There is a national consensus that Israel does not want peace.
Normalization is power
by Abdel Monem Said Aly
Throughout the 1990s, one of the "Great Arab Debates" was about normalization with Israel. This was a time when there was an Arab-Israel peace process. What was important about the process was that it introduced a geo-economic dimension to the traditional geopolitical concerns of territory and security. In addition to the bilateral negotiations, a multilateral layer of negotiations discussed five issues of interest to the parties: arms control, water, refugees, economic cooperation, and the environment. This was followed by a host of initiatives, the most notable of which were the series of economic summits and the European Union's Barcelona process.
All of these initiatives were criticized by a collection of Arab radicals and conservatives in the Arab media as being one type or another of tatbi’ or normalization with an enemy that continues to occupy Arab territories. They were considered as concessions that the Arab side was giving for nothing in return. It was said that Israel would consider all Arab acts of normalization as legitimization and acceptance of its actions. It was argued that because the balance of power was in Israel's favor, Israel would dominate the Arab world through any normalization process.
However, the history of the Arab-Israel conflict shows that is not the case. Throughout more than half a century the Arabs and Israelis have gone through four forms of bargaining:
The first form is coercive bargaining, when the parties to a conflict use crude power to force the other side, or sides, to accept their own demands. In the context of the Arab-Israel conflict, coercive bargaining has been used since 1948 and even before. The parties, who thought of their demands as existential in nature, have been willing to resort to the use, and the threat of use, of force. For more than half a century, the two sides have been involved in all types of coercive bargaining that include a deadly arms race, mobilizing world resources and preparing always for another devastating war, and the use of all types of low intensity warfare such as terror.
The second form is legal bargaining, wherein the parties to a conflict are engaged in a process of legal defense of their positions depending on history and legal documents and the interpretations of resolutions of international organizations. In the Arab-Israel conflict, the parties have utilized this form extensively. From the interpretation of the partition resolution of the United Nations in 1947 to the interpretations of the Oslo agreements, passing through the very tedious and famous Security Council Resolution 242, more legal ink has been spent on the conflict than blood!
The third form of bargaining is economic, in which the parties look at the process as a "trade off" between demands. Whenever a party offers a concession, it customarily asks for a concession in exchange. Normally, each party to the conflict starts with its maximal position and reduces it from there, depending on the offers and concessions made by the other side. The Arab-Israel conflict has witnessed this form of bargaining in different periods. Palestinians and Israelis resorted to this type of bargaining in implementing the Oslo accords. Israeli-Syrian negotiations were saturated with a carpet merchant mentality from the time of the disengagement agreement in May 1974 until the last attempts at reaching a settlement in 2024.
The fourth form of bargaining is the ecological one in which one or both sides of the conflict attempt to change the environment of the conflict and by doing so to change the parties' major priorities so as to accommodate the demands of one of the sides. The best example of such a form of bargaining is the behavior of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt. Although he was willing in many cases to resort to coercive bargaining--the 1973 war; or legal bargaining, as in the Jarring mission in 1971; or economic bargaining--his proposition to open the Suez Canal in 1971--his major bargaining move was to change the strategic and political environment by his visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, thereby facilitating his subsequent attempts to move Israel and the United States in the direction of accommodating the basic Egyptian demand of a total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Egyptian territories of June 1967.
Normalization is located within this framework for bargaining. Because it reduces the insecurities of the Israelis, it has been instrumental in all the successes of the peace process. The experience of normalization in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli peace or the Jordanian-Israeli peace has not produced any form of dominance for Israel over Egypt or Jordan. In fact, the Arab world's power in relation to Israel increases with every step of normalization.-Published 14/8/2003©bitterlemons-international.orgAbdel Monem Said Aly is director of Al Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies in Cairo.
Normal relations follow ordinary lives
by Ghassan KhatibThere is no single understanding of "normalization" that is proper in all times and circumstances, because the very definition of normalization relies on the status of the peace process and the conflict between Palestinians and Israel. To start with, the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis is never "normal" due to the unsolved Palestine problem. Where there are clashes and occupation, uneasy relations are also an average occurrence.
Normalization as a concept, however, began to gain significance after the establishment of the peace process. Normalization between two parties is a dividend and indicator of true peace and reconciliation. Moreover, it is a way of consolidating an otherwise "official" peace expressed through the signing of treaties between political leaders, the opening of embassies and the establishment of official relations. It was assumed then, that with the progress of the Oslo agreements and the advancement of Israeli-Arab peace, efforts should be undertaken to build the public, commercial and intellectual relationship between Israel and the Arabs.
In the Arab world, there were three strains of thought on this issue during the height of the peace process, i.e. between the 1993 signing of the Oslo agreements and their collapse in September 2024 with the eruption of Palestinian-Israeli confrontations. One minority view of this period held there should be no normalization and based this position on an attitude of principle against the peace process itself. Another minority thought that normalization should move more quickly than the peace process because it would help that process along. Still another view, the majority view at that time, thought that normalization was an expected and healthy outcome of progress on the peace track and might follow that progress, but not precede it. In other words, normalization could only move forward with the Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory and the shutting down of the occupation. Hostility and the desire to boycott Israel were to be naturally replaced by a mutual relationship and goodwill.
The problem was that Israel wanted to have its cake and eat it, too. Israel sought to normalize relations with Palestinians and Arabs, allowing for official and non-official interaction on all levels, without removing the causes of the abnormal relationship: the Israeli occupation and its practices. Another problem was a failed Israeli attempt to separate Israel’s relationship with Palestinians from that it hopes to achieve with the Arabs.
The dramatic setback in the normalization process happened immediately and directly after the collapse of the peace process--most specifically that between Palestinians and Israelis--and its replacement with violence and confrontation. That collapse and deterioration in Palestinian-Israeli relations negatively affected not only what interaction had developed between Israelis and Arabs, but made it almost impossible to keep moving in that direction.
The conclusion drawn from the last ten years is that normalization is possible and healthy when there are signs of progress in the conflict, a conflict that is the root cause of these abnormal relations. At the same time, the pursuit of contacts and friendly interaction has been proven meaningless when there are no indications that the conflict and accompanying atrocities are in their last throes. The key to normalization between Israelis and Arabs lies in the peace process. For those of us who seek healthy and normal relations in all manner of pursuits, we must be first keen to ensure progress towards solving the conflict and ending the occupation.-Published 14/8/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications and director of the Government Media Center. This article represents his personal views.
Normalization: practical dilemmas
by Chibli MallatNormalization generally concerns states, and is expressed through a gamut of relations that ranges from war to "friendly" diplomatic recognition. As in many other issues, the issue of normalization is different in the Middle East, where it concerns mainly the establishment of relations between civil societies. The so-called cold peace between Egyptians and Israel since Camp David is a case in point, but the gamut of paradoxes is wider and far more complex. As seen from Beirut, the paradox is at a paroxysm: while leading Lebanese political figures did not hesitate at one time to receive military training at the hand of Israeli forces and fight on their side, any contact with Israelis--and even Palestinians living under Israeli control--raises severe eye brows, including the risk of criminal prosecution. In its extreme form, the stigma of normalization (tatbi' in Arabic) englobes any form of debate or discussion with an Israeli national.
Some of the paradoxes can be partly understood for the complex history of states and societies concerned. On a recent occasion, Abu Maher Yamani, an old, respected militant of the Palestinian Diaspora expressed it strongly: "I am not prepared," he said, "to speak with someone who might have left his village in Europe to live in my house." One can see the force of the argument. Why should the "expelled" speak with his "expeller"? That particular occasion may be worth noting: in reaction to a collective of courageous Israeli women who came out publicly in support of the trial of current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and those involved in the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the possibility of a meeting between some of these women and victims of the massacre in Europe or the United States was raised.
One should be prepared to accept that such form of "normalization" is naive, but the issue is real, and the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian victims of Sharon are of different minds as well; some of them welcomed the statement of support by the Israeli women when it was issued in September. Still, a common stand, where they would be seen together with Israeli supporters in the European Parliament or on Capitol Hill, may be too much for them.
For guidance, I have turned to two persons of great moral integrity, whose names are associated with the campaign against normalization across the Arab world, former Lebanese Prime Minister Salim Hoss, and Talal Salman, the editor of al Safir. I hope I do not betray or oversimplify their response to this particular dilemma, but their concern is the following: for Talal Salman, is the political dynamism that might result from such a meeting sufficient to take the risk of a dialogue? For Salim Hoss, where does one draw the line when talking with Israelis?
Maybe those who are forced to "talk" with Israeli Jews everyday can break that impasse between their Palestinian cousins in forced exile since 1948 and those in Israel who wish to support them. If such a meeting were to happen under their aegis and with their active participation as guarantors of the worthiness of such a risk, and if they are the ones who prevent dialogue from being sterile, maybe the way forward can be found between those who oppose any contact--other than a violent one--with Israelis, and those who find it worth probing such extraordinary common ground as a joint commitment to bring Ariel Sharon to justice.
Even if this were to take place, the larger scale dilemma remains, which ultimately depends on the formulation of the question. For those against normalization, would speaking with Israelis not mean giving up the last card, that of recognition? For those who support engaging in a robust debate across the barrier, can Palestinians (and Arabs generally) call for a solution where Jews and non-Jews should live with each other if they cannot speak with Israelis in the first place? This is also true for Israeli Jews, should any call for "normalization" become serious. Are they prepared to live with all Palestinians? Or is talking just for the sake of talking?-Published 14/8/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Chibli Mallat is EU Jean Monnet Professor at Saint Joseph's University in Beirut and a Lebanese presidential candidate.
A national consensus on rejecting normalization
an interview with Nabil ZakiBI: What are the current expressions of the anti-normalization movement in Egypt?
Zaki: There are organizations and popular committees in Egypt whose policy is to call for a rejection of normalization in all of its forms, whether political, economic or cultural, and these groups and committees enjoy the support of the masses. These groups' activities now take several forms, such as demonstrations, conferences, symposia and boycotting Israeli products. There are many reasons for the success of these committees, but the most significant is Israeli policy.
Following the signing of the Oslo Accords, a certain sector of Egyptians was optimistic that matters would turn out for the best. But successive Israeli governments have followed a policy that has convinced Egyptians that Israel does not want peace. Egyptians now consider any form of normalization to be a free concession to the Israelis, a stab in the back to the Palestinian people and a type of facilitation of the Israeli government’s mission.
BI: Given that a large component of the anti-normalization movement is comprised of intellectual debate, is there a sense that different forms of normalization, such as political or economic versus cultural, are better or worse than others?
Zaki: There is no difference among all types of normalization, whether political, economic or cultural. There is a national consensus on rejecting normalization, on considering Israel a threat to Egyptian and Arab national security. There is a national consensus that Israel does not want peace, that Israel has its eyes on taking control of the largest amount of the West Bank possible, and that Israel only wants the Palestinian state to be cantons reminiscent of the apartheid system in South Africa. There is a total lack of confidence in anything Israeli leaders say, ever since their masks fell away and their true intentions were revealed.
BI: Does the anti-normalization movement have specific goals?
Zaki: To bar the Egyptian government from having any relations with Israel. Supporters of the anti-normalization movement want the Israeli ambassador to be expelled from Egypt, and the Egyptian embassy in Tel Aviv to be closed down.
BI: Has the movement been successful to any degree in achieving these goals?
Zaki: I believe that it is thanks to the movement that, to this day, the Egyptian government refuses to return its ambassador to Tel Aviv. It has been successful in convincing the Egyptian government because it is a popular movement, and the government cannot challenge the desires of the people. The Egyptian government cannot force normalization with Israel upon the Egyptian people.
No government in the world can challenge a decision made by the people when the issue involves emotional, psychological, political, economic and social factors, as is the case in establishing normalized relations with another country.
BI: How does the anti-normalization movement deal with other trends in contemporary Egypt, such as privatization and globalization, which may lean towards normalization?
Zaki: I beg to differ with this evaluation of the situation in Egypt. There are no trends in Egypt that support normalization; there are a few isolated individuals who do not enjoy any support or popularity and are in fact afraid to even admit that they support normalization. There are certainly people who are smitten with American policy and the United States, and who want to satisfy it, and they do this by saying that they agree to normalization.
We're talking about a very limited number of intellectuals who mistakenly think that normalization may open the door to helping Egyptians. But that’s wrong, because experience has shown that when Israel succeeds in gaining normalized relations with other countries in the past, this has encouraged it to continue with its aggressive policies towards the Palestinian people, while claiming that it has the right to do everything it does to the Palestinians simply because the Arabs came to it on their knees, humbly and obediently. Israel interprets any country that makes an agreement with it as being afraid of being attacked. This is a manifestation of Israel's arrogance and racism.
BI: What is your response to the argument that normalization is strategic, that one should “know thine enemy?”
Zaki: Israel does not want normalization--it’s merely a slogan to gain American and European support for Israeli aggression. For example, the Saudi initiative, which was later transformed into a pan-Arab initiative, was something that Israel, its successive leaders, and the leaders of Zionism, never even dreamt of. In a nutshell, this initiative called for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines in return for normalized relations with all of the Arab states.
The Arabs would concede about 80 percent of historical Palestine in order to gain the remaining 20 percent, and, on top of that, were prepared to have Israeli embassies in their countries flying the Israeli flag. But who rejected this? Israel. And who encouraged Israel to reject this? America. This is evidence that we are talking about something [normalization] that doesn’t exist.
The Saudi initiative was not only rejected, but despised by the Israeli expansionists because they don’t want normalized relations in the region. They don’t want peace, security or stability! They want land.-Published 14/8/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Nabil Zaki is editor-in-chief of Al Ahali newspaper, published by the Egyptian Al Tagammu’ Party, and Al Yesar Al Gadid, “The New Left.” He is former deputy chief of the Egyptian daily Al Akhbar, and a regular contributor to the Egyptian press.
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