At the point of no return
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

As millions of Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, and Libyans protested with demonstrations and calls for reform and change, many analysts speculated that Syria was unlikely to be next. Five weeks ago, Syria appeared to be a powerful regional player with a domestic political status that left very little possibility for surprise. Snowballing demonstrations that would bring brutal reaction from the strong security organs were unlikely.

Syria under the Assad family remains under tight control. The army as well as the security apparatus is run by trusted Alawite leaders. In addition, the legacy of brutality against internal opponents is well-known from the time of President Hafez Assad.

Even with the benefit of recent regional experience, the Syrian regime has been quite stunned by the protests shaking the country--but not nearly half as stunned as the Syrian people themselves.

Having spent the last half century under martial law and under the heavy thumb of a very authoritarian regime, Syrians had for the most part adapted to their reality and formed a semi-positive perspective: they had neither the proverbial bread nor freedom, but it was still better than being like Iraq or Lebanon, especially as the country remained under permanent pressure from Israel and its allies.

These factors were little consolation, however, when people under similar regimes began to manufacture their own future and impose their own demands; were Syrians doomed to watch from afar, with the only characters with the guts to stand up to injustice relegated to the TV series Bab al-Hara and similar fictional places? While the full answer to this question can't yet be given, the exasperation that is surfacing brings with it a certainty that no matter what happens next, some things have already changed forever.

The first major change, of course, is in the threshold of fear. Even with dire warnings about the potential for lost stability through a spectrum of social and religious ills (and with the threatened sectarian "fitna" the regime is marketing), it seems the Syrians who have already come out will stay out, confidently recruiting more people to their cause. Indeed, heavy repression from security forces has so far merely served to attract more protesters, and to spread outrage across the country at the huge number of casualties at the hands of Syrian security forces.

That such an openly heavy-handed response would follow peaceful protests, and would even target the martyrs' funerals, has shocked many Syrians to their core, jolting them into action and pushing them into the unchartered territory of trying to impose their will on the regime. In doing so, their expectations have also changed over what the regime is capable of, or willing to do.

For one, the decade-old belief held by many that there was an old guard hindering the reform process was shattered by the president himself, whose speech turned several commonly-held notions into immediate urban myths. In very clear words, the president explained that, contrary to rumors that he was held back, his entourage actually pushed him towards reform. In other words, the buck stopped with him, and people would be informed when the government, at its discretion, was ready to make reforms.

This could have been understood as contradicting earlier promises made by various Syrian officials. But in fact, serious changes were clearly effected in response to popular pressure, in turn giving protesters more impetus to continue demanding their rights and to keep the pressure up.

Remembering how quickly the regime can act when needed, many people mentioned the fact that the Syrian constitution had been changed in mere minutes in 2024 (to allow for President Assad to take power at the age of 34), and the sudden change from a closed economy into an open one in 2024 (to punish Lebanon by discouraging Syrians from dealing economically with it, following the withdrawal of Syrian troops). However, both these changes had been driven by specific regime needs.

Now, for the first time, a big change has occurred driven purely by the pressure of the Syrian people: not only have officials promised that the hated emergency law would soon disappear, but the regime suddenly granted Syrian citizenship to hundreds of thousands of stateless Syrian Kurds.

In a few short weeks, with protests of a very small size relative to other Arab countries, Syrians have already achieved phenomenal changes, despite paying a heavy price with so many dead, injured and detained. For the first time, Syrians have been able to directly pressure the regime into making immediate changes, a tool they are likely to continue using while the regime responds and acts to save itself from further damage.

The official response, of course, is that this is all a conspiracy threatening the very unity of the nation. While it's not the first time Syrian media has gone into full-blown nationalist frenzy, it's the first time this has happened in direct response to pressure from the Syrian people, making the media campaign anything but deja vu. Unprecedented in scale and in content, and not allowing for a single mea culpa or an Egyptian army-style salute to the fallen martyrs, the current Syrian media campaign is itself an indication of how threatened the regime feels at the prospect of the Arab spring blooming in Syria.

Regardless of the context, what is happening in Syria is truly revolutionary--if not a revolution. But while the regime has not hesitated to crush the protests openly and brutally, it doesn't seem to have realized yet that no amount of force can or will tame the protesters, and that the only way forward is drastic change, rather than inconsequential reform. Syrian officials have started speaking of a second corrective movement, which will do nothing to assuage people's frustration.

With other Arab regimes seemingly throwing their weight behind the Syrian regime, fearful of the reach of this inconvenient Arab spring, the prospect of outside influence to push for real domestic change seems to be practically nil. Save one important regional player with much at stake in its relationship with Syria: Turkey.

Recent statements by the Turkish prime minister, and messages passed by Turkish officials and even Turkish media, have been crystal clear: reform, right now. After years of cultivating this relationship, unable to turn a blind eye to the current repression, it is clear that Turkey is potentially one of the most significant foreign factors to influence Syria, either playing a role in helping save the regime from its own excesses, or helping save the Syrian people from their predicament.

It's difficult at this point to predict which way the wind will blow, but Syrians seem determined to have a lot more than merely the right to remain silent.-Published 14/4/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

The refreshing winds blowing from the Atlantic to the Gulf are dealing a serious and hopefully fatal blow to deeply-ingrained western misconceptions about the Middle East. The orientalist dogmas underlying foreign intervention--from Bonaparte's 1798 Egypt expedition to George W. Bush's 2024 Iraq invasion--are shattering. The western gaze will no longer be the same; the times they are a-changin'.

No one can any longer refer to the "Arab street" with condescension. Arab publics can no longer be ignored, described as lethargic, inherently illiberal, fanatical or incapable of taking a hand in their destiny. The Arab revolutions were driven by a moral quest for justice and dignity, and by secular demands that put to rest the theocentric notion that everything that happens in this part of the world is driven exclusively by religious motives.

Recent events also demonstrate that a popular grid of analysis that divides Middle Eastern powers between the so-called "axis of resistance" (mumana'a) and the so-called "moderate Arab regimes," is actually a sinister joke. Whether "moderate" or "radical", the first and foremost priority of every single regime in the Middle East and North Africa region is its own survival. Everything else is negotiable. We have seen that the allegedly "moderate" regimes were among the most ruthless in their repression of political opponents, bloggers, and human rights activists. But while it is true that spineless subservience to Dick Cheney does not equal moderation, it is also true that paying lip service to resistance does not provide immunity from popular anger. Nor can it quell the legitimate aspirations of freedom-hungry new generations.

Herein is the Syrian regime's predicament. Even if many Syrians feel fine about their country's foreign affairs, their wrath over domestic concerns is not appeased.

President Bashar Assad early understood that the United States committed a major strategic blunder by invading Iraq under fallacious pretenses, with disastrous long term consequences. Syria welcomed, assisted and absorbed more than 1.3 million Iraqi refugees, not an easy task for a country of 22 million. Many ordinary Syrians felt this was right. Syria strengthened its strategic partnership with Iran and provided political and logistical support to Hamas and Hizballah, while pursuing indirect negotiations with Israel, even during the July 2024 Lebanon war. The Syrian regime dug in its heels and weathered the storm during the Bush administration's era of hubris. Then Syria broke its isolation thanks to Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy, and to France's impulsive and nervy Nicolas Sarkozy, whose Syria policy consisted in doing the exact opposite of his predecessor.

Today, the domestic situation is much more problematic. But once again, foreign powers may allow the Syrian regime to survive or at least gain time.

Cosmetic changes and minor reforms are no longer sufficient. Syria is in dire need of radical political, social and economic transformation. Politically, younger generations need oxygen. The 48-year-old state of emergency is a symbol of oppression. Syrians who work in agriculture or industry can no longer make ends meet. The informal economy is very large and most workers have no social safety nets. The black market is flourishing. A small group of individuals control the telecom industry, agro-business, commerce and real estate. The Syrian economy needs an overhaul. Crony capitalism and remnants of rigid bureaucratic socialism offer the worst of both worlds. Add to this a set of enormous regional disparities that need to be addressed. The riots started in the small underprivileged agricultural town of Daraa. In other regions, masses of disaffected youth are deprived of basic rights and opportunities; they too dream of a better future, inspired by Tunisia and Egypt. Turning a deaf ear to them is not a realistic option. With courageous reforms, Syria can rapidly move toward economic success. It has assets: high literacy, a young population, tourist potential, and little debt, to name a few.

Yet, to judge from history, the regime seems incapable of reform. If it regains momentum, the protest movement can threaten the regime's survival. Syrians reject the specter of sectarian strife but are nonetheless committed to serious change--today, rather than tomorrow. Bashar Assad cannot meet their demands without hitting close to home and facing powerful vested interests, which he seems unable or unwilling to do.

Here, once again, the Syrian regime's hope comes from abroad. To understand why Hillary Clinton calls Bashar a "reformer", it's important to keep in mind that the Obama administration is under intense pressure from Israeli, Jordanian and Saudi allies who desperately want to maintain the Middle Eastern status quo. During the Egyptian revolution, these states lobbied hard to "Save Private Mubarak". When this became impossible, they asked the US for guarantees against further destabilization. Despite differences with Bashar, most if not all of the regional powers support his stability. And this probably will make the difference.

If so, it would constitute a bitter irony and the ultimate paradox: Syria's foreign policy, while appreciated by the public, is not enough to assuage the protestors. At the same time, foreign powers, who resent Syrian foreign policy, may end up saving the Syrian regime in the name of realpolitik, in this case the "devil we know" or the dubious theory of a "lesser evil".-Published 14/4/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Karim Emile Bitar is a fellow at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations, the editor of ENA Magazine and the author of "Regards sur la France".

It started with a brave but desperate act of self-immolation. This time it was not a cry in the wilderness, as is the norm in the Arab world, but a spark that ignited the Arab world, including Syria.

Yet while there are demonstrations in Syrian cities, practically no signs or slogans of "enough" or "leave" have appeared as on the streets of Cairo, Tunis, Benghazi and Sana'a. It should also be noted that no demonstrations to speak of have taken place in Aleppo and Hama, two centers of Islamic activism. This is a good indication that sectarianism is not a factor in the demonstrations. As is well known, the spark for the Muslim Brotherhood's 1978-82 violent confrontation with the Syrian government was in Aleppo, and the finale was in Hama.

The people who are demonstrating in the streets are by and large looking for President Bashar Assad to reform, not to resign, and for several reasons. First, he has cultivated an image that presents him as humble, civil and likeable, unlike the typical arrogant, authoritarian image for which many Arab leaders are known.

Second, he is popular not only with Syrians but with many Arabs. He is viewed as the last warrior facing Israel and refusing to submit to American dictates. He is seen as an Arab leader viewing issues from an Arab nationalist rather than just a Syrian perspective.

Third, it is unfortunately true that blood has been shed in several Syrian cities. Yet pragmatic Syrians appear to have rationalized that the Egyptian-Tunisian scenario is not an available option even if they wanted it. Nor do they relish the bloody Libyan-Yemeni scenario. Thus, they have opted for reform and not regime change. They want less emergency law and more freedom, less corruption and more transparency, less security and more liberty, less of one party and more of multi-party, less nepotism and more competency.

President Bashar has committed himself to reform. If promises become policies--and the sooner the better--he will emerge stronger and more credible. In fact, some promises have become policies already, such as the overdue change of government, the removal of the governors of Daraa and particularly of Homs, and Kurdish citizenship registration.

In a certain respect, the Arab uprisings have worked to Syria's advantage, particularly with regard to Egypt, Bahrain and Israel. The downfall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his regime is both a victory for Egypt and a blessing for Syria. Syrian-Egyptian relations have been on a roller-coaster for decades, particularly since the break-up of the United Arab Republic in 1961. Strained relations reached a breaking point after the 1973 war with the development of the Sadat model. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat put all his eggs in the American basket and signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, as opposed to Syrian President Hafez Assad's model of leading the steadfastness front against Israel and maintaining his distance from Washington. The Hafez-Sadat conflict was followed in recent years by the Bashar-Mubarak conflict, for similar reasons. Although Mubarak's downfall was due primarily to domestic causes, anti-Israeli and anti-American feelings shared by both peoples might now open the door for rapprochement between Cairo and Damascus.

As for Israel, and in light of changes in Egypt and uncertainty in Jordan, peace with Syria should now become an urgent matter. The Israeli strategic defensive wall is composed of neutralized and demilitarized Sinai in the west, occupied Golan in the northeast and the Jordan River basin in the east. Now, security arrangements regarding Sinai and the Jordan River basin could become problematic. It is true the Golan has been stable and quiet--but certainly not forever.

Bahrain is simmering, as is historic Shiite Farsi vs. Sunni Arab animosity. The introduction of the Gulf Cooperation Council's forces in Bahrain has increased tension between Tehran and Riyadh and could lead to a confrontation. President Bashar is one of the few Arab leaders who maintain good relations with both sides, particularly with Tehran. This affords him leverage with Tehran to help reduce the tension and avert a potential confrontation.

Finally, during the last decade President Bashar faced serious external challenges and threats, particularly from the US, and survived. With prompt reforms, the Syrian domino piece that teetered temporarily will hopefully weather the storm and remain standing and President Bashar will survive the domestic challenge.-Published 14/4/2011 © bitterlemons-international.org

Elias Samo is professor of international relations at American and Syrian universities.