Edition 9 Volume 8 - April 15, 2010

The Petraeus Statement

A taboo being challenged in Washington -   Saad N. Jawad

Israel has become a burden and liability to America.

We need to take this seriously -   Daniel Kurtzer

The US gains substantial Arab support for its regional policies when the US is active in the peace process.

Little Baghdad -   Mark Perry

Unfortunately, the Petraeus controversy has failed to spark a useful debate about US-Israel relations.

Israeli policy-makers, take note -   Itamar Rabinovich

Barack Obama as candidate and as president endorsed this linkage.


A taboo being challenged in Washington
 Saad N. Jawad

Although some have quibbled with what exactly he said, there is little doubt that General David Petraeus, the commander of the US Central Command who also served as commanding general of the multinational forces in Iraq from January 2007 to September 2008, was voicing broad US dissatisfaction with Israel and its policies vis-a-vis the Palestinians when he was recently quoted as saying that the Arab-Israel conflict is fomenting anti-US sentiments in the Arab world. Significantly, he went further to imply that this conflict is putting the lives of US soldiers in jeopardy, and that Israeli intransigence is harmful to US interests.

Petraeus' attitude is not new in American circles. It represents the realistic views and attitudes that have started to develop in the US since the publication in 2006 of two books, one by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt about the harm to US interests the pro-Israel lobby in the US does (Walt by the way was Gen. Petraeus' advisor when he did his PhD at Princeton in 1987), and one by former president Jimmy Carter, "Palestine: Peace not Apartheid".

It would appear that Petraeus, profiled in 2009 by Foreign Policy Magazine as eighth on its list of "Top 100 Global Thinkers" and a PhD holder in international relations, has also come to believe that the unconditional support the US is giving Israel is the real cause behind the antagonistic attitude the people of the Arab and Islamic regions hold toward the US. He is aware that the US, unlike Britain and France, had no colonial past in the Middle East until 2003 and the occupation of Iraq.

In 1956, most Arabs respected the position of US President Dwight Eisenhower during the war against Egypt. Arabs and Muslims held no grudge against the US until 1967, when America wholeheartedly and unreservedly supported the Israeli aggression and occupation of more Arab land. All terrorist and extremist movements in the area that have targeted the US were established because of and are nourished by the expulsion and dispossession of the Palestinian people, their continued killing, especially the unwarranted and excessive use of force in Gaza last year, the Israeli occupation of Arab land and the failure of the US to adopt a balanced position.

When he served in Iraq, Petraeus would have seen firsthand the catastrophic consequences of the war and subsequent occupation, and he will be aware of the role Israel played in promoting and pushing for that war. It is not a secret anymore that the Zionist lobby and pro-Israel neoconservatives in Washington pursued the occupation of Iraq to fulfill an Israeli agenda. Philip Zelikow, a former member of President George W. Bush's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, even at the time said that, "the real threat from Iraq was not a threat to the US.... The unstated threat was the threat against Israel.... The American government does not want to lean too hard on it rhetorically because it is not a popular sell."

Petraeus has surely come across the Israel factor in and around Iraq during his service. Israel is one significant element keeping Iraq chaotic. And for any objective and balanced observer, what is happening in Iraq undermines the interests of the US though it serves Israeli interests. Israeli leaders and the influential lobby in Washington were pushing the US administration as far back as 1990 to attack Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein's regime, and managed to keep the country under draconian and inhuman sanctions until 2003 and the invasion. But US plans to create a stable base in Iraq were foiled by a series of unwarranted and unstudied decisions taken immediately after the occupation, decisions that were all produced by people loyal to Israel rather than the US.

As a military man, Petraeus must have realized that Israel is no longer a strategic ally or necessity for the US. It may have been an asset during the Cold War when the US needed to contain the Soviet Union's attempts to infiltrate the oil rich Middle East. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Israel has become a burden and liability to America. Because of Israel, the US has vetoed more than 32 resolutions in the Security Council, is paying $3 billion a year in cash support and is furnishing it with all its military machinery.

What is the payback? Israel embarrasses the US and Europe with its intransigence and defiance. The encirclement and bombing of Gaza and the assassination of a leading member of Hamas in the United Arab Emirates using European passports are just the latest examples.

For almost six decades, the subject of Israel's influence in US policy-making circles and the harmful effect it is having on American interests was a taboo subject in Washington. It is not anymore. Slowly but surely, a space is being opened up in the US for an open and honest discussion about the US-Israel alliance and the benefit of antagonizing a whole region for the sake of an ally that is no more than an economic burden, an ally that was ready to pass classified US material to the Soviet Union to get more exit visas for Jews to migrate to Israel, and an ally that was ready to provide China with sensitive military technology for its own interest.

Maybe one should not expect a major shift in Washington in the short term, but it is happening. The latest CIA report, that cast doubt over Israel's survival beyond the next 20 years, is another indication of this shift.- Published 15/4/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Saad N. Jawad is a professor of political science at Baghdad University.


We need to take this seriously
 Daniel Kurtzer

General David Petraeus denies saying that the persistence of the Arab-Israel conflict endangers American troops in the region. Vice President Joseph Biden also denies saying this. That part of the story should thus be laid to rest.

What Petraeus did say, however, is quite important. In written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 16, Petraeus said:

The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our [CENTCOM] ability to advance our interests in the AOR [area of responsibility]. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of US favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of US partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.

Petraeus' statement to the Senate is not surprising to those of us who have served and traveled in the Arab world. We may not like what we hear, and some of what is said is highly exaggerated; but these are constant themes expressed by Arab interlocutors, including friends of the United States. We need to take this seriously.

US diplomacy in the Middle East has always involved a balancing act among competing interests that include: deep friendship with Israel; friendship with moderate Arabs; commitment to a peace settlement; preventing external aggression or internal destabilization; and ensuring the security of energy exports. American officials usually insist that each of these interests can and should be pursued in and of itself, unlinked to any other issue; but they realize that America's ability to secure these interests is inextricably intertwined with the Israel-Arab conflict in the minds of those in the region.

Recent history has shown that the US gains substantial Arab support for its regional policies when the US is active in the peace process--even if such activity does not lead to success. Arab officials I interviewed for a book project were unanimous in saying that their governments would extend themselves to help the US when they could demonstrate US activity in support of peace, and they cited the experience of the Clinton and Bush administrations. The opposite also holds true.

The implication of the Petraeus statement is thus two-fold: first, that Arab views of the US rise and decline on the basis of their views toward the Israel-Arab conflict; and second, that the US can influence those Arab views by adopting a strong policy in support of peace and a policy perceived as fair and balanced.

Petraeus' testimony appeared just as the recent US-Israel mini-crisis over settlements/Jerusalem heated up, and it was read--erroneously--as timed to influence US policy in the mini-crisis. Actually, the Petraeus testimony is a required annual exercise that normally doesn't get much coverage among the US-Israel policy community, since the testimony is a very lengthy assessment of CENTCOM activities and plans. The coincidence of its appearance at the time of US-Israel tensions, however, has given it wide distribution and added salience this year.

America's current top regional priorities are the scheduled withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and the effort to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. For US policy-makers, it is imperative to clear the decks of any other issue that impedes their ability to secure these objectives. Thus when America's top regional general says that the persistence of the Arab-Israel conflict hurts his effort to achieve core US national interests, the president, Congress and the American public sit up and pay attention.

The issue is no less important and, in many ways, very similar for Israeli policy-makers and the Israeli public. The government of Israel has identified the Iranian nuclear issue as its number one priority, and the government surely understands that the effort to push back this program--short of military action--will depend on concerted international action, through diplomacy and/or sanctions. If the Arabs have identified as their top priority, or one of their top priorities, progress in the peace process and a more balanced and active US role, it would seem prudent for the Israeli government to agree--not only to serve the larger goal of containing Iran, but because peace is also clearly in Israel's interest. The intersection of these interests and warning signs can thus be transformed from a problem into an advantage: that is, activate a serious peace process with a serious American role and get in return the kind of Arab support Washington will need to curb Iran's aggressive intentions.

Some may argue that this is peace process doubletalk, that is, an argument to get Israel to move on the peace process based on faulty American assessments. Indeed, it is possible that Arabs are telling Americans what they believe the US needs to hear, rather than some objective reality. But since we know that Arabs have acted in the past based on these views and are likely to act again in the future according to these views, wouldn't it behoove both the US and Israel to take note?- Published 15/4/2010 bitterlemons-international.org

Daniel Kurtzer holds the Abraham Chair in Middle East Policy Studies at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. He served previously as United States ambassador to Egypt and to Israel.


Little Baghdad
 Mark Perry

When, at the end of World War II, George Marshall received word that Germany had surrendered, he put on his best uniform and visited Harry Truman. "Mr. President," he said. "I am pleased to announce that we've defeated Germany." Truman smiled: "I'm happy to hear that, General," he responded, "because for a while there I thought we were fighting the British."

The British and Americans worked well together in World War II, but even the best alliance is not seamless: Marshall's protege General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell referred to the British as "f-cking pigs", Douglas MacArthur refused to cooperate with them during the Pacific War ("they just want their colonies back"), and Eisenhower's friendship with Winston Churchill earned him the enmity of George Patton: "Ike's the best general the limeys have," he said.

Franklin Roosevelt was only marginally less critical. He had two goals in the war: to defeat the Axis powers--and to end the British Empire. Roosevelt blamed the British for the war, describing British colonialism as one of its primary causes. Churchill was uncomfortably aware of this, but he knew the facts: the UK needed America not only to defeat Germany, but to survive. So it was with a sense of relief that Churchill welcomed December 7, 1941: it meant that his country was saved. But he was careful: thousands of dead at Pearl Harbor were not cause for celebration.

Sadly, some of Israel's most ardent American friends have failed to follow Churchill's example. In the aftermath of 9/11, the New Republic's Martin Peretz ("Israel, The United States, and Evil") was nearly gleeful. Finally, America could "grasp Israel's human losses"; finally the Israeli-American alliance was "bonded in blood"; finally "we Americans no longer need any instructions in how it feels to be an Israeli." Put another way, 9/11 might have been bad for America, but it was good for Israel.

Really? The brain-dead view of our history holds that we defeat our enemies and come home with our views intact. The reality is quite different: we defeat our enemies (or not, as the case may be) and then we marry them. Or set them up in business. There's a neighborhood called "Little Saigon" blocks from where I live. Then too, fighting people is a subversive experience: we learn about them. Once upon a time it was acceptable to refer to people as "dirty Japs," or "filthy Huns" or "gooks"--or, more recently, "Hajis". Not anymore. They're now our neighbors.

It's useful to keep all of this in mind when reflecting on what General David Petraeus said about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict several weeks ago: that the conflict "foments anti-American sentiment, due to a US perception of favoritism toward Israel." Petraeus' public words went further: the problems caused by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict head the list of challenges faced by the US in the region.

The outpouring of rage among the pro-Israel advocates was interesting: that Petraeus never said what he said, that he said it but didn't mean it, or that he said it but it only showed his ignorance. This last view--repeated by columnist Andrew McCarthy in the National Review ("Petraeus' Israel Problem")--holds that "Petraeus is echoing the narrative peddled incessantly by leftists in the government he serves and by Islamists in the countries where he works." What Petraeus really needs, McCarthy says, is a better understanding of the "totalitarian, iniquitous, misogynistic, homophobic, virulently anti-western and anti-Semitic culture that dominates Muslim countries."

Those who believe Petraeus, meanwhile, are "leftists," "terrorist groupies" or "Hizballah flunkies".

My God, man, I don't even hear this tripe in Israel. Rarely, if ever, do you hear anyone articulate Petraeus' real message: that if the United States wants to win the war on terror we have to address the region's most fundamental issues.

Of course, my country's senior military officers aren't delusional; they know that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict won't end the war on terror. But they're convinced that it will remove an arrow from the quiver of our enemies. And even if it doesn't, isn't it worth doing anyway? And there's another message. There's not only a deep strain of anti-colonialism in the American military, there's a strong sense that not only does America come first, no one comes second. We're willing to fight with our friends as a part of a coalition (in fact, that's our preference), but we'll only do so if we're the ones in charge. We're even willing to shed our blood with our allies, but only for our interests, not theirs. The message was clear for Churchill and it is just as clear for Binyamin Netanyahu: we don't need to prove that we're committed to Israel's security, they need to prove that they're committed to ours. Israelis can do that by working to resolve their conflict with the Palestinians. If they do, they'll remain a strategic asset and an ally. If they don't, they won't. It's just that simple.

Unfortunately, the Petraeus controversy has failed to spark a useful debate about US-Israel relations. The language surrounding the controversy has been divisive and polarizing. It'll only get worse, especially if Israel attacks Iran. If that happens, Americans will die. At which point, I'm quite sure, we'll hear Andrew McCarthy extol the virtues of killing Iranians: they're a bunch of "misogynistic", "homophobic" "anti-Semites" anyway so what the hell. And (I'm also quite sure) that even as the bodies of our dead arrive at Dover Air Force Base, we'll hear Martin Peretz tell us that while all those dead young men and women are bad for America, they're actually good for Israel. Because the lives lost will reinforce our "bond of blood" with our Israeli allies.

But don't try to peddle that garbage in the Pentagon.- Published 15/4/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mark Perry is the author of "Partners in Command, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace". His most recent book is "Talking To Terrorists" (Basic Books, 2010).


Israeli policy-makers, take note
 Itamar Rabinovich

What General David Petraeus said in his testimony before the Senate's Armed Services Committee on March 16, and the manner in which his statement was quoted, represented and interpreted, must be understood within the context of the charged atmosphere in Washington regarding US-Israel relations and the Israel-Arab peace process. The president of the United States and the prime minister of Israel are in open disagreement over these issues. Recently, a respected academic raised the question of dual loyalty in his blog. Against this backdrop, a statement by one of America's most prominent generals--head of the Central Command, who holds military responsibility and authority for most of the Middle East--that points to a negative linkage between America's support for Israel and the success and safety of its soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq, is bound to become a controversial issue.

The controversy begins with the question of what General Petraeus actually said. Misquotation and misinterpretation by anti-Israel bloggers prompted a counter blog by the conservative author Max Boot. In his "Commentary" blog of March 18, Boot argued that Petraeus was both misquoted and quoted out of context and pointed to the discrepancy between the written text and the general's oral presentation.

Unlike Boot, I think that the written statement is important. But the paragraphs referring to Israel should indeed be put in context. In the first part of the written testimony, Petraeus speaks of "US interests and the most significant threats to them". He mentions and elaborates on a few such threats: "Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran's destabilizing activities and policies, instability in Iraq and in Yemen". This list is then followed by a second category, "Non-military challenges to security and stability". He points to eleven such challenges, the first of which is "insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace":

The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR [area of responsibility]. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of US favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of US partnerships with governments and people in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.

While he did not quite say that Israel and its policies were jeopardizing the lives of US soldiers, the general or the staff member who actually authored the text adopted the first of two conflicting narratives.

The first narrative has its roots in the heyday of British imperial power in the Middle East. It was then argued by several policy-makers and analysts that there was a mutual bond between Britain and Arab nationalism, but Britain's support for "the Jewish National Home" in Palestine and its pro-Zionist policies (such as they were) poisoned Britain's relationship with the Arab world. When the US displaced and succeeded Britain as the principal western power in the Middle East, this narrative was transplanted into an American context. The US, so the argument went, had no imperial and colonial past in the Middle East and the sole reason for Arab support for the Soviet Union was America's support for the state of Israel.

The counter-narrative argues that this was at best a naive argument. Britain was hated because it colonized and dominated much of the Arab world and tried to hang on to its empire in the age of de-colonization. When America succeeded Britain, it did not acquire colonies in the Middle East, but created dependencies, exploited oil resources, built military bases, engineered coups d'etat and supported autocratic regimes. Support for Israel did not help with Arab and Muslim public opinion, but was not a prime reason for anti-US sentiments.

The debate between the two narratives was given a new twist by Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. He told Arab interlocutors that Washington was Israel's friend and protector but that precisely for this reason it was in their interest to come close to it. Washington and not Moscow could get Arab states the land they lost in 1967. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was the first to accept this argumentation. His archenemy, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, appeared to follow suit in 1991, but did not complete the transition. The Israeli-Palestinian signing ceremony in the White House in September 1993 seemed to be a culmination of this new process.

This was fine as long as the US was orchestrating a functioning Arab-Israel peace process. With the onset of a new decade and a new century, the situation was transformed by several developments: the collapse of the peace process and the exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the terrorist attacks on the US mainland, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the apparent conflict between George W. Bush's America and large parts of the Muslim world, and Iran's emergence as a major regional power and a leader of the "resistance camp", namely resistance to the US and Israel.

These developments revived the debate between the two narratives. The Hamilton-Baker commission of 2006 endorsed the notion of linkage and argued that for the US to emerge successfully from Iraq, it had to revive an Arab-Israel peace process. Barack Obama as candidate and as president endorsed this view.

Israeli policy-makers should take note of the fact that a prominent US general (or his staff) either adopted the same point of view or thought that it should be represented in his testimony in Congress. They should also take note that in the text of this testimony the Iranian nuclear issue does not receive the prominence that Israel would have expected it to have.- Published 15/4/2010 bitterlemons-international.org

Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's ambassador to the US in the mid-1990s, is the Ettinger Professor at Tel Aviv University. He is also affiliated with NYU and The Brookings Institution.





 
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