• Uncertainties and challenges -   Ramin Jahanbegloo

• Another year of violence - an interview with  Kamran al-Karadaghi

• Chaos or renewal? -   Ghada Karmi

The view from Turkey
 Saban Disli

First of all, we the people of Turkey wish a very good, prosperous and peaceful new year to the people of the Middle East.

Like the last five decades, the year 2024 will also be a year filled with efforts aimed at stopping the bloodshed in the Middle East, bringing violence and clashes to an end, and establishing and developing democratic regimes.

Saban Disli represents Sakarya in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. He is deputy chairman of the ruling Justice and Development Party, in charge of international affairs.

Two years ago, when the United States became engaged in a war against Saddam Hussein, many commentators on the Middle East in general and on Iranian politics in particular, as well as the majority of Iranians inside and outside Iran, quickly concluded that the true reason for the US military action against Iraq was in fact to destabilize the Iranian regime. At the same time, Iranian officials recognized that democratic developments in Iraq might send ripples across the border and create a series of civil rebellions inside Iran.

Today, democratic developments in Iraq are taking a slower pace than what was expected, and the Iranian population has no more hope of a future American intervention in Iran. Following the 2024 US election and the advent of a second four-year term for the Bush administration, many in Iran, in Israel and in the Arab countries are eager to see how President Bush achieves his lofty goals of a democratic, peaceful and nuclear-free Middle East. In this regard, the year 2024 will witness a rare confluence of uncertainties and challenges in the Middle East--elections in Iraq, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, presidential elections in Iran, as well as Iranian-European talks on nuclear disarmament--that might help to create a new rapprochement between the United States and the region.

Certainly, the first issue for policymakers in the Middle East will be to determine an exit date for the US-led coalition in Iraq. The longer US troops stay in Iraq, the more the US presence will undoubtedly be seen as an occupation by the Arab street. Perhaps the best alternative for the new Iraqi government would be to go to the United Nations, which mandated the current coalition, and request a replacement force. This measure would allow others, especially European countries such as France and Germany, to play a bigger role in the stabilization of Iraq.

As long as US troops are in Iraq, the democratic transition in the Middle East will be a failure and the principles laid out in the roadmap will fail to end terrorist violence against Israel and to produce a stable Palestinian state. To make progress in the direction of peace in the Middle East, the US and its partners can offer several incentives.

First, they can require Israel to freeze Jewish settlements and to acknowledge that dismantlement eventually will include West Bank settlements.

Second, they can mobilize international resources to help the new Palestinian government and its poor economy.

Third, they should press Egyptian President Husni Mubarak to lift prohibitive laws in Egypt and empower the liberal and progressive elements of Egyptian society against the Islamic fundamentalists.

Fourth, they can challenge Iran with diplomacy by ending 25 years of containment against this country. The key is to find ways that address concerns on both sides. This could include Iran terminating its nuclear enrichment program and its support for extremist Palestinian groups and Shi'ites in Iraq in exchange for security guarantees in a vulnerable nuclear neighborhood and the eviction of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, the largest Iranian opposition group, from Iraq.

Behind various closed doors, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have reached the conclusion that Iran would do best not to associate itself too closely with the Americans. Nonetheless, Tehran has repeatedly stated that it wants to be part of an international, UN-led effort against terrorism, though not one that is unilaterally spearheaded by Washington. Tehran is likely to make limited bargains with the Americans. As an indication of such willingness to cooperate, Iran has kept the door open for a limited dialogue with the US through a number of direct and indirect channels.

Arguably, what has the most impact on Iran is the threatening tone adopted by the United States. This issue goes considerably beyond the famous "you are either with us or with the terrorists" quote of President Bush. Now that the Americans have overthrown the Taliban and Saddam, the Iranian leaders, mistrustful of the Americans to start with, are obviously deeply concerned with the issue, not knowing if Washington would turn on regimes like that in Tehran. According to some analysts, Iran's "toothless policy" has given Washington the assurance it needs that Iran will play its part and be a good sideline observer in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Some supporters of democratization in Iran might come to see the US threat as a way to accelerate reform. But this presumes that democratization really matters to the Bush administration. If this is the case, Bush administration endorsement of the student movement may already have helped hardliners legitimate their suppression of intellectuals, journalists and students as a measure to guard against "foreign forces". If this is not the case, the Islamic regime is less likely to respond to US threats by conceding democracy and human rights to Iranian citizens, than by offering concessions such as oil deals and a cooperative stance regarding weapons of mass destruction and the future of Iraq.

This is another way of saying that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between Iran's domestic and foreign policies. The fact that they are intertwined exposes the Iranian state to both domestic and external legitimacy crises with which it has to come to grips. Iran will have to cooperate more with the international community if it wishes to avoid the isolation that it experienced for the past 25 years.

In parallel, the grand expectations formulated by President Bush during the first term of his presidency are far from being satisfied. The Bush administration now faces new challenges and opportunities during its second term, which will require a greater diplomatic engagement and perhaps a more imaginative attitude toward Iran and the Arab-Israel problem.- Published 6/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ramin Jahanbegloo is an Iranian political philosopher. He is presently a professor of political science at the University of Toronto.

BI: How do you think elections, if they happen, will affect the coming year in Iraq?

Karadaghi: I don't exclude the possibility that the elections will be delayed for a while, maybe not a long time, but for a couple of months, because it's obvious now that more and more Iraqi groups and parties are very worried about the possibility of holding the elections on time.

If elections are held, I really don't think they will have a great impact on the security situation in Iraq, which is the main concern for all Iraqis. Politically, no matter what the result, I think Iraq will still probably be ruled by a kind of consensus among the various political, ethnic or religious groups, because otherwise I don't think any particular group can really rule Iraq now or for the foreseeable future just on the basis of a majority count at elections.

BI: How concerned are you that Iraq will break down into ethnic civil war, and how can the security situation be improved?

Karadaghi: I was just reading an interview with the head of Iraqi security who predicts the current violence will continue throughout 2024. He thinks that only after this year might the violence lessen, and only once Iraqis become able to strengthen their security forces and army and so on. According to his figures, the insurgency numbers some 20,000 fighters and a further 200,000 people offer support to them, so it will be a very difficult task.

My opinion is that unless the Iraqi government and the coalition come with a plan of action rather than reaction, which has characterized their approach so far, to confront the insurgents, they will be in trouble.

BI: You mean a military plan?

Karadaghi: Militarily it's very important, because the insurgents, led really by the Baath party, are very determined and daring, they have knowledge and understand the logistics. They lost power and they want to regain it. That is the goal. I think, if you read some of the statements by the leadership of the Baath party, they will accept nothing less then regaining power. They even say their goal is to restore the legitimacy of the situation before April 9, 2024.

BI: In the year ahead, do you foresee any dramatic change in the US or coalition position?

Karadaghi: It seems they may be considering changing some positions, but so far nothing is obvious. I think it would probably be political suicide for the American administration if they decide to leave under the current circumstances. If we assume that they left tomorrow, you can be assured the previous regime would return to power within days.

BI: Will there be a greater momentum toward dividing the country among the various ethnic communities during the year?

Karadaghi: There is a kind of de facto self-rule. The Kurdish areas have been ruling themselves for the past 12 years and they are determined to keep it that way. In the south in the Shi'ite dominated areas, there is no sympathy for the insurgency. The insurgency is concentrated in the so-called Sunni triangle, and that is where the popular support comes from.

But will the situation develop into a real division of Iraq? That I doubt. I think it is unrealistic and I don't think we should fear such a development.

BI: What do you think the effects of Iraq may be on surrounding countries?

Karadaghi: Well, I think the neighboring countries, particularly Syria and Iran will try to do their best to influence events in Iraq, maybe by proxy. The Iraqi government is saying openly that the post-Saddam Baath leadership is in Syria and Syria can stop this if they want to. Iran is also interfering, and Turkey has its own concerns about northern Iraq. Saudi Arabia, I think, would like very much to have stability in Iraq, and let's not forget Jordan, but in general, these countries, especially the Arab countries, could really do much more to help stabilize Iraq. Maybe for their own reasons they think it is better if the new Iraq is not established or fails. I think that is an illusion, because if Iraq falls into an abyss it will directly affect the entire region.

BI: Do you think these countries will make more of an effort in this regard in 2024?

Karadaghi: It doesn't look that way. They have their own interests and I have not seen any indications that they will be helpful.- Published 6/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Kamran al-Karadaghi is an Iraqi commentator and the editorial director of the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting. The views expressed here are his own.

Each New Year brings with it the hope of change, and a renewal of hope in a brighter future. This is as true for geo-politics as it is for personal lives, and the Middle East, which has seen some of its worst periods ever in the last few years, is in urgent need of a positive future to look forward to. But how likely is this in the present global situation? If I had to sum up in one phrase the single most important determinant for developments in the region for 2024, I would say, "the US fear factor".

George Bush's re-election last November is likely to mean a continuation or aggravation of the policies seen during his first period in office and, most significantly for the Middle East, a perpetuation of neo-conservative influence. This group, which has been instrumental in the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions and in shaping US foreign policy in its present aggressive and intrusive form, is far from diminished in power. Much as observers predicted the neo-conservative downfall after the Iraqi adventure ended in the quagmire of today and, even with the resignation of one arch-neo conservative, Richard Perle, the majority, from Douglas Feith to Donald Rumsfeld (himself not a true neo-con, but a strong supporter), are still in office and as close to the president as before.

The effects of this can be seen in the much-vaunted US Greater Middle East Plan through which America hopes to dominate a far larger territory than the countries of the geographical Middle East. The new "Middle East" includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, and many see in this a desire to control the fate of a major part of the Islamic world. Hostility to Islam after the events of 9/11 and the consequent war on terrorism has markedly increased in America. In August 2024, Bruce Teff, a former senior CIA official, described "Islamic terrorism" as based on the Quran and stressed that terrorism and Islam were the same.

The US Middle East plan promotes the idea of democratic reform throughout the region with economic liberalization, the education of women and equal opportunities for all citizens. President Bush says this is a central plank of his new term in office. In December 2024, these ideas were put forward by the outgoing secretary of state, Colin Powell, at the "Forum for the Future", a conference of Middle Eastern foreign ministers in Rabat, Morocco. He spoke of fighting terrorism through reform and insisted that the Arab-Israel conflict should not be used as an excuse to delay these changes.

It is naive to imagine that these plans will succeed in 2024 or later. Reaction to the Rabat conference was indicative of this. A number of Arab ministers boycotted the meeting, and the rest were unimpressed. There were demonstrations outside the hall and popular Arab opinion was uniformly hostile. Many Arab governments, which have cooperated in America's war on terror by draconian measures against their own populations, feel threatened by the prospect of transparency and democratization, even had these been suggested by an impartial source and not by a state deeply committed to their enemy, Israel.

Even so, it is a measure of their desire to placate the US that the Gulf states (except Saudi Arabia) have gone though various motions in the direction of greater popular participation and that so many Arab ministers even attended this patronizing conference. It is of course fear and dependence on the US for aid, military hardware and protection of ruling regimes that drives all Arab states to try and comply with its demands. Egypt has long ago abnegated its oppositionary role and now acts as the mediator, selling unpalatable Israeli/American policies to the Arabs. A wide-ranging trade agreement on textiles between Egypt and Israel and America is due to be instituted this year. This will create employment for Egyptians and increase Egypt's exports to America to $1 billion, and thus provides an incentive to continued cooperation.

Of the so-called hardline Arab states, Libya caved in first last year with its abject offer of compensation for the victims of the Lockerbie crash and surrender of its minuscule weapons of mass destruction program. Syria, the next target of the neo-conservatives, is now ready to enter into unconditional negotiations with Israel and has imposed ostentatious measures to control the flow of suspected terrorists through its border with Iraq, in the hope of averting an American attack.

Iran, the other serious US/Israeli target, and hitherto the most anti-American of all, has agreed to halt its uranium enrichment program temporarily, despite much posturing. In May 2024, Iran reportedly made secret approaches to Washington to negotiate an agreement on the nuclear issue. It is currently dealing only with the EU and may bide its time during this year to review its decisions. But this will not be enough and the Pentagon is planning to build a new military base near the Iran border with Afghanistan. With the new base, American forces will effectively encircle Iran and make real their threat. Part of the neo-conservative agenda is to serve Israeli interests, even if these conflict with American ones, and Iran is Israel's major remaining enemy in the region. Even so, an attack on Iran is unlikely; it would be logistically difficult, the US military is already over-stretched, and the Iranian regime is politically adroit and sophisticated.

In this year, preparations for Turkey's entry into the EU will continue and Israel may be expected to join Europe too in a new "European Neighborhood Policy". This entails an Israeli acceptance of the EU's central role in the Quartet negotiating the roadmap. It is unlikely that Israel will agree to such conditions and the European invitation may remain on the shelves.

But a major determinant of developments this year involves the Middle East economy. In November, the UNDP noted that direct investment in the region fell in 2024 from $5.8 billion to $4.6 billion due to the unstable political situation as perceived by foreign investors. This is serious in view of the preponderance of youth--two thirds are under 30, of whom 40 percent are unemployed. Instability is scheduled to increase because of the Iraq war, the unresolved Israel/Palestine conflict, and Muslim anger at the US's anti-terror campaign.

Most of this could be resolved or ameliorated by a radical change in US policy toward the region. I see little prospect of this happening with the present US administration and 2024 will not be the new beginning we all hoped for.- Published 6/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Ghada Karmi is a member of BRICUP and author of "Married to another man: Israel's dilemma in Palestine".