After February 11, all talk and ideas of national reconciliation were shelved.
What is the green movement?
Caught in the intoxicating effects of a violent moment in the history of a nation, one is particularly susceptible to reactionary outbursts. But it is exactly during such moments that intellectual discourse must prevail over ideological cacophony. And the cacophony about the causes and consequences of the recent unrests in Iran has been deafening, exactly because too many think tank pundits, embedded journalists and uninformed native informants are busy cashing in on the "Iranian Studies" industry and/or plotting and scheming to subdue a country that has been punished for its radically independent foreign policies for a long time now. They told us, about one year ago, and rather definitively, that Iran was in the middle of an irreversible revolution. They were wrong.
It is equally wrong to assume that the green movement stands for an "Americanized" Iran. It is not geared toward re-negotiating Iran's pro-Palestinian stance or its opposition to the policies of the Israeli state. Neither is it anti-nationalistic. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami and co., would not abandon Iran's nuclear energy program. In the grander scheme of the dialectic between state and society in Iran, the green movement is the latest manifestation of the quest for government accountability and freedom of expression, not more, not less.
These demands are both contemporary and steeped in a history of resistance to the arbitrariness of the state that goes back to the Tobacco revolts of 1891, the constitutional revolt of 1906, the Mossadegh interregnum between 1951-1953, the opposition to the Shah's "White Revolution" between 1960-1963 and the Islamic revolution of 1979 itself. In all these major upheavals in Iranian history, society took on the fight with the state in order to renegotiate the political order in favor of the people.
The green movement is the latest product of the political and socio-economic demands of influential strata of Iranian society, expressed by a whole range of women's rights activist, intellectuals, academics, artists and professionals. They are driving what I have called a "pluralistic momentum" in Iran from the bottom-up, from society to the state. This pluralistic momentum is entirely structural, partially institutionalized and scattered along class lines and a range of political convictions.
The green movement has attempted to capitalize on it politically as a reincarnation of the "Second Khordad" movement that was named after the date of Khatami's election in 1997. So the political expression of the green movement is a pronounced will to power. As Mehdi Karroubi stated in an interview when he became the speaker of the parliament in June 2000 during the presidency of his ally Khatami: "I think [the reformist-conservative rivalry] is a natural political rivalry over power and government. The debates are about power."
Today, the major problem is that this ongoing competition over the power of the state is defined in zero-sum terms by the rightwing constituencies supporting the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. As a result, for the first time since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran has a president that perceives the other side as vicious enemies, rather than adversaries whose existence needs to be tolerated. We fight against them until they leave the battlefield! Iranian politics has moved from an agonistic to an antagonistic mode.
In the summer of 2009, the Iranian Right created a dangerous precedent: it turned politics into a battlefield in the truly destructive sense of the term. Politics as war by other means. Power politics as totalitarian strategy. Earthly power as an end in and of itself. Today, Iranian society is paying dearly for the emergence of this understanding of power that is seditious, rather than transcendental: it creates categories such as friend and enemy, rather than overcoming them. It fortifies the boundaries between different strata of Iranian society, rather than acting as an interlocutor between them. And all of that during a period when the national security of the country is threatened.
So what is the green movement? At the time of writing, it is the political "other" that has made the re-election and the current policies of Ahmadinezhad possible. For the Iranian Right, it is the adversary whose presence calls for mitigated violence. But in the final analysis, the green movement or any of its reincarnations are as much a part of the Islamic Republic, as the supreme leader, the Baseej, the Revolutionary Guards and President Ahmadinezhad. When it becomes impossible to govern the country without the collusion of that "enemy", the Iranian right wing is likely to accept that in the long run power can never be effectively monopolized. If it remains color blind, however, the state will continue to suffer from political schizophrenia.- Published 22/4/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam has taught comparative politics and international relations at SOAS since 2005. He is the author of "Iran in World Politics". His newest book entitled "A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations" will be published in November 2010.
Think long, and don't get boxed in
For those of us who closely followed the Iranian revolution in 1978 and 1979--which I did as a young officer in the CIA--the green movement this past summer in Iran always seemed a pale imitation. That is not to be critical of the enthusiasm of the demonstrators in the streets and their commitment to the cause of a better Iran. They have been stalwart in their fight. But in 1978 and 1979, virtually the entire nation was in revolt against the Shah. The revolution's leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was one of the most charismatic and determined leaders of the twentieth century. Khomeini was never intimidated or irresolute.
Now the green movement seems stalled. The prospect of a quick and easy change of regime in Tehran seems remote. The nation is divided, but only one side has arms and it is likely to stay in power. This has enormous significance for American and Israeli policy toward the dangerous regime that has survived the greens' challenge so far.
President Barack Obama wisely tried to engage the regime; that effort has failed to attract Iran to talk seriously. Now we are looking at sanctions. Few expect those to change the regime in the foreseeable future or to persuade it to give up its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. For years, the United States has kept the option of a possible military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities "on the table". As an option however, it should not become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We need instead to develop a long-range strategy for dealing with a nuclear Iran and not box ourselves into war.
Retaining the threat of a military strike is seen as increasing American bargaining leverage. Not only does it supposedly intimidate Iran, but it may help Washington persuade other countries to tighten and enforce official sanctions. The United States can argue that sanctions are preferable to military force, but that sanctions will only work if all cooperate.
The strike option, however, lacks credibility. America is already engaged in two massive and unpopular military campaigns in the region, with almost a quarter of a million troops deployed. Given Iran's ability to retaliate for a strike against it by making the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan much worse for us, it is simply not credible that we would use force in the foreseeable future. A third war in the Middle East between America and Iran, with a spillover into Lebanon and maybe Gaza, would be a disaster for our interests.
And the technical reality remains: neither Israel nor the US can slow Iran very long from its pursuit of a bomb even with a massive strike. We do not know where all existing Iranian uranium enrichment facilities might be located--as the revelation of yet another previously unknown site near Qom last year reminded us. Even if we do strike most or all existing facilities, Iran can rebuild fairly fast, and will surely kick out inspectors and also burrow even further underground when building its next batch of facilities. We will be even harder pressed to find, and strike, those assets.
If there were any real chance of major political reform within Iran within a couple of years, buying that much time might be worth the cost. But given the regime's control of the military, the unrest in Iran since last year's stolen election is not likely to bring about regime change. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has observed, Iran is becoming a military dictatorship of the Revolutionary Guards. A military strike by an outside power would be unlikely to help the cause of Iranian reformists, especially if it does not have international legitimacy. And the United Nations is not going to sanction a strike under almost any conceivable scenario. Moreover, a strike on Iran in those circumstances could lead to generations of Iranian enmity to America.
There are dangers to an open-ended threat of force approach. Saying we will not tolerate a nuclear Iran and will use force to prevent it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy and box in decisions. There is a better way: sanctions, deterrence and containment. Another nuclear armed state in the region, especially one touting the extremist views of the current Iranian regime, will be very bad for regional security. But it would hardly embolden Iran to take suicidal actions like attacking an American ally in the region, especially one like Israel that has a formidable nuclear arsenal of its own. Moreover, Iran has already proven its willingness to wage proxy and terror wars against the United States and Israel prior to having nuclear arms; it is doubtful a small nuclear arsenal would offer it many more options than it has already employed.
Washington should now structure a sanctions regime designed to evolve into containment of an Iranian regime with a nuclear arsenal. High technology goods and weapons transfers should be the focus of this policy. We should also declare our intent to provide a nuclear umbrella over Israel and other threatened states. In other words, we would use Cold War techniques of containing the Soviet Union to handle this newer, serious yet smaller threat. In time, like Moscow, Tehran's internal dynamics will change in our favor.- Published 22/4/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org
Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy in the Brookings Institution. He advised Presidents Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama on the Middle East and South Asia in the National Security Council of the White House. He is the author of "The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future".
No turning back
The so-called "Green Revolution" that followed widespread protests in Iran after the June 2009 presidential elections, where President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad "beat" opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi with the blessings of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been called many things, including the "Green Wave", "Sea of Green" and even the "Persian Awakening".
The movement that spearheaded the protests against the election victory of President Ahmadinezhad could have been called countless other names. At the end of the day, it was not a revolution but rather a spontaneous public reaction to a fraudulent election that only cemented the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei and Ahmadinezhad, his protege.
The people who took to the streets across Iran could have been transformed into a revolutionary movement had there been a central charismatic figure to unite them as well as a clearly defined ideology and a well-prepared plan of action to direct them. Certainly, the killing of a young Iranian woman, Neda Agha-Soltan, on June 21 at the hands of the Basij had the potential of igniting a larger fire among the crowds and soliciting even wider support.
But while mythologized by the opposition as a martyr, her death was not exploited to the full by the leaders of the opposition, headed by Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, the former chairman of the Iranian parliament, as well as reformist clerics Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Rowhani, to widen their base and bring about dramatic change. Neither the suppression of rioters by the paramilitary Basij, using batons, pepper spray, sticks and even live fire, nor the charge that prisoners held by the government were tortured and/or raped, succeeded in stoking a fire to proportions that could be classified as a prelude to a revolution.
What may also have pre-empted the opposition movement from becoming a full homegrown intifada might have been an ABC television report back in 2007 that alleged that US President George W. Bush had authorized a $400 million covert CIA operation to destabilize Iran. It was reported that Bush had signed a "nonlethal presidential finding" to implement a CIA plan that included a coordinated campaign of propaganda, disinformation and manipulation of Iran's currency and financial institutions in a bid to undermine the ruling regime and bring about a change of course for the country.
The allegation that the US was behind a well-orchestrated plan to overthrow Iran's clerical regime was buttressed when the US Congress consented in 2008 to Bush's demand to fund covert operations against Iran. This provided the Khamenei-Ahmadinezhad dictatorship with the ammunition to strengthen its grip on power by accusing foreign powers of being behind the popular protests in Iran. These accusations may have helped pull the carpet from under the leading figures in the opposition camp and silence their supporters.
For all intents and purposes therefore, what Iran witnessed and experienced was not really a revolution but rather a small-scale uprising that was relatively easy to subdue by the powers in Tehran.
This said, Iran is not the same as it was before the elections. A new political dynamic has been set in motion in the country and there is no turning back from the consequences of the people's awakening and desire for a change. Khamenei is an old man and his years in power are numbered. The country is ripe for change, though of an evolutionary nature. Ahmadinezhad cannot hold out long against this transformation, with pressures building up against the current Iranian leadership from within and outside the country.
The standoff between Tehran and key western countries over alleged Iranian plans to manufacture nuclear weapons can only speed the pace of change in Iran. The West is pinning more hope on dramatic change in the domestic political climate in Iran than on a military strike to prevent the regime in Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. And it seems a sound strategy: there is no turning away from Iranians' deep-rooted yearning for modernity.- Published 22/4/10 © bitterlemons-international.org
Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.
Premature to declare victory over the greens
Ten months ago, the Iranian presidential elections shook the country, and Iran made world headlines for weeks. President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad was officially declared the winner, leading immediately to huge protests by supporters of two other candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
During the months when all four candidates were campaigning, Mousavi and Karroubi chose green as their election campaign color; hence their supporters were nicknamed "the greens". Hundreds of thousands of green supporters poured into the streets of Iran's main cities, notably Tehran, refusing to accept the results declared by the government. Both Mousavi and Karroubi demanded the cancellation of the election results. Three days after the elections, a huge protest rally held in Tehran brought together, even by conservative estimates, more than three million people. Three days later, an even bigger crowd packed the center of Tehran.
During the first week of the green protests, many Iranians as well as western observers were baffled. Some moderate Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, urged Mousavi to show restraint and understanding and to convey protests through official channels. Mousavi and his representatives met with the Supreme Leader separately and were strongly advised by him to call off the street protests and instead accept official arbitration by the Guardian Council, which was in charge of the elections. The ayatollah's pledge to the green leaders went unheeded and both Mousavi and Karroubi pressed to void the election results.
It appears that from the second week of the crisis on, the government changed its tactics. Rather than appeal to the green leaders for restraint and calm, it decided on a crackdown. Hundreds of green activists were rounded up; nearly all of Mousavi's aides and campaign organizers were detained and taken to the notorious Evin prison. Still the protests and street rallies went on, despite the detentions.
Next, the security forces went into action. Dozens of demonstrators were shot dead and many more were arrested. It was now the turn of the moderate Iranian leaders to call for restraint and reconciliation. But the government, which appeared to have won the street, pressed for further crackdowns. The protestors who had been barred from demonstrating on the streets now exploited official rallies on religious and national occasions to demonstrate against the government. The latter in turn pressed for more arrests and sought to impose additional restraints on both Mousavi's and Karroubi's movements as well other green and reformist figures.
In retrospect, the events on the holy day of Ashura, the most important day in the Shi'ite calendar, marked a complete change in the government approach toward the post-June elections crisis. The main feature of Ashura has always been huge processions by mourners. It was simply impossible for the Iranian authorities to ban street processions on Ashura. The security forces maintained a presence but kept their distance, largely leaving the streets to the protestors, and the latter took advantage of the occasion after months of beatings and arrests and demonstrated bitterly against the government. There were casualties, including ten dead.
The intensity as well the bitterness of these December 27 protests convinced the authorities that they had no choice but to crack down yet further on the opposition. Hundreds of journalists, Mousavi aides and supporters, student activists, artists, weblog-writers, human rights supporters and women activists were detained following the Ashura protests. The government also entered into an ideological war with the greens. The protests on Ashura were depicted as anti-religious. Three days after Ashura, anti-green protestors filled the main street of Tehran protesting against those who had abused and desecrated the holiness of the occasion. The green leaders were dubbed "traitors" and "conspirators", Zionist agents and US lackeys.
In the days that followed, Mousavi issued a statement granting de facto recognition of Ahmadinezhad's government. His statement was tantamount to acceptance of the June 12 election results. Karroubi followed suit and took a similar stand.
All eyes were now on February 11, the anniversary of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Contrary to many expectations, the anniversary passed peacefully, with hundreds of thousands supporting the revolution. Excited by the huge number of supporters, the Iranian leaders took this as a show of support for themselves--a somewhat hasty conclusion that might prove to be a gross misjudgment.
Following its apparent success on February 11, the government's spirits rose to a level unprecedented since the June elections. All talk and ideas of national reconciliation were shelved. The state media as well government supporters simply began referring to the green movement as "the conspiracy" and to its nominal leaders as "the conspirators". On the face of it, the hardliners appeared to have won the battle.
But the war continues. An observer who witnessed the streets of Tehran last summer may wonder today where all those green supporters have gone; you see no trace of them on the streets of Tehran. Still, it may prove premature to conclude that they no longer exist.- Published 22/4/2010 © bitterlemons-international.org
Sadegh Zibakalam is professor of political science at Tehran University.