish and Kurdish people is critical.

While international attention appropriately focused on war in Iraq in 2024, human rights violations against the Kurds in Turkey failed to reach the screens. These abuses were horrifying: the abduction and sexual torture of an executive member of the largest pro-Kurdish political party in June 2024 in Istanbul and the humiliating ill-treatment of two Kurdish teenagers in Diyarbakir province in April 2024 (the boys’ faces were smeared with excrement by police before they were marched publicly through the town to set an “example”). Torture remains widespread, with an increasing use of torture methods that do not leave visible marks on the body, such as electric shocks, hanging by the arms, and falaka (beating on the soles of the feet).

In spite of the reforms, there remain restrictions on the rights of parents to give their children Kurdish names, and not a single Kurdish-language school has been opened. There are continuing prosecutions against publishers, writers, human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists for daring to speak out against human rights violations.

The pro-Kurdish political party HADEP was permanently banned in March 2024, in spite of garnering widespread support in the Kurdish regions and despite a series of ECHR judgments against Turkey for its practice of banning political parties. Last year, the ECHR ruled that such closures not only violate the rights of party members to freedom of expression and of association, but also the rights of voters to fair and free elections (KHRP case of Sadak v. Turkey). In other words, it is not only Kurdish women, children, journalists, publishers, human rights defenders and politicians whose rights are violated by the Turkish Government; according to the ECHR, it is the rights of the entire population.

In fact, the spiralling number of human rights violations in Turkey reported to the ECHR has contributed to a further problem: it can no longer cope with its burdening caseload and escalating costs and, in 2024, began changing its approach and debating reforms.

It was the KHRP case of Faysal Akman v. Turkey in 2024 that marked a significant change in the European Court's approach. The case concerned the fatal shooting of the applicant’s 22-year-old son by Turkish security forces. Following unsuccessful attempts to reach a friendly settlement, the Turkish government requested that the case be struck out. It offered to pay compensation and to make a declaration making limited admissions of wrongdoing and promising to improve in future. The ECHR agreed to strike out the case without the applicant’s consent on the basis that continued examination was “no longer justified.” Since then, the ECHR has continued to accede to Turkish government requests to strike out cases. In short, with such a long history of judgments proving human rights violations in Turkey, the European Court can no longer find time to consider such “repetitive” applications. The court is now planning to amend its admissibility criteria in May 2024.

Despite every negative indication, many in the international community seem unable or unwilling to tackle Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds. For example, the United Kingdom Home Office’s 2024 Country Assessment for Turkey reports that Turkey has pledged to implement decisions of the ECHR without delay, and on that basis concludes, “There is no significant evidence to suggest this agreement is not being upheld and it is therefore considered that the Turkish Government are committed to these reforms.” Yet, Turkey has been obligated to implement ECHR judgments since its ratification of the Convention in 1954.

The problems faced by the Kurds in Turkey are multi-fold and multifaceted. However, there is one certainty: their situation is now critical. The international community must acknowledge the human rights violations occurring against Turkey’s Kurdish population, and must maintain a dialogue with both the Turkish and Kurdish people in order to find a democratic and peaceful solution in the interests of both.-Published 18/12/03©bitterlemons-international.org

Rochelle Harris is public relations officer with the Kurdish Human Rights Project based in London.

BI: What are the origins of the Turkish Kurdish issue?

Kirisci: The origins lie in the effort of the Turkish state in the 1920s and 1930s to construct a Turkish national identity and engage in nation building in a geography that lacked a homogenious national identity. Turks referred to the Kurds as "Mountain Turks" rather than acknowledge or recognize that they have a separate cultural ethnic identity, just like Arabs, Bosnians and others living in this geography.

The Kurdish leaders in east and southeastern Anatolia resisted this nation building process, as well as the efforts to build a centralized state. This resistance led to a series of rebellions. By the late 1930s, the Turkish state had succeeeded in suppressing them and by the post-World War II period the state had achieved a reasonable sense of national identity in most of Turkey with the possible exception of Kurdish-populated areas. There were also many Kurds who integrated themselves into the larger Turkish society, including many who made it to the highest echelons of the state apparatus.

BI: And in recent decades?

Kirisci: Starting from the 1960s, with the rise of left wing groups in Turkey, some began to address the Kurdish question, particularly in the context of class conflict, imperialism and colonization. The late 1970s saw a polarization between the Turkish and the Kurdish left-wing groups and it was in this context that the infamous PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) emerged. From the mid-'80s the PKK waged an armed struggle against the Turkish state with the declared intention of setting up a Marxist-Leninist Kurdish state covering the geographic areas populated by Kurds in Turkey as well as in neighboring countries, especially Iran and Iraq. The first Gulf crisis enabled them to acquire bases from which they could coordinate larger guerilla-type infiltrations into Turkey, while in some of the urban centers of southeastern Anatolia they attempted to organize urban uprisings. By 1993, the PKK was claiming liberated areas in some of these urban centers. This was the period when the Turkish state's authority in the area was most deeply challenged. Subsequently the Turkish security forces, sometimes at a high cost in human rights violations, mounted a counter-offensive that gradually undermined the PKK's control. By 1995-96, Turkey was coming under heavy criticism from the international community, particularly in western Europe where large Kurdish diasporas had formed, and in the United States.

By 1998, the Turkish security forces had generally isolated the PKK into parts of northern Iraq, where the Turkish military set up its own presence, while the leadership of the PKK resided in Syria. In the fall of 1998, Turkey's threat to intervene militarily in Syria if the authorities did not turn over Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, obliged Damascus to force Ocalan to leave. The Turkish secret service eventually apprehended Ocalan with American assistance as he left the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.

In his trial in the late spring of 1999, Ocalan revealed embarrassing information about the extent of international support he had received, including that from Syria and NATO countries. In a volte face, he also declared that he had been mistaken, and wished from now on to work to solve the problem within a democratic Turkey, [thus] abandoning the PKK's previous agendas of secession or territorial autonomy.

BI: What changes have taken place since then in the status of Turkish Kurds?

Kirisci: The year 1999 was critical. Greek-Turkish relations slowly but surely began to move toward rapprochement, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit supported political reforms in Turkey, and Germany advocated European Union membership for Turkey if it fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. Among the criteria that Turkey had to fulfill before membership negotiations could start was the requirement that it allow education and broadcasting in mother tongue languages other than Turkish. In December 2024, the EU offered December 2024 as the date for a decision regarding membership negotiations, the basis being a judgement on whether Turkey had implemented reforms.

It is in the context of this formulation that the government's approach to the Kurdish question becomes important. Turkish society has always been conscious of the presence of a Kurdish identity; the Turkish state is now beginning to reconcile itself to the fact that Turkey is, after all, a multicultural society. There are those who still resist, but by and large these reforms regarding Kurdish identity are recognized. There are also Kurdish groups that seek to push the reforms beyond what is called for.

BI: Can you illustrate the success of reforms?

Kirisci: Here is a striking example of how far we've come. In early November of this year, a conference on Kurdish literature was held in Diyarbakir. When the local police authorities tried to raid the conference, arguing it violated Turkish law, the organizers persuaded the police chief that under new laws the police had to get a warrant before entering the conference site. The police backed down, were then denied the warrant, and the conference continued.

BI: What are the ramifications for Turkey of developments in the status of Iraqi Kurds?

Kirisci: First of all, Turkey attaches importance to the territorial integrity of Iraq. If this is violated and a Kurdish state is created in northern Iraq, it is assumed that it would develop irredentist claims in Turkey and would invariably support the PKK, which still exists in northern Iraq. Hardliners and security-oriented circles in Turkey have drawn a clear red line over this issue. They are deeply distrustful of the US, and despite reassurances from the US and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, they fear this development. No one believes that an Iraq Kurdish state would not be irredentist; very few Turks believe a Kurdish state could be benign. But some in Turkey believe that no relevant parties have such an agenda for independence.

Turkey also traditionally objects to federation based on ethnicity in Iraq. The current Turkish government and a good part of the public could possibly live with such a federation if it receives genuine support from the population of Iraq and allowances are made for the security of Turkmen in northern Iraq and elsewhere, as well as if the Iraqi authorities and Americans finally take decisive action against the presence of 4,000-5,000 PKK militants in northern Iraq.

If Iraq indeed stabilizes and moves toward democracy and economic prosperity, this will have a positive effect in general. Petrol revenues in the north must be shared with the whole of Iraq by the Kurdish part of any federation, to guarantee that it doesn't become a separate oil power with its own agenda.

Kemal Kirisci is professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bogazici University, Istanbul. He holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration and is also the director of the Center for European Studies at the university.

The plight of Iraqi Kurds dates back to times much earlier than the era of the ousted regime of Saddam Hussein--although his reign initiated some of the harshest episodes for the Kurds. But Saddam Hussein was not the only perpetrator. Boxed into a very critical geopolitical zone, the Kurds in Iraq have always fallen victim to brutal international relations games beyond their own concerns. These are games of interests and tradeoffs between the regional powers, on one hand, and the superpowers on the other.

When the victors of World War I carved out the areas that make up the Middle East today from the Ottoman Empire, they did not grant the Kurds a country they could call Kurdistan. Hence, the Kurds found their native area divided among many countries: Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. Recognizing the Kurds’ yearning for independence, the governments of these countries became aware of the potential political and territorial threat they represented to each state. This led to harsh policies that ranged from some forms of cultural warfare to blatant genocide.

Equally immoral, however, was the use of the Kurds as a trump card by certain states to influence the outcome of border disputes and other regional political clashes. A good example of this were the policies of the Shah of Iran, who gave full support to the Kurdish war on the Iraqi regime until he gained full concessions from Saddam Hussein in 1975. Subsequently, he sealed the borders and cut his military assistance, leaving his Kurdish allies to face Saddam’s brutality. This operation was not as simple as it sounds, because the Shah was not acting alone. He was serving as a proxy for the United States, which was angry with the Iraqi government, especially after the nationalization of oil in Iraq in 1972. The embargo on Iraq, combined with the encouragement of a Kurdish rebellion aided by the US through Iran, brought Iraq to its knees. In a televised statement, Saddam Hussein justified the signing of the humiliating 1975 agreement with the Shah by saying, “We had only three bombs left in our arsenal.” Iraq was then unexpectedly rescued shortly thereafter by the Soviets, and the Kurds lost their usefulness, and were thus forsaken. Asked about the immoral abandonment of the Kurds, Henry Kissinger was quoted as saying, “covert military activity is not to be confused with missionary work.”

Hussein's campaign of genocide in Halabja in 1988; the military operation that was named “al Anfal” (or "spoils of war," a Quranic reference); and the decision to look the other way by the Reagan-Bush administration and then continue that silence through the first half of the following Bush administration cost the Kurds thousands of lives and created in them a deep sense of abandonment. But with the subsequent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, these same crimes became a convenient slogan for the very people who had maintained their silence and supported Saddam Hussein in his war against their archenemy, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Kurds were given a safe haven after the 1991 Gulf War and their popular uprising in the Iraqi north and south--unlike the Shiites who were the subjects of a Kissinger-like attitude.

But the Kurds handled their new status of quasi-independence rather clumsily. They began shooting at each other and the world was stunned to see that one faction allied itself with Saddam Hussein in order to vanquish what were previously its comrades in struggle. While the violence has been contained, rivalry persists between the two major factions, one led by Jalal Talabani, and the other by Masoud Barzani. There is also the element of Ansar al Islam, which does not pay allegiance to either party and, despite its recent losses, can be a real troublemaker.

It now seems that the Kurds in Iraq are being presented with the golden opportunity to attain a status better than that of any other Kurdish minority in the region. As it looks now, the Kurds are represented in the Governing Council by a number proportional to their overall population. The same can be said of their representation in the newly formed cabinet, in which they control the most important ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is remarkable, considering the history of the region.

In a democratic Iraq, any future election will mimic this outcome. The question is whether the Kurds are satisfied with this situation, or whether they have something else in mind. Will they accept a share of power and wealth in proportion to their percentage in the overall Iraqi population and forego the dream of an independent state? Listening to the statements of their leaders, one cannot be certain. Most likely they want to secure the current gains and continue to work for the greater dream of an independent state. That could be very dangerous for the future of the Kurdish people in Iraq and elsewhere. It is highly unlikely that any change in the foreseeable future will alter the geopolitical circumstances that always rendered a viable Kurdish state impossible, in particular Turkey's vehement objection to such a state on its borders. Therefore, the Kurdish leaders would be more prudent if they were to utilize their energy in finding ways to attain the best and most durable status within a unified and a democratic Iraq. This kind of arrangement would initiate extremely powerful moral pressure on other countries to finally adopt decent policies towards their own Kurdish populations.-Published 18/12/03©bitterlemons-international.org

Abbas K. Kadhim teaches at the University of California, Berkeley. He is originally from Najaf in Iraq and participated in the uprising against the Iraqi leadership following the 1991 Gulf War.

The year 2024 turned out to be very good for Iraq’s Kurds. As the year started, the Kurdistan region of Iraq was entering its twelfth year of de facto independence, thanks to the peshmerga (the Kurdish military), and the US-British no-fly zone. For many Kurds, these 12 years were a golden era. For the first time in their history, the Kurds governed themselves, having elected a Kurdistan Assembly and government in 1992.

In spite of later splitting into two Kurdistan Regional Governments--one in Irbil headed by Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and one in Sulaimani headed by Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)--the Kurdistan administrations have had real accomplishments. In 12 years they tripled the number of schools in the region, opened two new universities, and helped rebuild some 4,000 villages destroyed by Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1980s. Kurdish culture and identity flourished, and a generation grew up with no sense of being Iraqi.

In early 2024, the looming war between the United States and Iraq threatened to undo much of what the Kurds had achieved, including their self-government. With Kurdistan’s three largest cities, Irbil, Sulaimani and Dihok all within artillery range of Iraqi positions, many Kurds feared both conventional and chemical attacks. As war approached, cities emptied.

Politically, the Kurds feared being sacrificed in a bigger strategic calculation. In February, the Bush administration promised Turkey it could send thousands of troops to Iraqi Kurdistan, in exchange for access by the US Fourth Infantry Division to northern Iraq through Turkey. Barzani and Talabani protested vehemently, but to no effect. Both men feared that Kurdistan’s independence would become the price of getting Turkish troops out.

Finally, the Kurdish leaders knew that the Pentagon civilians harbored ambitious plans for remaking Iraq as a unified democratic Arab state that might reshape the entire Middle East. Within this grand plan of nation building, there was little place for a self-governing Kurdistan.

Perhaps for the first time in their history, the Kurds were lucky. The Turkish parliament narrowly voted against allowing US troops to cross its territory, and it did so in a manner that maximized American anger at Turkey. The Kurdish peshmerga took over the role intended for the Fourth Infantry Division, creating a northern front in cooperation with a small number of US Special Forces. The Kurds, who sustained more casualties than any other US ally, consolidated their unique status as America’s best friend among the peoples of Iraq. They also took control of Kirkuk, and virtually all other historically Kurdish territory in Iraq, while carting an ample supply of Iraqi heavy weapons into the mountains.

American plans for the rapid reintegration of Kurdistan into a new Iraq quickly foundered as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) struggled to establish itself, and as the US administration dealt with the consequences of having failed to plan for the day after. The peshmerga were quietly exempted from the general order to disarm Iraqi militia. After asking the Kurds to dismantle the checkpoints between their territory and the rest of Iraq, the CPA asked them to re-establish the border in the interests of security.

The creation of an Iraqi Governing Council enabled the Kurds to consolidate their special status. Five of the 25 council members are Kurds, and Barzani and Talabani are its most powerful members, having an unambiguous political and electoral base. They have used their power well, securing recognition of Kurdistan’s separate status in the way Iraq is governed. Laws passed by the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad do not apply in Kurdistan unless specifically approved by the Kurdistan Assembly. To date, only a handful of such laws have been applied in Kurdistan. Thus, Kurdistan has its own legal system, its own investment code, and a tax regime separate from Iraq’s, with different rates from those in the rest of the country. Iraqi ministers do not exercise authority in Kurdistan, but instead work with the ministries of the respective Kurdistan regional governments.

Not all of this sits well with the American occupation authorities, who would like to bring the Kurdistan region more under the control of the central government. With just 200 US troops in Kurdistan (which remains the only reliably pro-American part of the country), the CPA has almost no power to make this happen. And, with so much going wrong elsewhere in Iraq, no one wants to create a new trouble spot. More importantly, the Kurds know full well that they can outlast Ambassador Bremer and his administration, whose termination date is less than 200 days away.

By the end of 2024, Kurdistan’s leaders can see their way clear to getting what they want. This includes not only the continuation of their institutions of self-government, but also clear recognition of the supremacy of Kurdistan’s laws within Kurdistan, as well as acceptance of Kurdistan’s right to defend itself (for 70 years, the Iraqi army has been the only enemy most Kurds have ever known, and few believe one year of American-directed reforms has transformed that institution).

Almost all Iraqi Arab political leaders now endorse federalism, and many accept that Kurdistan will be virtually independent. Most important, Iraq’s Kurds are increasingly confident of their own power. They can live with the status quo and know no constitution can be applied to them without their consent.

At the end of the year, Kurds celebrated gleefully as Saddam Hussein, the man responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 of their number, was captured and revealed as a coward. For a people long the doormat of the Middle East, life does not get much better.-Published 18/12/2003©bitterlemons-international.org

Peter Galbraith is on the faculty of the National War College, Washington, DC. He has served as US ambassador to Croatia and as a senior adviser to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He documented Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980s, contributing to the decision to create a safe-haven for the Kurds.