The coming Islamicization of Tunisian society
 John R. Bradley

The Tunisian revolution may appear to provide a beacon of hope for Arab pro-democracy activists, but lost in the coverage is that the corollary of greater democracy in the Arab world is always a greater role for Islamist movements. In this sense, there is a rich irony in the fact that the country's deposed secular president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, an avowed enemy of Wahhabi-style Islam, will be living out his remaining years in Saudi Arabia. But his choice of exile may also prove prescient. In the coming years, Tunisia's remarkably liberal society will increasingly resemble that of Saudi Arabia.

When Tunisia gained independence from France in 1956, the new regime struck a bargain with its people: limited freedom of expression in return for strong economic growth, massive investment in education, universally free health care and, above all, equal rights for women. For decades, the regime delivered on its promises, and there is no evidence that the regime, in contrast to practically every other in the region, ever executed any of its opponents.

After more than two decades of silence and fear, Tunisians dared to try the unthinkable. Indeed, ten days previously, nobody imagined that what eventually took place was going to happen: the flight of the dictator.

Started by an individual act (the immolation of the young Mohamed Bouazizi), immediately followed by a local reaction (in the city of Sidi Bouzid) that was repressed violently by security forces, the movement quickly spread to the other cities of central Tunisia--a deprived region that has not benefitted from the level of development that characterizes other regions of the country--and from there all over the country.

The most remarkable element in this movement is its spontaneity, emerging without any political frame or supervision and without any ideology whatsoever. This is what made it difficult in the beginning to qualify the movement as a revolution. Indeed, the protest was at first essentially social (against unemployment and the high cost of living), then evolved--always without any political supervision--towards political opposition to the regime, and finally openly confronted President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and his family.

Two important elements aided the rapid spread of the movement throughout all regions of the country. First was the support of the local and regional structures of the Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail, the powerful union of Tunisian labor syndicates, and its adhesion to the demands of the population. The positive attitude of the UGTT was critical to the success of the movement, promoting mobilization and providing an organizational framework for the voice of the street.

Second was the role played by the media, new and classic, in the real-time circulation of information concerning the evolution of the protest movement, an evolution that in fact took its cue from the high degree of repression. Amateur videos circulated on internet social networks while satellite channel images, particularly those of Arabic al-Jazeera, were accessible to millions of persons who either have no internet connection or were unable to bypass governmental controls and censorship.

Of all the possible plans for ending the authoritarian regime, it was the least probable that took place. Some people, I among them, always thought that no change would arrive in Tunisia without the violence of a military coup d'etat or a popular revolution. And because the security services' grip seemed so perfect, we were persuaded that nothing would ever happen. We were wrong. The people showed it was capable, and the dictator turned out to be fragile and vulnerable. This is an important lesson from the Tunisian revolution.

Still, the deathblow leading to Ben Ali's hasty fall came from the army, after the commander of the land forces refused to follow orders to suppress the demonstrators and fire at the crowd. This act of disobedience played the greatest role in convincing the president that he could not overcome the popular movement.

Tunisia now faces a transition phase. A government is in place, but it is operating under heavy pressure. It confronts daily demonstrations calling for its demise and disputing the presence within it of ministers who are "symbols of the former regime". In particular, for the same reasons, it is confronted directly by the UGTT, the union of the workers.

In the event that this government fails to ensure security and stability, some suggest that we cannot neglect the possibility of either a role for the army or the lightning rise of the Islamists. Concerning the army, there is virtually no indication that at this stage it intends to play a political role. The chief of the land forces, addressing demonstrators at the government palace, announced clearly on January 24 that he would respect the constitutional order and not exceed it.

For the Islamists, the fall of the Ben Ali regime constitutes a chance for rebirth and reorganization. They are clearly trying to occupy the street, they are in all the demonstrations, and their leaders and former prisoners appear at the head of processions. The movement asserts that it will not abandon its right to participate in Tunisian political life. All this seems justifiable and in accordance with the principle of no-exclusion of any political movement whatsoever. However, even if there is a risk that (in contrast with the other political formations) the populist and conservative discourse of the Islamists will find favor with wide fringes of the population--to which, for religious considerations, the Islamists are naturally close--society will certainly find its balance.

This society, which has evolved greatly since the 1990s, will definitely not accept another dictatorship of any kind.-Published 27/1/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Ahmed Driss is professor at the University of Tunis and director of the Centre for Mediterranean and International Studies.

There is no need to speculate as to whether Tunisia's January 14 revolution will have a regional impact: it already has. The Tunisian effect is bringing out grievances specific to each country in North Africa that are causing many to rethink their government's legitimacy.

We are seeing in Egypt demonstrations of a size unprecedented in the Mubarak era. It is too early to say whether they will lead to the downfall of Egypt's president of nearly 30 years, but they have already shattered the credibility that was carefully maintained by the state press and the ruling party about Egypt's stability and the regime's popular legitimacy. The example of Tunisia has been an inspiration for Egyptians, as for other Arabs, that change is possible. But it is not simply a copycat movement, it is based on grievances that are specific to Egypt: unusually fraudulent parliamentary elections in December 2024, rising outrage about the security services' brutality and systematic use of torture (as Amnesty International describes it), opposition movements that have been brutally repressed or humiliated, and perhaps most of all a strong resistance to the idea that Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal will succeed him as president.

In Algeria, riots and a general "ras-le-bol" against the intrigue and manipulation of a regime divided between the military and President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika is certain to yield changes in the next few weeks, probably including the fall of Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia's cabinet.

It may not be enough. Algeria is a wealthy oil and gas producer, yet its citizens have the living standard of much poorer states. There is no good reason it should be generating so many angry youth with no prospects who only dream of emigration, and no good reason its government has managed the economy with such spectacular incompetence. Part of the problem stems from Algeria's troubled history since its independence war against France: the ruling elite is drawn from the ranks of a generation of men associated with that struggle but who have done a great disservice to their country by monopolizing power since the 1960s. Their legitimacy has eroded too.

Libya is the worst off of these states, with the most repressive Arab regime since the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Its leader, Muammar Qadhafi, has ruled the country according to his whim and it suffers from profound human development problems compounded by his use of tribalism as a ruling mechanism. Prospects for hope are dim there, as is information about what is happening in this extremely tightly-controlled state, although there have been reports of unrest. But the western governments and companies rushing to Tripoli to sign contracts in Qadhafi's palace should use this opportunity to rethink the wisdom and ethicality of their investment.

Morocco and Mauritania have thus far not seen major protests. In both countries, the head of state is a relative newcomer and some reforms have been achieved in recent years. Morocco, in particular, should be a cause for concern. The last years of King Hassan II's reign and early years of Muhammad VI's reign have provided grounds for hope, but many have grown disappointed more recently. A clampdown on the independent press has shattered confidence that an era of greater freedom was dawning. The ravenous appetite of palace advisors and the royal family's own increasingly hegemonic role in the national economy are discrediting the idea that Muhammad VI would oversee a tranquil, gradual reform process. Rising social inequality and political anomie caused major riots in Sidi Ifni in 2024 and in Laayoune in 2024. The Moroccan government should urgently change tack to avoid further popular disaffection, most notably by starting in earnest the structural political changes many desire, most notably constitutional reform to make the parliament and the judiciary independent from the executive, lifting restrictions on the press and a more stringent application of the rule of law.

The events of Tunisia also have a lesson for western governments allied to these countries: the idea that these regimes are stable or are bulwarks against extremism has been proven wrong. Western interests would be best served by more open political spaces, more accountable government, greater social equality and economies where wealth creation is not siphoned off by those close to power. Events in the weeks ahead are likely to make that point forcefully.-Published 27/1/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Issandr El Amrani is a writer on Middle East affairs and editor of the Arabist.

Does the ouster of the regime of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia herald similar (r)evolution in Morocco? Similar evolution maybe not, but changes most probably. The Tunisian example is a wake-up call for a country whose social problems are even deeper than those of its eastern neighbor. Despite a relatively robust economic growth rate during the last ten years and greater investments in infrastructure, inequality and poverty rates are still unhealthily high in Morocco. While Tunisia ranks 81 in the last human development index ranking, Morocco is much lower at 114. Youth unemployment in the urban areas is higher in Morocco than in Tunisia. Riots broke out periodically during the last four years with a whole city, Sidi Ifni, erupting in June 2024.

While it is hard to disentangle the causes of the Ben Ali regime's downfall, it is safe to say that the near absence of credible social intermediaries led to an unsustainable pressure build up that brought about the social and ultimately political explosion we have witnessed. There were no sufficiently independent political parties, workers unions, media or NGOs to channel the people's anger.

One reason why Morocco did not witness a Tunisia-like people's revolution despite its social ills is that it still has these security valves. The key word here is "still". Morocco is considered freer than most Arab countries. But the independent political and social forces that allow for the modicum of political and civil liberties Moroccans enjoy are increasingly battered by a hegemonic monarchy.

This process has been dubbed the "Benalization" phenomenon. Until recently, Ben Ali's Tunisia seemed stable and enjoyed western support, mainly from the United States and France, despite its egregious human right records, harsh authoritarianism and economic predation. Power elites in Morocco took notice. Why liberalize when all that is asked is fighting Islamism, opening national markets to western companies and promoting women's rights?

Two recent evolutions in Morocco illustrate this "Benalization" trend: the advent of the Authenticity and Modernity Party and the monarchy's predatory economic practices. The AMP was formed in August 2024 by Fouad Ali al-Himma, a former deputy minister of interior and a close friend of the king. One of the State Department cables on Morocco published by Wikileaks shows how the palace ordered the Ministry of Interior to intervene to favor AMP candidates to the detriment of candidates from the Islamist party, the Party of Justice and Development. While far from exerting the same type of total control over the political scene as Ben Ali's party, the RCD, al-Himma's AMP is on its way to dominating Moroccan politics by exploiting state resources and relying on palace support.

The monarchy's business voracity bears a striking resemblance to the Ben Ali family's tight grip on the Tunisian economy. Under the pretext of forming powerful conglomerates to protect the Moroccan economy in an ultra-competitive global environment, the king's businessmen went on an expansion spree. Siger, the king's holding company, controls the biggest bank, the biggest insurance company and one of the three telecom operators. Here again the leaked State Department cables shed a disturbing light on the king's business practices. The CEO of ONA, another of the king's holding companies, is quoted as telling US diplomats that "major investment decisions are made by three individuals: Fouad al-Himma, the former deputy minister of interior who now heads the Party of Authenticity and Modernity, Mohamed Mounir al- Majidi who is the head of the king's private secretariat, and the king himself." In the same cable, "one of Morocco's leading business entrepreneurs" laments "that major institutions and processes of the Moroccan state are being used by the Palace to coerce and solicit bribes in the country's real estate sector."

Even more worrying, the king's business deals sometimes undermine the monarchy's legitimacy. Being the commander of the faithful is the much vaunted pillar of the king's legitimacy. It is said to unify the country under the same religious authority that keeps the Islamists in check. Yet recent revelations show how the king invested in casinos in Macao and Morocco proper, in al-Jadida. He also invested in the brewing company, Brasseries du Maroc.

These political blunders worry the social groups usually allied with the monarchy. They expose a lack of acumen that might endanger the country's stability, especially in light of what happened in Tunisia. Preventing a revolution is a matter of survival for these elites. If the people erupt in Morocco, the chances that the country will end up with a much bloodier and more protracted revolutionary period are high given the depth of social and economic inequalities. Accordingly, there is a greater incentive today to reignite an incremental but credible democratization process, leading to a true democratic constitutional monarchy.-Published 27/1/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org


Aboubakr Jamai is former publisher of Le Journal Hebdomadaire in Casablanca.