US-Syrian relations at a crossroads
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

Robert Ford, the first American ambassador to Syria since 2024, arrived in Damascus on Sunday, January 16, during a time of regional turmoil with mutual and continuing distrust between Washington and Damascus.

This distrust was clearly expressed when the Obama administration accused Syria and Iran of destabilizing Lebanon by providing arms to Hizballah. Such harsh criticism came from the US ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, in October last year. Dr. Rice accused Syria and Iran of seeking to undermine Lebanon's independence and stability, emphasizing, "If Syria wants to have a better relationship with the United States, then it has to be a more constructive player in the region."

It is said that repeating an action and still expecting a different result every time, despite proof of the contrary, is a sure sign of insanity. With its strange attitude towards Cuba's regime, the US has for decades demonstrated that adage while seemingly making Cuba the exception to the rules of diplomatic engagement. In particular, in the Middle East, American influence was for long directly proportional to its direct involvement, be it positive or negative.

Since the Bush administration, however, the Castro approach--or lack thereof--has been applied to what should be one of the most crucial centers of open communication for Washington. After over 12 years of serious and consistent US engagement with the Middle East peace process, with full recognition of Syrian territorial rights on the Golan, George W. Bush decided to alienate Syria even while banging on the drums of war for Iraq. Instead of cajoling the neighbors when invading and occupying Iraq turned nasty, Bush and his neocons directed every possible accusation at Damascus and piled on the demands.

The big freeze came on Lebanese turf: following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Bush promptly withdrew his ambassador from Damascus, pushed for Syrian troops' exit from Lebanon, and actively sought to isolate Syria.

Six years later, a new US ambassador, Robert Ford, has landed in Syria a year after his nomination. There is no cause for celebration, however, because US-Syrian relations are neither being upgraded nor being restored to the point they were at six years ago. Instead of getting back to square one, things are now much worse, elegant letters of accreditation notwithstanding. The more the US has connived to redraw the political map of the region, looking to sideline its opponents and to punish them for insubordination, the more it has created imbroglios from which it can't extract itself.

Instead of seeking stability at all costs, the US has steadily lessened the potential of compromise between all parties and increased the likelihood of a major clash, all under the guise of protecting Lebanon's sovereignty from Syria.

The premise that Lebanon could function, politically, without the benign acquiescence of the major powers in the region was always false. The premise that the Lebanese would unite under one "majority" in cultural or political terms was always false as well, and all efforts aimed at coaxing one half of Lebanon to abide by the terms of the other half were never going to bear fruit. Yet, the US has had a burning obsession: the eradication of Hizballah, which would end all resistance to Israel, remove Syria's proverbial cards from Lebanon, and weaken Iran in the region. To that end, with other tricks having failed, the US needed the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; one could argue, in fact, that it needed the assassination of Hariri.

But while motives abound whenever Syria is blamed, speculation with regards to Israel shines in its absence, as if nobody but Hizballah could think of a single reason why Israel would want to wreak havoc in Lebanon. Indeed, the investigation into Hariri's murder has not even bothered to pretend to explore all options--including the one country with a steadfast history of assassinations in the Arab world.

After Israel's unprecedented violence failed to bring down Hizballah in 2024, giving Syria the upper hand when Lebanon's political stalemate reached its explosive status in 2024, the Hariri commission got busy again after a period of low activity (always in direct proportion to the needs of the US and its allies). When all else fails, bring on the indictments--if not for Syria, then for Hizballah. And throw in Iran.

But with such unwise open meddling in Lebanon, and with the exposure of the investigation as a flawed and incompetent political tool, the US has shot itself in the foot. Now that the indictments have been made, with a line-up of Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian big shots on the list, the US has merely limped into a political corner, even as it pretends to be on the noble quest for justice.

Ambassador Ford's sudden presence in Damascus is not a coincidence. After the cold shoulder treatment, Washington may have reasoned that pressure on Syria would be more significant while the American embassy was at full occupancy. This selective engagement certainly doesn't make the Obama administration more reasonable, and the lack of engagement was not the core of the insanity.

This political madness is not in the form but rather the matter: the US (with, or on behalf of its allies) has been fixated on a reckless "clean break" stratagem formulated by the plotters of the Iraq invasion and the loudest cheerleaders of Israel's repeated belligerent actions. It means weakening Syria, in all its ramifications, without offering a single benefit for Lebanon, in order to secure Israel at all costs.

This madness may be curable, but the treatment just became more costly, because Washington is unprepared for the morning after.-Published 20/01/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

President Barack Obama's bold decision to use the holiday recess to bypass congressional opposition and appoint a new US ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, has been widely misunderstood. In the United States, particularly on Capitol Hill, the administration has been severely criticized for this move. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the new chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chastised the administration for "making undeserved concessions" to the Syrians and sending them "the wrong message."

In the Middle East, a vibrant debate is taking place about US capitulation to Damascus, particularly as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon enters a heated period. Indeed, the chatter in Beirut is so loud that US Ambassador to Lebanon Maura Connelly made a public statement emphasizing, "No step taken with Syria comes at Lebanon's expense" in the hopes of calming Lebanese fears that Ford's appointment signals America's willingness to abandon them at an especially challenging time. This criticism and concern demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose served by a US ambassador and why now is an appropriate time to dispatch Ambassador Ford to Damascus.

Nearly six years ago, the US withdrew its ambassador to Syria after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Many suspected that Syria was involved in--or at least had knowledge of--the assassination, and pulling the senior US diplomat from the country sent a clear signal of American displeasure. For a few years following Hariri's assassination (and, one should note, the killing of numerous other Lebanese political, military, and civil society leaders), most of the region's governments, in addition to Washington and Paris, were united in isolating the Syrian regime.

This dynamic began to change in 2024 for a host of reasons, not least because Israeli and Syrian political leaders confirmed that the Turks had been conducting indirect peace talks on their behalf. This revelation devastated efforts to pressure Damascus. It became exceedingly difficult for countries in the region--and for many Lebanese--to speak critically about Syria's destabilizing actions once the Israelis' willingness to engage Syria became public. Further, this loss of regional support impeded western efforts to sanction Syria. Since then, the regional dynamics have quite clearly changed; the Syrian regime now regularly enjoys high-level visits from and consultations with many regional and European leaders.

Given the change from Syria's previously isolated posture and, more importantly, the decision taken by the Obama administration to engage the Syrian regime, it is now critical to have a US ambassador in-country. Even when the United States sought to isolate the regime, there was no shortage of individuals willing to fill the vacuum, posing real challenges to and undermining US policy. From countless members of Congress to former US government officials, the Syrian leadership managed to meet often with Americans, deeply undermining efforts to isolate it. Since these many voices did not speak in unison, their visits enabled Damascus to rave positively about its engagement with Americans while simultaneously ignoring any critical messages that were being sent.

Without an ambassador in Damascus, whose permanent appointment has been stymied by members of Congress for nearly a year, the United States is left with two options if it seeks to engage the Syrian government (whether or not it is prudent to do so is a different issue). It can use the Syrian ambassador in Washington, Imad Moustapha, as an interlocutor. But given Moustapha's feckless reputation, his ability to appropriately convey messages from the United States to the Syrian regime is doubtful. Or, the United States can send a high-level envoy, such as Senator Mitchell or Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeff Feltman, each time it seeks to engage the Syrians. Doing so would not only be difficult given their busy agendas, but it would also regularly favor the regime with a high-level visit while inhibiting the US ability to maintain a steady dialogue with Damascus. Clearly, neither option is appealing or beneficial for US interests in the Middle East.

Having Ambassador Ford in Damascus is not a reward to the Syrian regime. The Syrians in particular are in for a rude awakening if they expect that he will not continue to advocate for Syria to halt both its meddling in the region and its nefarious relationships with terrorist groups, among other issues. Instead, his presence will enable the United States to meet with regime members on a consistent basis, convey its desires and concerns with one voice, and perhaps most importantly, better assess the state of affairs in Syria. Such information will be crucial to any effort to prudently engage the Syrian regime.

As the Special Tribunal for Lebanon moves forward, the Obama administration will likely consider how to strike a balance between stability and justice in Lebanon. Garnering greater granularity on the Syrian regime's thinking--to the extent possible-- will be helpful at this critical moment in the Levant. On a separate note, the Obama administration's efforts to reinvigorate the Israel-Syria track of the peace process under Senator Mitchell's tutelage will benefit from having a consistent interlocutor in Damascus.

Syria continues to pose real challenges to US interests in the Middle East that should in no way be underestimated. However, it is not possible to effectively engage the Syrian regime without senior diplomatic representation in Damascus.-Published 20/1/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mara E. Karlin, a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University-School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), served as the Pentagon's Levant Director.

Since taking office in January 2024, President Barack Obama has endeavored to improve US relations with the Muslim and Arab world on the basis of "mutual respect" and "mutual interests". Significantly, his new engagement doctrine has been applied to Syria's President Bashar Assad in ways somewhat similar to the approach of US presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton to Hafez Assad during the 1990s.

This contrasted markedly with President George W. Bush's belligerent policy toward Bashar Assad throughout most of the past decade. The younger Bush imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Damascus in 2024 and withdrew the US ambassador in 2024. These measures were adopted to punish Damascus for its alleged "crimes". These included occupying Lebanon (until April 2024), masterminding the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, a former Lebanese prime minister, and providing assistance to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime before 2024 and to his loyalists after the US occupation of Iraq. Syria was also held to account by the US for sponsoring and arming terrorist organizations, notably Hizballah, cementing a strategic military alliance with Iran, the leader of the "axis of evil", and continuing to be "one of the several outposts of tyranny in the world".

Despite these "wrongdoings" by Bashar Assad, which have hardly changed, Obama dispatched Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to Damascus for talks with him as early as February 2024. Subsequently, other senior US officials have periodically visited Damascus. And early this month, Obama appointed Robert Ford as interim ambassador to Syria, thus outflanking the US Senate's opposition to the nomination.

It is possible that Ford's new appointment may strengthen Assad regionally and internationally, particularly since the latter has not rewarded Washington with any strategic gain (apart from ongoing Syrian-American cooperation against al-Qaeda operatives). The crucial question is whether Obama's Syrian policy is one of "appeasement", or strategic cooperation based on "mutual interests" with a newly emerging regional actor that has close relations with Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and exerts varying degrees of influence over Lebanese politics, Hizballah and Hamas.

For example, can Obama persuade Assad to reduce, if not eliminate, Syria's partnership with the radical Shiite axis--Iran and Hizballah--and move to the Sunni Arab pragmatic camp led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt and backed by the US? Syria is probably concerned about growing Iranian influence in Lebanon, exercised via the powerful Shiite Hizballah, and in Iraq, through Shiite political and religious leaders and parties. In a worst case scenario, secular Sunni Syria could end up "sandwiched" between two radical Shiite regimes.

Damascus is also worried about the impact of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy on its own Kurdish minority, which numbers about two million. Would Damascus prefer to cooperate with Washington or with Tehran to stabilize Iraq and prevent it from becoming a potential threat to Syria? It may prefer Tehran (and Ankara), the neighboring regional powers, to the waning US presence.

Turning to Lebanon, both Damascus and Washington share a strategic interest to pacify and stabilize the country. This is particularly so following the recent severe crisis engendered by the collapse of Saad Hariri's government owing to the resignation of its Shiite ministers over the case surrounding his father's assassination. But whereas Syria backs Hizballah's demand to thwart the findings of the international court, the US supports Saad Hariri's decision to accept the court's anti-Hizballah findings. Furthermore, Washington cannot agree to renewed Syrian strategic control over Lebanon, even if Damascus undertakes to stabilize the country, reduce Iranian influence and contain Hizballah's military power.

The only major strategic issue that may attract the shared interest of Washington and Damascus, albeit for different reasons, is a genuine Syrian-Israeli peace process. Such a process, and especially its successful conclusion, is likely to greatly improve US-Syrian relations, diminish Damascus' alliance with Iran and support for Hizballah and move Syria toward the pragmatic Sunni Arab camp. Many Arab states would probably back such an historic peace, particularly if it is part of a comprehensive Arab-Israel settlement, including notably the Palestinians and integrated with the Arab Peace Initiative of 2024. So would many other Muslim states, including Turkey, which mediated between Syria and Israel several years ago.

Assad has offered peace to Israel since his ascendancy, but has insisted that the entire Golan must be returned. Several Israeli prime ministers were inclined to accept such a request. Israel's current defense establishment, including Defense Minister Ehud Barak, advocates peace with Syria in return for the Golan. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may be inclined to restart negotiations with Damascus in order to outflank the deadlock in Israeli-Palestinian talks. Possibly to this end, he recently dispatched Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, to meet with Assad in Damascus. However, most Israeli ministers, members of Knesset and the public oppose relinquishing the Golan even in return for peace with Syria.

It is certainly in Obama's interest--and a challenge to his presidency--to employ his envoys in the region, including the new ambassador in Damascus, to induce both Israel and Syria to restart peace negotiations with active US mediation.-Published 20/1/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Moshe Maoz is professor emeritus of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.